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The two parts of the present EconomicSualy differ in Character, 
but they complement each other in presenting an up—to—date view of the 
salient features and trends of Latin American development. 
Part One comprises a kind of balance—sheet of some of die main 
aspects of the Latin American economy at the end of this decade, 
comparing the present magnitudes with the trends they have followed in 
recent years, This seems the right moment to present such a balance 
when there is an evident desire for a critical examination of the 
guidelines and objectives of development policy, not only for the sake 
of a deeper interpretation and understanding of the problems of under—
development, but also to encourage the efforts now being made to laun.ch 
a second Development Decade. 
Part Two is essentially a review of developments in 1968 in the 
region as a Whole and in each individual country. As in previous 
Lu=y2, its purpose is to present a systematic compilation of data 
and information describing the short—term changes and, in general, the 
main characteristics of recent economic development. 
Although the two parts have different aims, a study of both 
provides a basis for evaluating recent events in the light of longer—
term prospects and, at the same time, for observing how some structural 
factors are becoming more important while others are changing in their 
effect on the course of economic development. In more direct terms, 
the 1968 results were in general most favourable; but, for the appraisal 
to be accurate, the fact that some of the determining factors were 
entirely fortuitous must not be overlooked. For example it is necessary 
to bear in mind that this is not the first time that some areas of the 
economy have been expanding or relatively prosperous. The last few 




beginning of a lasting trend. Moreover, data covering a short span 
should be evaluated within a broader perspective which would reveal 
the outstanding structural features of the period and, therefore, of 
the kind of situation that is characterizing or taking chape at the end 
of .the decade. NaturallY„-the-diekents of flexibility that seem to 
emerge from recent exPerienOe must not be Under-estimated in this 
appraisal eithere 
The material contained in the two parts is Mai 	descriptive 
and no attempt has been made to present an analytical interpretation. 
This is done in other secretariat documents which are being presented, 




SOME ASPECTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY TOWARDS 
THE FAZ OF THE NINETF,EN-SIXTIES 
Chapter I 
POPULATION, INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT 
1. Population 
(a) Pow1211on size and rowth 
By 1970 the population of Latin America will be over 280 million, 
and its Share of the world population will be close to 8 per cent. 
As the population of the region was lens than 90 million in 1920, 
this means that it has more than trebled in the last fifty years, whereas 
the world population has not even doübled in the Same lapse of time (see 
table I-1). Latin America is thuS. the region where the most rapid 
demographic growth has taken place, and the rate still continues to outstrip 
that of any other part of the world. 
To make a more accurate diagnosis, a closer study is required of 
over-all population trends in each of the last few decades, and of trends 
in the individual countries, since the changing angle of observation reveals 
highly significant differences. 
The growth rete of the population of the region as a whole was 
particularly rapid during the nineteen-forties and fifties, and soared so 
high that it has risen relatively little during the present decade. Between 
1920 and 1930 the over-ali increment was 20.9 per cent. This proportion 
dropped slightly during the thirties to 20.7 per cent, but expended in the 
forties to 25.5 per cent and increased equally quickly during the fifties, 
when it was 31 per cent. In the sixties the increase will have been 
about 32 per cent (see figure I-1). 




ESTIMATES OF WORLD POPULATION BY MAJOR REGIONS, 1920-70 
Region 	1920 1930 , 1940 1950 1960 1970 
East Asia 	553 345 591 244 634 420 684 353 794 144 910 524 
South Asia 469 770 528 964. 609 993 696 722 865 247 1 106 905 
Europe 	324 800 353 947 378 920 391 717 424 657 453 918 
Soviet Union 155 300 179 000-  195 (500 186 000 214 400 245 700 
Africa 	142 921 163 846 191 458 221 538 272 924 345 949 
North 
America 	115 661 134 166 144 342 166 073. 198 664 226 803 
Latin 
America 	88 967 107 579 129 854 163 014 213 529 282 333 
Oceánia- 8 521 10 044 11 060 12 677 15 713 18 711 
TOTAL 	1 859 285 2 068 790 2 295 047 2 516 094 2 999 278 3 590 843 
Sources: Latin Auerica: Latín  American Zemographiétentre (O_LLAD41, 
Boletín Demográfico, Year 1, Vol. I (Santiago, Chile, January 1968). 
• Other regions: World_r2pulatión prosoects assetsed'in 11(9_ 
(United Nations publication, Sales No.:66.XIII.2), tablas 





LATIN AMERICA: CHANCES IN THE GROWTH RATE OF THE POPULATION 











This recent deceleration has taken place at very high levels of natural 
growth, but even so it is significant in itself and in relation to the world 
total. During the twenties and thirties, the rate of population growth in 
Latin America was almost twice as high as the world yate, and more than 
two and a half times as high as in the forties. In the last twenty years, 
however, it has only been about 60 per cent higher. These changes in the 
ratio of the growth rates have been partly due to the acceleration of 
population growth in other under-developed regions, which, with a time-lag 
of one or two decades, are repeating the process that began in Latin America 
thirty years ego.- 
Within Latin America, population growth has varied widely from one 
country to another. The population of Venezuela and Costa Rica in 1970 
will be nearly four and one third times as large as in 1920, while that 
of Uruguay will have barely doubled. Apart from these extreme cases, 
there are only two countries - the Dominican Republic and Guatemala -
in which the population will have increased more than three and a half 
times in relation to its 1920 Level, and in two others - Haiti and Bolivia - 
it will have
/ 
 increased less than two and a half times. In thirteen 
9 
countries -r- which, by 1970, will have nearly 85 per cent of the total 
regional population, the number of inhabitants will be two and a half to 
three and a half times as great as in 1920 (see table 
Despíte these wide differences in growth, the lorg-term trends are 
remalkably similar. In most countries, the growth rato has steadily been 
gathering speed since 1920, but in at least eight, relative stagnation or a 
decline has set in at different points in the post-war period (see table 1-3). 
1/ 	In Africa and Asia the sharp acceleration took place mainly in the 
fifties. A comparison of the periods 1940-50 and 1950-60 shows that 
the ten-year rate of population growth rose from 7.9 to 16 per cent 
in East Asia, from 14.2 to 24.2 per cent in South Asia and from 
15.7 to 23.2 per cent in Africa. The acceleration was shorter-lived 
than in Latin America, since the ten-year rate of increase dropped to 
14.7 in East Asia during the sixties, and rose more slowly in South 
Asia and Africa (to 27.9 and 26.8 per cent respectively), 
2/ 	Argentina, Prazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, 





LÁTIN AMERICA: TOTAL POPULATION BY COUNTRIES, 1920-70 
(Thousands of persens) 
Country 	 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 
Argentina 	 8 861 10 358 11 896 13 044 14 169 15 390 17 070 18 893 20 669 22 352 24 050 
3 696 4 136 4 658 
Bolivia 1 918 2 022 2 153 2 314 2 508 2 740 3 013 3 5 ,
,12  
Brazil 	 27 404 30 332 33 568 37 150 41 375 46 252 52 178 60 496 70 141 81 050 93 292 
Chile 3 783 4 098 4 424 4 768 5 147 5 592 6 144 6 854 7 788 8 736 9 969 
Colombia 	 6 061 6 701 7 408 8 190 9 104 lo 291 11 796 13 578 15 657 18 053 20 875 
Ecuador 2 000 2 118 2 277 2 479 2 726 3 024 3 382 3 748 4 354 5 152 6 093 
Paraguay 	 699 	785: 	880 	988 1 111 1 216 1 343 1 527 1 751 2 030 2 379 
Peru 	 4 862 5 229 5 651 - 6 134 6 681 7 285 7 969 8 790 10 025 11 650 13 586 
Uruguay 1 392 1 538 1 699 1 831 1 943 2 057 2 193 2 363 2 536 2 715 2 886 
Venezuela 	 , 2 408 2 650 2 950 3 300 3.710 4 267 4 974 6 049 7 331 8 722 10 399 
Sub-total 	 59 388 65 831 72_906 .10121 88'474 5111 no 062 115620 143 9+8 164 64.6 188 187 
Cesta Rioa 	 421 	456 	499 	551 < 	619 	714 	Ah -9 1 025 1 235 1 491 1 809 
El Salvador 1 168 1 301 1 443 1 531 1.633 1 736 1 921 2 175 2 509 2 917 3 441 
Guatemala 	 1 450 1 532 1 771 1 996 2 201 2 586 3 o4o 3 512 4 013 4 586 5 276 
Honduras 783 	862 	948 1 026 1 117 1 234 1 388 1 589 1 854 2 186 2 603 
Nicaragua 	 645 692 743 	797 	855 	983 1 133 1 308 1 511 1 745 2 024 
Sub-total 	 4 467 4 843 5 404 11.21 6_1ív5.  7_252 1_231 9 609 11 122 21211 15151 
Cuba 	 2 950 3 364 3 837 4 221 4 566 4 932 5 52o 6 133 6 CI9 7 553 8 3!:1 
Doninioan Republie 	1 140 1 258 1 40o : 1 567 1.759 1 981 2 243 2 587 3 030 3 589 4 277 
Haiti 	 2 124 2 260 2 422 2 610 2 825 3 085 3 38o 3 722 4 140 4 645 5 255 
Mexioo 14 500 15 204 16 589 18 089 19 815 22 670 26 335 3o 684 36 046 42 639 50 670 
Panama 	 429 	464 	502 	524 	595 	675 	765 	882 1 021 1 197 1 410 
Sub-t,:ta1 	 21 1133 22 550 21211 27 011 2556(2 332.12.  28_212 44 008 51 ir6 52 622 699,3_ 
Sub-tota1 20 _70Untriee 84 121 21.224 13 060 113 no 121±211.128 710 216.0.§.1.11.22z 206 116 237 2414 221_^2,5 
Other oountries and 
territories 	 3 969 4 214 4 519 4 932 5 395 5 867 6 378 6 866 7 403 8 104 9 040 
Total 	 88 961 27 438  17 522 118 r42 129 854 í44 57z 163 014 186 103 n3 2p 215 40 2821 
Scuroe: Latin American Demographio Centre (CULADE), Boletín DemogrIfic22 Year 1, vol, 1 (Santiago, Chile, 
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With the exception of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela, 
where international migration has been an important factor in population 
growth,during certain periods at least, the trends in other countries in 
Latin America 2% since the beginning of the century have been largely 
the product of the drop in the death rato and the maintenance of a high 
level of fertility. The information available indicates that the crude 
birth rate in such countries has remained more or less constant at 40 to 
50 per 1,000 and the pattern of fertility seems to have changed very little. 
The small variations detectable in the over-all trend are unlikely to 
reflect real changes in fertility, and the slight rise in the rates in 
certain countries, especially after 1950, may be due to ore or more of 
the following factors: better record-keeping, better health conditions?  
an increasingly small proportion of widows of child-bearing age, more 
stable marriages and .changes in nuptiality. The slight downward trend 
in some countriest retes at certain times may be attributable to changas 
in the age structure of the population as a result of the drop in mortality. 
The crude mortality rates at the beginning of the century probably 
ranged from 30 to 35 per 1,000. Since then, they have been dropping 
steadily at varying speeds depending on the country and -period concerned, 
and are now at a much lower level in most countries. In Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay 
and Peru, the rates in 1960-65 (12 to 17 per 1,000) were probably less 
than half the rates around the turn of the century. The reduction in 
mortality was no doubt a good deal less in severa' countries; in 1960-65 
the rates in Guatemala (18-20 per 1,000), Bolivia (20-22 per 1,000) and 
Haiti (20-24 per 1,000) were still very high. In a third group of 
countries there was a much greater drop; in Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico 
and Panama, the death rates fell to levels of g to 12 per 1,000 in 1960-65 
that is, to about a third of their magnitude in 1900. 
There are signs that the decrease in mortality was not evenly spread 
over the period under consideration. In general, it was slow and steady up 
to about 1930, but then picked up speed slightly to the end of the Second 
World War and has since been much faster. 
2( 	This category comprises Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 




In Chile, the acceltératiOn ofpoptlation growth as a result of the 
falling death rete was slowed-down by a marked; drop in fertility of a 
speCial kind. At the beginning of the behtury,:.•_the birth rate was 
probably more than 45'per 1,000. From then onwards it gradually declined, 
and by 1935-39 drew Virtuallyto a standstill at 37 to 38 per 1,000. 
It is only very recently that the downward trend of fertility has shown 
signs of resuming. 
Argentina and Uruguay forro á pair in which,population growth has 
been conditioned by the same kind of factors since-the beginning of the 
century. In both, international migration has played an important part 
during certain periods, and the. trends of their birth and death rates 
haVe also been very much alike. 
In Argentina, the birth rate„ which is thought to have begun to 
drop before the end of the nineteenth century, continued to fall slowly 
Until the middlé of the decade, 1910-20, when it was less than 40 per 
1'1000. Thereafter it declined much more quickly and by the second half 
of the thirties stood at 25 per 1,000. It oscillated arcund this figure 
until 1958, when it took a further downward turn, and is estimated to 
have reached 22 or 23 per 1,000 in 1960-65. Mortality also begun to decline 
there before 1900, and by then was already probably less than 25 per 1,000. 
Since then the rate has dropped slowly ,  but surely  and by the end of 
the twenties it was less than 13 per 1,000. The decline was fairly slow 
after that because of the low level it had already reached and the aging 
of the population. The crude death rate in 1960-65 is estimated to have 
been 7 to 8 per 1,000. In Uruguay-the birth and death rates have followed 
the same trends as in Argentina, but at lower levels. 
Population trends in Cuba since the beginning of the oentury have 
been similar to those of Argentina and Uruguay in various aspects. 
International migration has played .a major part - in population gromth. 
It is the third Latin merican country after Argentina and Uruguay to 
have a birth rate of less than 30 per 1,000, and during the period under 




International migration has recently become an important factor in 
Venezuela as well. Before the Second World War, it contributed little 
to the growth of the population, but between 1945 and 1950 as many as 
400,000 immigrants entered the country. This influx combined with domestic 
factors, raised the average annual growth rate to nearly 4 per cent in 
1950-55 and 1955-60. 
After 1900, population growth in Brazil was aImost entirely natural. 
At the beginning of the century, the rate was less than 19 per 1,000, and 
then increased very slowly, being still under 2 per cent in 1930-35. It 
increased a little more rapidly afterwards, but was still less than 
2.4 per cent in 1945. It subsequently gathered more speed, but now seems 
to have become static at a maximum of about 3 per cent annually. This 
trend was the outcome of the changes in the birth and death rates, which 
had contradictory effects. The birth rate declined slowly from about 45 per 
1,000 in 1900-20 to roughly 40 per 1,000 in 1960, but the slight reduction 
in natural growth as a result of the decline counted for little against the 
increase produced by much sharper declines in the death rate after 1930 
and, more particularly, 1945. Migration played only a minor role in the 
growth of the population. From 1850 to 1950 about 4.8 million persons 
emigrated to Brazil. About three-quarters of them made their home 
there and, with their descendants, added approximately 6.8 million to 
the population that is, about 15 per cent of the population increase 
during that period.W The flow of immigrants increased gradually until 
it reached its height in 1890 to 1900, when it accounted for 25 per cent 
of the total population increment. From 1900 onwards, the slaokening of 
the influx of immigrants and the ever-increasing size of the population 
reduced the relative contribution of the former. In 1900-40, they 
represented less than 10 per cent of the over-all population increment. /  
j/ 	G. Mortara, "The development and structure of Brazil's population", 
Population Studies, vol. VIII, No. 2 (London, November 1954). 
.2/ 	Ministry of Planning and Economic Co-ordination, Plano decenal de 
desenvolvimento ecoridmico e social, Demografía, Diagnóstico 




Immigration dwindled to a trickle in 1930-40 and was negligible during 
the forties. After 1950 it increased again and between 1950 and 1960 
nearly 600,000 immigrants•are estimated to have entered the country. 
Although„ in absolute terms, this figure is comparable to or even greater 
than earlier influxes, its relative importance as a factor of growth,has 
d$clined considerably (it represented less than 4 per tent of the over-all 
increase in 1950-60). 
lo sum up, the data available indicate that the role played by the 
factors that are quickening the tempo of population growth varíes widely 
in the different countries. In some - Argentina and Uruguay, and Cuba to 
a lesser extent - the birth rate has been dropping steadily for some time; 
in others, notably Brazil and Chile, the decline has been slowér and the 
present rate is still quite high. Many countries show no clear-cut trends 
and yates have fluctuated at fairly high levels. Death rate trends have 
been somewhat similar; in some countries they fell,most sharply several 
decades ago and subsequently dropped fairly slowly, while inseveral, 
the greatest reduction took place in the forties and fifties„ and in 
others,again, among which Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay 
and Peru must be counted, there have been substantial decreases during 
the sixties. 
Iffien the data are grouped by fiye-year periods, it is exceptional 
to find an increase in the birth rate, and the prevailing trend seems to 
be downward. Death rates are becuning increasingly uniform throughout the 
region, and are already low enough for subsequent decreases to be necessarily 
much smaller, This explaing why the rising tempo of demographic growth 




(b) Composition and distrj.bution of the population  
It is useful to supplement this general picture of population growth 
with brief references to two additional aspects which are typical of the 
demographic situation in Latin America: the age structure of the 
population and its distribution in urban and rural areas. 
Obviously, a rapid deduction in the mortality rate and the persistence 
of high birth rates necessarily result in a much younger population and, 
therefore, a higher degree of dependence. These are the characteristics 
of the present age structure of the Latin American population. 
Some projections for 1970 indicate that 42 per cent of the whole 
population of Latin America will be under fifteen years of age, while 
old people (65 years and over) will represent 4 per cent; therefore the 
proportion of economically active population will be about 54 per cent 
(see table 1-4). Of course, these general proportions differ appreciably 
from country to country. The under-fifteen age group is smallest in 
countries which have the lowest birth rates (28.2 per cent in Uruguay, 
29.3 per cent in Argentina, and less than 40 per cent in Chile and Cuba) 
and larger than average in countries which continue to record higher 
birth rates (about 47 per cent in Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador and Nicaragua). The opposite is true of 
the proportion of old people. Compared with the low regional average 
(3.8 per cent), it is 4.6 per cent in Chile, 7.3 per cent in Argentina 
and 8.6 per cent in Uruguay, the country with the lowest birth rate in the 
region. Thus, the lower proportion of children in these countries is in 





LATIN AMERICA: PROJECTM STRUCTURE OF T} POPULATION 
IN 1970,  E! AGE GROUP 
Number of inhabitants StruThure 
(Percentage) (thousands) 
Total Dopulatión 274 929 Me0.0 
Up to 14 years 116 625 42,4 
15 to 64 years 147 997 53.8 
65 years and over 10 307 3.8 
Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), Boletín Demo ráficz, 
Year 1, vol. II (October.1968). 
In brief, outstanding differences may be noted between Latín America 
and other regions from the standpoint of the "dependency retes!! involved 
in this age structure of the population. A more accurate interpretation 
of the significance of these rates requires, however, that other important 
factors be considered. For example, in developing countries with a high 
fertility rate, the inhabitants usually start work at an early age and 
seldom retire before they are quite old. In Latin America itself, 
notwithstanding the serious unemployment and under—employment probiems, 
it is estimated that more than three—quarters of the 15 to 19 age group 
and about 70 per cent of those aged 65 years and over are economically 
active. Factors such as these, which are linked to the relatively low 
índex of years of schooling and the inadequacy or inefficiency of the 
social security systems, partly mitigate the effects of a relatively 
small proportion of population being of working age, from the standpoint 




The distribution of the population in Latin America, for its part, is 
the most important demographic variable as regards the characteristics of 
development peculiar to the region. The intensive scale of rural-urban 
migration, combined with the characteristics of income distribution and 
the general conditions of social organization and structure, has been 
the main cause of problems such as marginality and under-employment. 
As this topic is examined more thoroughly in chapter II, suffice it 
to give some of the main conclusions here. The first fact to emerge is 
that towards the end of the present decade the Latin American population 
will be mainly urban: some 55 per cent will be living in centres of more 
than 2,000 inhabitants. Secondly, this is not only a general process of 
urbanizatíon; there is also a definite trend towards an increasing and 
disproportionate concentration in specific metropolitan areas„ while the 
smaller urban centres are growing much more slowly. If there trends 
continue up to 1980, at least one-third of the population of nearly 
all the Latin American countries would be concentrated in cities of over 
half a million inhabitants, and not less than 55 per cent in urban centres 
of over 20,000 inhabitants. 
These changes in the distribution of the population also have an 
important impact on the age structure of the population when urban and 
rural areas are considered separately, since it is mostly the young 
adult population which migrates. The information available on annual 
rates of migration by age and sex in a number of countries shows that 
in both mate and female population the highest migration rates apply to 
groups ranging from ten to thirty-five years of age, while the rates for 
/ 
old people are much lower and in some cases negligible.1  
(c) Effect of economic and social f ctors on demo raphíc parameters  
The demographic situation described aboye is closely bound up with 
other basic structural factors and economic and social changes in the region. 
Thus in many cases the population indexes themselves, as defined for the 
population as a whole, are not sufficiently representative, and some 
significant distinctions must therefore be made. 
6/ 	Among other studies, see Juan C. Elizaga, Migraciones interiores  




This is true, for example, of the mortality rates, whose reduction 
does not affect all sectors of the population with the same intensity. 
When the improvement of the rate depends on the extension of fairly 
low—cost public health services and methods of disease control, as a 
result of technological advances in this field, the effects are felt by 
the whole or at least the majority of the population. This does not 
happen, hawever, when the causes of death lie in the levels of living 
of specific population groups, particularly nutrition levels and 
environmental hygiene conditions. In these circumstances, high rates of 
infant morbidity and mortality are found anong a large proportion of both 
the rural and the urban population. Once the critical stage for infants 
is past, these sectors are less able to adapt thenselves biologically, 
physically and intellectually, for reasons which are beyond the sphere 
of action of the public health services. 
The same applies to the fertility rates. Generally speaking, 
the birth rate of urban fanilies is much lower than that of rural families. 
There are marked differences in the birth rates according te the employment 
position, and there is a clear relationship between the birth rate and 
specific socio—economic categories or sectors of the population classified 
by income levels, of which the middle—income groups tend to have the 




2. Level, composition and distr-bution of the nroduct and income 
(a) The product and its rowth 
Towards to the end of the nineteen-sixties the over-all regional 
product will amount to some 130,000 million dollars, which, in per capita 
terms, will be an average of 510 dollars.2(  
In absolute figures, this is a considerable improvement on the 
situation iniinediately after the Second World War and in the early 
nineteen-sixties. In 1950, the total product was 53,700 mi-ilion dollars 
(excluding Cuba, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) 
while, by 1960, it had climbed to 86,500 million dollars, representing 
average per capita figures of 355 and 433 dollars respectively* However, 
this substantial improvement hides very modest annual rates of growth, 
and has not been enough to maintain Latin America1 s former position in 
the world economy. 
Some world figures for 1960 and 1967 (excluding the centrally 
planned economies) indicate that the average per capita increase in the 
product was 2.8 per cent annually during that period. It was divided into 
an average rate of 3.7 per cent for the developed regions and of only 
2.5 per cent for the under-developed nations as a whole, to which Latin 
Americats contribution was as little as 1.7 P 
Allowing for the difference in levels, these estimates suggest that in 
1960 the per capita product of the developed areas was just under ten times 
as much as for the under-developed regions, and had increased to 10.7 times 
as much by 1967, while, in relation to Latín America,it rose from 3.7 to 
4.2 times as much in the same lapse of time. 
7/ 	These are dollars at 1960 prices and estimates based on different 
factors from those used in former Economic Survevs to convert Latin 
American currencies into dollars. In the appendix to this chapter, the 
reasons for the chango have been set forth and an account given of the 
information and methods used for calculating the new ratios. Mention 
has also been made of the statistical and conceptual reservations that 
must be made if the figures are to be properly interpreted. The 
purchasing power equivalents of Latin American currencies in terms of 
dollars at 1960 values are as follows (in monetary units per dollar): 
Argentina, 56.03 Argentine pesos; Bolivia, 7.80 Bolivian pesos; Brazil, 
105.50 cruzeiros; Chile, 0.985 escudos; Colombia, 5.08 Colombian pesos; 
Costa Rica, 5.01 Costa Ricen colones; Dominican Republic, 0.98 Dominican 
pesos; Ecuador, 11.39 sucres; El Salvador, 2.04 Salvadorian colones; 
Guatemala, 0.91 quetzales; Haiti, 3.77 gourdes; Honduras, 1.90 lempiras; 
Mexico, 8.23 Mexican pesos; Nicaragua, 6.48 córdobas; Panama, 
0.87 balboas; Paraguay, 78.32 guaraníes;. Peru; 16.83 soles, Uruguay, 
7.10 Uruguayan pesos; Venezuela, 4.60 Bolívares. 
/Table 1-5 




TRINOS OF THE PER CAPITA PRODUCT BY EOGIOMIC REGIONSY 1960 AND 1967 



























Western EUrope 304 102 259 560 1 172 405 246 277 302 1 461 302 
Australia 16 357 10 275 1 592 22 935 11 751 1 952 3.0 
New Zealand 3 727 2 372 1 571 5 067 2 726 1 859 2.4 
United State 509 000 180 684 2 817 703 947 199 118 3 535 3.3 Canada 36 981 17 909 2 065 52 857 20 441 2 536 3.3 Japan 42 769 93 210 459 85 239 99 920  853 9.3 South Africa 7 430 15 925 467 11 36o 18 733 606 3.8 
Sub-total 2.15116  579 935 1 587 1216151 629 991 2 042 .217.- 
Under-develo 
Africa 27 241 247 655 no 34 330 291 184 118 1.0 
Latín Muertos 87 981 202 906 433 120 651 247 969 486 1.7 
Asia 81 716 863 617 95 113 422 1 027 820 110 2.1 
Southern Europe 29 015 14 539 307 49 210 104 125 473 6.4 
Sub-total 225 953 	1 408 717 160 317 613 1 671 098 121 2t2. 
1 146 319 1 988 652 52á 1 604 264 2 301 089 122 2,8 
Souroes: Developed  oountries: United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistios - 1966 and Monthly  
Bulletin of Statistics, various issues; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistios)  
various issues. 
Under-developed oountries:  Ekoept for Latin America,. Organization for Boononio Co-operation and 
Development Centre, National A000unts of Less Developed Countries 1950-66 (July 1968). 




Although Latin America's relative,loss of ground is partly attributable 
to the rising rate of population growth, it has in any case been large 
enough to reduce the region's share of the over-all world product. 
The Latin American countrios themselves differ widely, both in the 
absolute levels of their per- capita product and in recent trends. 
Forecasts for the end of the sixties show wide oscillations around 
an average annual figure of 512 dollars for the per capita product, from 
the lowest extreme of 85 dollars in Haiti to the maximum of 950 dollars 
in Argentina. Nine countries would be above.the average. In,descending 
order, they are Argentina, Venezuela, Panama, Uruguay, Mexico, Chile, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Jamaica. Fourteen would be,below 
the average, namely, Peru, Bra41, Barbados, Colombia, Guatemala, 
L1 Salvador, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Honduras, Dominican 
Republicy Bolivia and Haiti (see 
This reordering represents a considerable change from the situation 
in 1950 and is due to wide disparities in the growth rates of per capita 
income in the individual countries (see table 1-7). In Latin America as 
a whole, the rate has been relatively low; it was about 2 per cent annuaily 
during the fifties and during the sixties has been even less. The country 
figures show fairly mide differences ranging from stagnation to relatively 
rapid and sustained grouth at annual rates of nearly 3 per cent for the , 
per capita product. It is important to note that, within this diversity, 
no uniform trends can be detected for the countries in the upper and. 
lower income categories. They changed positions,in terms of the absolute 
per capita product within one group or the other, but there was no 
modification in individual positions as regards average income. This is 
olear from the fact that the rine countries which are now.above the average 
income level for Latin America were also aboye it in 1950. 
/Table 1-6 
E/CM.12/825: 
Page T-18.  
• -Table 1-6 
LATIN AflERICA: ESTI ATES OF THE TOTAL AND PER CAPITA PRODUCT 
TOWARDS THE END OF THE NINETEEN-SIXTIES 
(Donara at 1960 prices) 
Country Total product 
(Millions of dollars) 
Per capita product 
(dollars) 
Argentina. 22 529 950 
Barbadin 99. 371 
Bolivia 923 203 
Brazil 34 398 379 
Chile 6 411 671 
Colombia •'7 860 367 
Costa Rica 990 570 
Dominican Republic 974 233 
Ecuador 1 901 323 
El Salvador 1 161 349 
Guatemala 1 842 359 
Guyana 235 320 
Haiti 436 85 
Honduras 621 247 
Jamaica 1 015 559 
Mexico 33 108 677 
Nicaragua 675 344 
Panama 1 008 740 
Paraguay 627 272 
Peru 5 929 450 
Trinidad and Tobago 710 648 
Uruguay 2 025 710 
Venezuela 8 809 878 





LATIN ALL'RICA: RETE OF GROiTH OF THE PER CAPITA PRODUCT 
(Average annual ratas) 
Countries 1950-67 1950-60 1960-67 
Argentina 1.1 1.2 1.1 
Barbados 2.2 2.7 1,6 
Bolivia 0.1 -1.6 2.9 
Brazil 2.1 2.6 1.3 
Chile 1.6 1.2 2.4 
Colombia 1.4 1.6 1.1 
Costa Rica 3.0 3.2 2.6 
Dominican Republic 1.2 2.4 0.6 
Ecuador 1.9 2.3 1.0 
El Salvador 2.1 1.5 2.9 
Guatemala 1.8 0.9 3.0 
Guyana 1.4 1.7 0.9 
Haiti -1.3 -0.2 -1.7 
Honduras 1.1 0.6 1.8 
Jamaica 3.5 4.0 2.9 
Mexico 2.7 2.8 9.8 
Nicaragua 2.4 2.2 4,1 
Panama 3.2 1.9 5.2 
Paraguay 0.4 0.1 1.0 
Peru 2.9 2.7 3.0 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.5 2.3 0.4 
Uruguay -0.2 0.6 -1.1 
Venezuela 2.9 3.6 1,7 
Total 1.9 2.0 1.7 




Since that year the country with the largest per capita product 
has been Argentina. But as its growth rate has been fairly slow, in 
fact well below the regional average, other countries have been creeping 
up and are now approachingthe Same IeVel. This is particularly true 
of Venezuela-and -Panana, whose high growthratea.have_enabled them to 
improve their respective positions. Uruguay has lost some ground owing to 
the stagnation in its per capita product," drepPing from second to fourtti 
place since 1950. Although Mexico hasmaintained its relátive position, 
its high and steadily rising growth rate has brought the per capita product 
up to that of Chile in absolute terms, although they were far apart in 1950. 
Compared with those of Mexico and Panana, Chilets position has contracted, 
while Costa Rica is in the same situation as in 1950. 
Of the group where the per capita product is lower than the Latin 
American average, Ecuadores relative position has remained'unphanged, as 
has that of three countries with a lower absolute level, i.e., the 
Dominican Republic, Bolivia and Haiti. Peru, Brazil, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua have improved their positions, the first two mainly because pf 
the progress nade in the fifties, whereas those of Colombia, Guatemala, 
Paraguay and Honduras have worsened. 
These figures should be viewed with caution, as regards both their 
absolute levels and changos over time. Apart from the fact that conversion 
to a comnon monetary unit, as discussed in the appendix to this chapter, will 
arouse legitimate doubts, the official figures used as a bais are often 
revised, and substantial changes conmonly have to be made as a result. 
(b) Income distribution 
The average por capita product of each of the countries referred 
to aboye reflects national conditions which are of somewhat linited 
significante unless they are supplemented by information on the way in 
which incone is distributed among the various sectors or strata of the 
population. 
In this connexion, some recent research work provides new data 




Latin America, to compare it with income-distribution patterns in other 
regions, and to understand some of the significant differences between 
the Latin American countries thenselves. 
Figure 1-2 shows the resultsof a comparison between the estimated 
income distribution patterns of Latin America as a whole and of the 
United States. The comparison clearly shows the relatively greater 
inequities in Latin American income distribution and some of its basic 
features. 
The most striking feature is the small share of total income received 
by the poorer half of the population: barely 14 per cent of the total (see 
table 1-8). Also noteworthy is the considerable difference between the 
30 per cent of the population aboye the median, which receives 25 per cent 
of total income, and the 15 Per cent in the segment aboye - haif as many 
people - which receives 29 per cent. Moreover, the high concentration of 
income at the top level, comprising only 5 per cent of the population, 
which receives more than 31 per cent of income, shows that the pattern of 
distribution is extremely regressive. 
It must be noted that the imbalances shown by this pattera of income 
distribution for the region as a whole tend to be greater than those 
existing in any single country, since in the table, the effects of the 
differences in average income between countries are added to the disparities 
within each country, Even with this reservation, however, there is nom' 
doubt that these features make for an extremely high level of income 
concentration in the region. 
/ 	The ECLA secretariat is proceeding with a work programe on income 
distribution in co-operation with a number of national bodies. Two 
provisional notes, entitled Estudios sobre la distribución del 
ingreso en America Latina (documents E/CN.12/770 and Add.l) were 
submitted to the Commission at its twelfth session. Concurrently 
with the present Economic Survey the first two volumes of a series 
on income distribution uill be published, one containing a general 
review of the topic, and the other discussing the specific case of 
Argentina based on a wide range of research work undertaken in 
conjunction with the National Development Council of Argentina. The 
data and conclusions given here are derivéd from these documents and 
are based en the data available for a number of countries comprising 
some 75 per cent of the population of Latin America and very fragmentary 
data for the remainder. 
/Figure 1-2 
Latin America 






INCOME DISTRIBUTION.;'UPINCOME GROUPS, IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES - 
(Pneroentages) 
Natural'scale 
PooreSt20% 30% below. 	30% aboye 	15% below the Top 5% 





INCGME DISTRIBUTION IN LATIN aMIIIICa, BY INCOVE GROUPS 
Inoome grenp 
Peroentage Share 
al' total inoome 
Average inoome 	Average per capita 
(regional aver- income il  
age- z 100) 	 (.123152) 
The poorest 20 per oent 3.5 184 68,o 
The 30 per oent below the median 10.5 35.0 133.0 
The 30 per oent aboye the median 25.4 85.0 322,0 
The 15 per oent below the top 
5 per oent 29.1 194.0 740.0 
The top 5 per oent 	 31.5 	 629,0 	 2 400.0 
Source:. EGLA, 




Some measurements that show the level of concentration of income 
distribution as a whole illustrate the aboye. The relevant coefficient 
for Latin America is 0.56, whicl-COMPares very unfavourably with a 
coefficient of 0.40forthts Znitedatates,,,-  
Other important features are clearly evident from a more careful 
examination of the situation of the varioUS inconie'groups-sháwn in 
table 178. For examp e, in the: 5p• per,cept of the population at the 
lower end of the peale whích sea'wliolereceives only 14 per cént of  
total income - the differences_in_per_oapita_ir4pme.levels are oonsiderable,. 
since the levels rise by roughly 30 per cent from the bottom decile to the 
next. Noreover, the population in both these groups receives extremely 
low incomes in absolute tercos. It is estimated that,in 1965. the annual . 
per capita personal income of the poorest 25 per cent or so of the 
population of Latin America, expresSed'in dollarsat 1960 prices, was 
less than 100 dollars. At the highest level of the poorer half of the 
population in the region, it is estimáted that the figure was 
approximately 180 dollars, These figures give a better idea of the 
income inequalities if it is borne in mind that the average ánnual per 
capita personal-in:~ for the región•as-a- whole-in-I965 was-approximately 
385 dollars.12/ 
• 
2/ 	These coefficients were calculated on the basis of the foliowing 
formula, which measures the ratio of the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the line of equal distribution to the area of the triangle 
in which it is situated: 
n 
2: fi (Gi - 1 4- Gi) 
where 
10,000 
n = total number of income groups 
i = ordinal number of each group 
f = percentage of total population in each income group 
G - cumulative percentage of income received 
U/ The difference between these figures and those for the per capita 
product given earlier, besides being partly due to the fact that 
the periods of reference are different, is explained by the fact 
that such items as depreciation, external factor income and other 
items which distinguiste the gross domestic product from domestic 
personal income have been excluded. 
/In the 
á = 1 
E/CN.12/825 
Page 1-25 
In the two highest income groups, average income is relatively very 
high, which méans that there is a high cpncentration of total personal 
income-. in these two groups. Taken together„ their average income is almost 
twelve times that of the poorer half of the population, a difference which 
is of great significante and has far-reaching effects. For this is not a 
comparíson between'two small groUps, but between the one-fifth of the 
population which is at the top of the income scale and the poorer half 
of the population If this situation is contrasted with thatof an 
industrialized western area with a similar population density, it will 
be soon found that the average income of the richest ,fifth of the population 
of the United States is less than five times that of the poorer half of the 
population; in the socialist coúntriesthe proportion appears to be a little 
less than three times. 
Moreover, in the two upper income groups, income rises very rapidly 
and very unevenly. At the lower limit of the 15 per cent of the population 
immediately below the top group, per capita income is'under 500 dollars, 
while at the upper limit,it is almost three times that,sum. The income 
of the top 5 per cent is, of course, much higher still, with a considerable 
concentration of income. 
As has already been pointed out, these features are not only the 
result of the patterns of income distribution within each country but also 
of the differences in average per capita incomes,in absolute terms. A 
look at the distribution by countries of the population comprising each 
of these income groups makes the importance of this latter factor olear, 
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Within each ,egment,•the highest figures tend to be those for 
countries With the largest populations in absolute terms; although even 
so there are some significant features. For example)  the fact that income 
is relatively more evenly distributed in Argentina and. Uruguay and the 
average income higher in absolute terms explains why even the lowest 
income group in these countries receives more income than the poorest 
20 per cent of the population of Latin America as a whole. On the other 
hand, virtually half of the poorest 20 per- cent in the region comes from 
Brazil whose pápulation represents one-third of the total population 
of Latin America - because of its relatively low level of average income. 
Similarly, the position of the countries listed under the head of "other, 
countries" those of Central America and the Caribbean (excluding Cuba), 
and Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay - is even more striking: while these 
countries account for only 14 per cent of the population of Latin America, 
they comprise more than.a third of the poorest 20 per cent, 
In the lowest group there is a much greater correlation between 
the proportion of the poorest 20 per cent corresponding to each country, 
and its proportion of total population, particularly in Chile)  Colombia, 
Maxico and Peru. But even so, the share of the countries with higher 
average incomes in absolute terms (Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela) is 
relatively largor, while the opposite is true for the countries with low 
average incomes (Brazil and others). The only segment in which the shares 
of both groups of countries bear a marked.resemblance to each other is that 
of the 30 per cent of the population immediately aboye the median. 
These óbservations merely confirm the fact that in income distribution 
for the region as a whole will show very considerable disparities, partly 
as a result of adding together the national figures of countries with very 
different average per capita incomes in absolute terms. 
In order to determine the extent to which the effects of theSe.  
differences in average per capita income may be accentuated by higher 
levels of income concentration in the lowest income countries it would 
be neceszary to make a comparative analysis of the distribution pattern 
in each individual country. The statistical valueof the available 
estimates, given in table 1-9, varíes considerably, but they are sufficient 




The most stiiking fact tiut emerges from a comparison of the 
patterns of distribution-ofa significantnunber of Latin American 
cóuntries is their relative uniformity, despite the differences in 
these countries'• average: Tercapita4ncomes.and,,general level of 
deveiopment. On this tesia,dt is_possibleta pick out sone general 
featuréS of income distribution in Latin America which are markedly 
different from those in more:developed economies. 
The estimates also reveal.sone significant differences between 
the Latin American countries, although of-much lesser importante than the 
features that differentiate the region as a wholé from the industrialized 
countries. These are probably due to a number of.different factors, 
including factors relating to the level,of conceptration,of property 
ownership, and othér institutional. factors,,, In addition, if it is 
wished to relate these differences to the development pf each country, 
probably one of the most tempting approaches would be to look at the 
relative size of the various strata of productivity which can be clearly 
discerned in the Latin American economies as a;whole and at their effect 
on income distributionA/  
In the initial stages of development, a very high propo.rtion of 
the economically active population 5.s.,engaged inactivities which„ in 
terms of their average productivity, forms of.organization, production 
techniques, stock of capital per person, etc., can be defined,as forming 
a primitive sector of the economy; in contrast, a small fraction of the 
labour force is engaged in áctivities which, for similar reasons, form 
a modern sector.in which a high proportion.of total production and 
/ income will probably tend tobe concentrated.12   » As the modem sector 
11/ This question is discussed at greater length in a lates section„ 
where the problems of employment and labour force productivity are 
discussed.-  
22/ As explained-helow, these references to "primitive" andmodern" 
sectors, and to an ninternediaten sector, do not necessanily coincide 
with the usual classifications finto sectors of economic activity, 
but relate'rather to strata of prodUctivity and degrees of 
assimilation of technical progress, which can be distinguished within 
each sector of activity. For example;. a primitive and a modern sector 
can be identified.within the agricultural sector, and the same is 




expands and the primitive sector shrinks, the additional income tends to 
go mainly to new,members of the raodern sector. The influence of the 
primitive sector, which pushes inooue levels clown, tends to be felt 
only by a progressively smallér proportion of the population at the lower 
end of the income scale, while a progressively larger proportion of the 
population gains access to relatively high income levele.• The global 
effect of all these factores on income distribution is probably to give 
the groups close to the top of the income scale a larger share of total 
income, while the opposite is very probablythe case with the - groups at 
the very top and the very bottom of the scale. 
A comparison of the figures for several countries will show how far 
these considerations really mirror the situation in Latin America (see 
table I-10). In countries such as El Salvador, where the primitive 
sector still predominates„ the two median groups receive relatively small 
proportions of total income, while there is heavy concentration in the 
upper segment. In others, like Mexico and Venezuela, the modera sector 
has grown rapidiy and has become fairly important, although a sizable , 
proportion of the labour force is still in the primitive sector. Rente, 
the 30 per cent of the population that is aboye the median obtains a 
much larger share of total income, and the share of the next 15 per cent 
1/ 
also increases to some extent but there is less concentration at the top.--
3, 
 
On the other hand, the share of the poorer half of the population fails 
to improve and the bottom 20 per tent even find that their relativa 
position has worsened. This typeof_change can be seer from r the figures 
for Mexico relating 'Lo- different years in the post-war period, 
12/ It is important to bear in mind, particularly in the case of 
Venezuela, that distribution relates to national and family income 
levels. Consecuently, the profits of the big enterprises that are 





FIVE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: ESTIMATED PARTICIPATION OF 
DIFFERENT POPULATION GROUPS IN TOTAL INCOME 
The poorest The 30 per The 30 per The 15 per The top 
20 per cent cent below cent aboye cent below 5 Per 
of the 
population 
the median the median the top 
group 
cent 
Argentina 5.2 15.3 25.4 22.9 31.2 
Costa Rica 5.5 10.5 22.6 28.4 32-9 
El Salvador 5.5 12.5 22.0 25.0 35.0 
Mexico 3,6 11.8: 26.1 29.5 29.0 
Venezuela 3.0 11.3 27.7 31.5 26.5 
Source: See table 1-9.. 
The data on Argentina illustrate other kinds of changes which may 
be characteristic of the next stage, The primitive sector is very small 
there. As a result, the poorer half of tl-epopulation receives a much 
larger proportion of the total income than in countries such as Mexico 
or Venezuela, and the 30 per cent aboye the median remains in a relatively 
favourable position. The high absolute level of average income is also 
partly due to the absence of a primitive sector, and, as it enjoys a 
greater relative share of total income, the poorer half of the population 
is in a much better position than in any other Latin Amergan_country., 
/As the se 
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As there rernarks are merely intended to give a general picture of 
income distribution in Latin America, there is no need to dwell on aspects 
which Will be discussed at length in the specific studies mentioned. 
Particular reference has been made to the relationship between the 
characteristics of distribution ánd the structure of the economy divided 
into productiVity strata in order to bring out a facet of the problem 
which has tended to be overlooked in the past, but there is no intention 
whatsoever.of detracting from the importante of other basic factors that 
determine the pattern of income distribution. It need hardly be stressed 
that the differences that have been mentioned between the Latin American 
countries themselves are relatively unimportant compared with the 
differences between each one of them and economies outside the region. 
This reservation even applies to Argentina, where there are a number of 
factors that are particularly conducive to a more equitable pattern of 
national income distribution. 
(c) The compositi212W1211212ectors of actives  
The composition of the product by sectors of activity is a guide 
to the structure of the Latin American economy towards the end of the 
nineteensixtiese Snme of its typical features in this respect. are 
described below. 
First, in Latin America as a wholej  it will be seen that a 
relatively man proportion of the total product is generated in the 
sectors producing goods. It anounts to a little under 53 per cent, 
compared with 8 per cent for basic services - which are mainly the 
electric power supply, transport and communications - and nearly 39 per 
cent for the activities grouped under the head of "other services" 
- commerce and finance, public administration, personal services, etc* 
(seo table I-11). Given this kind nf economic structure and absolute 
level for the per capita product, the proportion of services seems 
top-heavy, since it invests the economy prematurely with the structural 
characteristics of a more developed country. In the industrialized 
economies, the increase in the share of the product contributed by 





LATIM-AilERICA: PROBABLE COMPOSITION OF THE PRODUCT TOWARDS THE 
END OF'THE NINItTEENSI)tTiES 
(Percentages of the total) 






Other services 22,2 








to indicate that the sectors producing goods are failing to respond 
with sufficient vigour to labour absorption requirements, which outstrip 
the job opportunities these sectors have to offer.11/  
Secondly, the economic structure of the region as a whole, taken 
at the same level of aggregation, has changed very little since 1950 
(see table 1-12). The figures for 1950, 1960 and 1967 show that the' 
contribution of the sectors producing goods has remained between 
52 and 53 per cent. The basic services enlarged their share slightly, 
but a tiny reduction took place in the share of "other services". 
Thirdly, there have been some significant changes in the inter-nal 
composition of the major sectors, particularlythose producing goods, 
and, aboye all in the relative shares of agriculture and manufacturing. 
Towards the end of the nineteen-sixties, agriculture will be contributing 
about a fifth of the total product, whereas in 1950 it was providing 
just over a quarter and in 1960 about 22 per cent. The counterpart 
to these changes is supplied almost entirely by the growth in the 
importance of manufacturing, which increased its share of the total 
product from just under 20 per cent in 1950 to 24.1 per cent in 1967.:
35J 
For purposes of comparison, it should be remembered that the 
relative weight of services - excluding basic services - is more 
than 39 per cent of the total product in Latín America, while in 
the Federal Republic of Germany and France in 1965 it was less 
than 38 and as little as 32 per cent respectively. The proportion 
of the product that deriVes from the. production of goods is very 
much smaller in Latín America, being 52.4 per cent as against 
more than 60 per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany, although 
the relative importante of their agriaaltural sectors differ 
corisiderably (over 20 and only 5 per cent respectively) 
15/ If a relative price structure similar to that of the United States 
was taken as a basis, as it is for investment tater in this 
document, the sectoral structure of the product would be quite 
different in some of the Latin American countries; in particular, 






LATIN AlifERICA: CHANGES IN-THEYCOMPOSITION OF- THE 
PRODUCT ax.  4CTORS,OF ACTIVITY 
Percentago comPositinn in 
relation to the total 
Cumulátive annual 
.. , growth rates 
1950. 1960 1967 1950-60 1960-67 1950-67 
SectorAnrczclucingwóc3.1 52.4 52,4 52.3 4.9 4.6 4.8 
Agriculture 25.2 22.1 20,5 3.5 	. 3.5 3.5 
riining 4.1 4.6 ' 4.4 6.1 ' 4.1 5.3 
Manufacturing 19.6 22.3 24,„1 6.2 5.8 6.0 
Construction 3.5 3.4 3.3 4.6 4.1 4.4 
Basic services 7.2 7.7 8.3 5.5 5.7 5.6 
Other services 40.4 39.9  39:4 4.8 4.4 4.6 
Commerce and finance 18.0 18.4 18.8 5.1 4.9 5.0 
hiscellaneous 22.4 21.5 20.6 4.5 3.9 4.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100,0 6.2 4.6 4.8 
Source: ECLA estimates. 
In mining and construction the situation has remained much the same, 
with the share of the former increasing slightly and that of the lattsr 
contracting equally slightly. This is the result of s.. grawth rate for 
the whole goods-producing sector that has.alnost matched that óf the 
total product (an annual average cf 4,8 per cent from.1950 tp 1967), 
and has been due to a yearly increase of 6 per cent in manufaóburing 
production, 5.3 per cent in mining 4.4 per tent in construction and 




As far as "other services" are concerned, commerce, finance, and 
miscellaneous services each represent about a fifth of the total product, 
and there have been no appreciable changes since 1950, either in the 
contribution of the whole group or of its individual parts. 
These general features are stiberimposed on widely different 
situations in the individual countries of the region, both in the past 
and in the presenta 
In one group, consisting of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the 
distinguishing fáature is the relative weight of the sectors producing 
goods, which is slightly greater than in the region as a whole, and of 
the "other services" sectors, which is a little less (see table 1-13). 
However, the most striking differences are in some of the Components 
of the major sectors. For instante, the relative importance of 
manufacturing industry is more than 27 per cent in this group of 
countries, while in the other four groups it is less than 20 per cent, 
and in three of them it oscillates round 15 per cent. Argentina is 
largely responsible for the high figure in manufacturing in the group, 
since manufacturing contributes more than a third of it's total product, 
while in Mexico the sector's relative importance is similar to the group 
average, and in Brazil it is almost 22 per cent (see table 1-14). 
A second group, composed of Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, is characterized by a slightly snaller share for the goods-
producing sectors than in the former group, and the structure of there 
sectors, in particular differs considerably. Although their general 
level of development is lower, the relative share of agriculture is 
snaller; however, this is offset by the much greater importance of 
mining and the extractive industry in general (see table 1-13). The 
share of manufacturing is a good deal srnaller. There are also some 
differences between the menbers of the group, particularly as regards 
agriculture in Colombia, where the relative share of the agricultural 





LATIN AMERICA: PROBABLE COMPOSITION OF THE PRODUCT TOWARDS /THE 
"LID OF THE NINETEEN-SIXTIES, BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES 2/ 
(Percentages of the total) 
Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E 
Sec.torLszroduciggnoods 53.7 50.5 48.9 5605 49.8 
Agriculture 20.7 16.8 30.7 30.5 20.2 
Mining 2.7 10.2 0.5 5.4 8.8 
Manufacturing 27.1 19.2 15.0 15.5 14.6 
Construction 3.2 4.3 2.7 5.1 6.2 
Basic services 1.2. 8.7 6.9 6.4 9.1 
Other services 38.0 40.8 &.11 37.1 41.1 
Commerce and finance 20.1 17.3 22.3 13.9 16,0 
Miscellaneous 17.9 23.5 21.9 23.2 25.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ECLA estimates. 
/ The groups comprise the following countries: Group A: Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico; Group B: Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela; 
Group C: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and- Nicaragua; 
Group D: Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay; Group E: Barbados, Daminican 





LATJ AMERICA: PRoBABLE COI POSITON OF THE PRODUCT TOWARDS 
THE END UF THE NINETEEM-SIXTIES, BY COUNTRIES 
(Percentages of the total) 
1. Group A  
Total Argentina Brazil Me tico 
Sectors producing goods 53.7 57.3 5401 51,0 
Agriculture 20,7 17.0 30.1 14.6 
Mining 2.7 1.8 0.6 5.1 
Manufacturing 27.1 34.6 21.9 27.1 
Construction 3.2 3.9 1.5 4,2 
Basic services 8,3  9.7 9.9 5.8 
Other services 38.0 33.0 36.0 43.2 
Commerce and finance 20.1 18.3 15.4 25.5 
Miscellaneous 17.9 14.7 20.6 17.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2. Group B 
Totk1 	Chile Colom  bia 
Uru- Peru guay 
Vene- 
zuela 
Sectors producing goods 50.5 52.2 56,0 48.2 44.5 47.4 
Agriculture 16.8 10.5 30.7 17.6 19.2 7.6 
Mining 10.2 10.5 3.1 5.3 22.2 
Manufacturing 19.2 26.6 18.4 19.9 21.4 13.8 
Construction 4.3 4.6 3.8 5.4 3.9 3.8 
Basic services 8.7 12.7 7.7 8.2 1,2 6,9 
Other services 40.8 35.1 36.3 43.6 46.2 L2.7 
Commerce and finance 17.3 18.3 16.3 21.9 22,1 13.2 
Miscellaneous 23.5 16.8 20,0 21.7 24.1 32.5 
Toni 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0.  100,0 
/Table 1-14 (concl,) 
E/CN.12/825 
Page 1-38 
Tabla 1-14 (concl.) 
Group C 







Sectors producing goods :48.9 46.5 	51.7 45.0 62.7 46.0, 
Agricultura 30.7 29.4_.28.8 29.6 40.8 29.5 
Mining 0.5 0.1 0.1 2.0 1.8 
Manufacturing 15.0 14.7 	18:4 13:6 16,0 12.9 
Construction 2.7 2,4 4.4 1.7 3.9 1.8 
Basic services 112 7 	6„2 LA 222 8%2 
Other services 4.62 45.8 42.1 48.6 30.3 51 
Comarca and finance 22.3 12.5 	21.8 30.1 15.2 22.8 
Miscellaneous 21.9 33.3 20.3 18.5 15.1 22,9 
Total 100,0 100.0 	100.0 100.0 100,0 10.0 
4. Group D 
Total Bolivia Ecuador Paraguay 
Sector producing goods 5.áz.5. 54.8 57,0 57.3 
Agricultura 30.5 21.7 33.1 35.5 
Mining 5,4 15.8 1.9 0.4 
1 anufacturing 15.5 10.8 17.0 17.8 
Construction 5.1 6.5 5.0 3.6 
Basic services ...t_l 10.2 5.1 4.6 
Other services 37.1 35.0 37.9 38,1 
Comarca and finance 13:9 10.3 13.7 196. 
Miscelianeous 23.2 24.7 24.2 18.5 
Total 100„0 100.0 100.0 100,0 
Source: ECLA estimates. 
/The third 
E/CN.12/825 
Page 1-39.  
'The third group,:which,comprises the five Central American 
countries, and the fourth:grOup, made up of Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay, 
have iáirly'Similar general Characteristics.. The agricultura]. sector 
generates'cobre than 30 per -cent' of the total producto and manufacturing 
indUstry'hae:a relative importante of only about 15 per cento Together 
with'thebelbers of the last group, which are too heterogeneous for 
averages to haVe any meaning, they forra what has been temed the 
"economicelly relatively less developed countries" in the region. 
This gróuping is very much the same as that which would be obtained 
by taking the absolute size of the national markets as the yardsticko 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have.62.2 per cent of the regional populaion 
and contribute 67 per cent of the product. These proportions are 21.7 and 
23.2 per cent for the five countries in the second group, while, they 
are only 16.1 per cent and 9.8 per cent for the other countries as a 
whole. 
There hás been no significant change in these structural differences 
for quite a long time. If the last group is excluded because of ite 
heterogeneity, the average growth rate of the agricultura) sector was 
3 to 3.7 per cent between 1950 and 1967 in all the others. There is 
an even closer resemblance between the gpowth retes of manufacturing 
production: the annual average was 6.1 for the first group, 6.2 per,, 
cent for th&second and 6.8 per cent for the third, while industrial 
development fell even further behind in Ecuador and, aboye all, in. . 
Bolivia and Paraguay. 
The interna) composition of some of the sectors of economic,  
activity has also changed appreciably in several cases. For instan.cej., 
it is highly probable that agricultura) production for exporthas been 
assuming greater relative importante than production for ,thes.home 
market, In 1960-66, at least, the over-all agricultura1 product of 
the region increased at an average rate of 3.4 per cent arihuálly, while - 
the average yate for agricultura) exports was 4.4 percent. 
Manufacturing industry has no doubt undergóhe pronounced changes 
in interna) composition, but it is difficulttO judge their extent 




suggest that there havebeenappreciable modifications in the relative 
importance of the industríesdeSeribed a$ traditional — food, beverages, 
tobacco, textiles, footwear and tiothing:, wood, furniture, printing and 
publishing, leather and leather predUcts, etc. — the intermediate 
industries, such as paper and paper products, rubber and rubber products, 
chemical products, petroleum products, non—meta Me minerals and basic 
metals, and the metal—transforming industries — metal products, 
16/ construction of madhinery, electrical equipment and transport equipment.- 
The first group expanded at a fairly slow pace (averaging 3.8 per 
cent annually), largely because of the very sluggish tempo of growth in 
Argentina. Production of intermediate goods, however, achieved a rato 
of over 8 per cent and metal—transforming of 10.6 per dente As a result 
of these trends, the Share of the traditional industries in the total 
gross value of industrial output in the region as a whole shrank from 
69 to 55 per cent, while that of the intermediate group roce from 22 to 
30 per cent and of the metal—transforming industries in particular 
from 8 to 15 per cent. The trend of these changos has undoubtedly been 
emphasized in later years as a result, amOng other things, of the 
notable progress made by the motor—vehicle industry. 
These broad trends cover basic differences in the industrial 
development of the individual countries. For instante, in many of them, 
and particularly those at a relatively less advanced stage of 
industrialization, the bulk of the growth took place in the traditional 
industries. This explains why Argentina, Brazil and Mexicors joint áhare 
of the regional total should have dropped from 67 to 58 per cent in the 
case of these industries, while it remained constant or increased in 
relativo terms in the case of the intermediate branches (close to 70 per 
cent) and metal—transforming activities (about 85 per cent). 
lb/ From various points of view this grouping is not entirely satisfactory. 
One reason is that it does'not make for a more accúrate division between 
the industries producing consumer goods and those producing capital 
goods, since it is dependent on the availability of the basic 




(d) Trends and composition of total supply and demand 
Towards the end of the nineteen-sixties, total supply and demand 
will probably anount to about 145,  000million dollars (in terms of 1960 
purchasing power). The main features of their composition will be the 
relatively small share of-external transactionS, with imPorts of goods 
and ser-ricos accounting for leas than 10 per cent kof, total supply and 
exports for a similar proportion,of-total demand, and a structure of 
dewand in- which- leas than 16 per cent would correspond to gross fixed 
investment and nearly three-quarters to consumption, divided, in its 
turn, finto 8 per cent flop:' peblíc consumption and almost 67 per tent 
for private consumption (see tablee 1-15)0 
This over-all structure is the outcone of trends whose main 
components sometimes diverge sharply. 
In Latín America as a whole, the most dynamic factor of supply 
has been the trend of the domestic product, despíte :As relatively slow 
rate of growth, discussed in eerlier sections. In other werds, the 
relative importante of -!mporte haz declined, and the import coefficient 
has therefore dropped 37/  steaily from just over 12 per cent in 1950 
to under 11 per cent in 1960 and leas than 10 per cent in 1967, 
However, these general regional trends do not taily with the 
individual trends in most of the countries. In fact, the averages 
(meted are etrongly influenced by Argentina and Brazil, Which cerry 
special weig7et in the Latín American totals, and where import coafficients 
are at their lowest and an'appréciablerédictión really took place in 
foreign purchaseso Other countries where the same trend has cropped 
up, but at different levels, are Colombia, Haiti, Uruguay and Venezuela; 
in some the reason'has been the relatively unfavourable trend of the 
external sector, and in Venezuela, the high growth rete ef the domestic 
product (see tabla I-16). In others, such as Guatemala and Panama, there 
were no significant changes, and the same is true of Mexico, where the 
sharp rise in exports coincided with highly 4gynemic growth on the part of 
the external sector. In at least ten of the Latín American countries, 
import coefficients are higher than in 1950 and 1967, at times by a 
considerable margin• 
21/ The importe are measured at constant prices, that le, without allowing 
for the effect of price increases. For a more extensivo analysis of 





LATIN AMERICA «II: PROBABLE TREND AND COMPOSITION OF TOTAL 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND AT THE END OF THE NINET11,5-SIXTIES 
(Millions of dollars at 1960 prices, market prices and percentages) 







1950-60 1960-67 1950-67 
T9tqlsur2IY 145 400 300.0 4.8 4.5 4.7 
Gros denestic 
product 132 000 90.7 4.9 4.6 4.8 
Imports of goods and 
services 13 400 9.3 3 7 3,4 3.6 
TotaT demand 145 400 100.0 4.8 4.5 4.7 
Exports of goods and 
services 14 100 9.7 3,8 4.4 4.1 
Groes fixedb/  
investment -1  22 800 15.7 5.2 3.9 	, 4.7 
Total consumotion 108 500 74.6 4.8 4.6 4.7 
Government consumption 11 300 7.8 6.0 27 4.6 
Priva. e consuption 12/ 97 200 6608 4.7 4.9 4.8 
So-rce: ECLA, en the basis of official statistics. 
al Not includ_Ing Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago. 





LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTGOEFFICIENTS, BY COUNTRIES', 1950, 1960 AND 1967 
(Imports-Of goods,and servicesaaa tarcentage'- 
of the danestic oroduct).  
Country 1950 1960 1967 
Argentina 8.9 8.0 6.6 
Bolivia 11.9 15.7 21.2 
Brazil 10.0 7.8 5.6 
Chile 11,4 15.7 15.7 
Colombia 14.9 '2,9  8.8 
Costa Rica 17.7 2106 23.2 
Dominican Republic 21.2 15,9 26.8 
Ecuador 7.6 12.2 12.7 
El SJili- d.or 19.0 20,4 22.4 
Guatemala 13.8 13.6 149 
Haiti 16.7 13.8 11.2 
Honduras 17.4 19.6 28.5 
Ileico 8.4 7.8 7.8 
Eicaragua 13,8 23.5 43.2 
Panama 34.2 30.0 32,9 
Paraguay 10.1 12.5 14.3 
Peru 12.0 11.9 16.6 
Uruguay 14,8 12.5 8.7 
Venezuela 41.8 27.1 21.1 
Total_ a/ 12.1 10.8 
Source: 	EUA, on the basis of official statistics.' 
/ Not including Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago. 
Viewed from this angle, the extent of these country differences is 
illustrated by the fact that in 1967 five Latin American countries had import 
coefficients of under 10 per cent, six of 10 to 20 per cent, a further six 




Of the components of total demand, 
account for fess than 10 per cent of the 
same nacional differedces as in the case 
rate of exports has .kept fairly close to  
exports of goods and services 
regional total, and there are the 
of imports. .Since 1950 the growth 
that of the domestic product (see 
}•• 
table 1-15)0 and has been much higher than that of importes. It should be 
rern.embered, however, that the trend is measured in terma of volume, and 
thuzdees not show the generaDy adverse effect of the terma of trade. 
T¿ken as a whole, the relative áhares of investment and consumption 
in Over-a:11 demand remained constant Between the end points of the period 
1950-67n Both increased at en average annual rate of 4.7 per cent, bpt 
with.broad djzparitís when the tiro c;ocados are considered separately. In 
1950-60, the growth rate of investmer:t cutstripped thA of consunDtion and 
the position was reversed in 1960-67. The import coefficient Lhus ended up 
in 1967 at the same level az in 1950. This is again a broad trend, which 
encompasses a number of nacional differences as regards the Share of 
investment in the total supply of goods and services. This declinad in 
Colombia, Ilexico, Uruguay and Venezuela, but took a more positive turn in 
others, particulariy Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Panana, Paraguay and Peru (see table I-17). 
In 1967, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti and 
Honduras fell short of the average ratio for the region; in the other 
countries it was exceeded in varying proportions, but only in toree c,m.es 
- Nicaragua, Peru and. Venezuela did the figure reacn 20 per cent or over. 
Az pointed out in other sections, the failure of the investment 
coefficient to increase vigorously enough has been one of the fundamental 
reasons for the relatively slow growth of the Latin American product, A 
word should be added here about the importance of maintaining an investment 
coefficient (defined as the ratio of gross fixed investment to the total 
product) of about 16 per cent for the Latin American economies. As per 
capita income levels in the region are fairly low and there is a justifiable 
demand for higher consumption levels, an állocation of 16 per cent for 
capital formation representa a tremendous effort, although this should be 
reassessed more accurately in the light of the prevailing income distribution 
models and consumption capacity. Without discounting the latter, it is 
important to remember that the saving effort envisaged will not necessarilv 
lead to an equiválent volume of real investment, as the relative prices of 





LATIN AMERICA: UTTLIZáTION OF THE SUPPLY OF GOODS AND 
SERVICES, BY COUNTRIES, 1950, 1960 AND 1967 
(Percentages)  
.1/•■ rl. -̂aneummiz.“~••■•■•11.11■111• 








Costa Rica 	84.2 
Dominican Repule lic 86.3 
Ecuador 	 - 91.4 
El Salvador 	920'8 
Guatemala 89.3 
Haiti 	 93.3. 
H,_ ,..,auras 87.0 
ItIoxico 	 . 79.3 
Nicaragua -90.5 
Panama 	 85.7. 
Paraguay 92.0 


































21.5 81.3 18.7 
1395 8.6 16.4 
16,3 87.4 12.6 
15.0 84.4 15.6 
18.1 83.9 16.1 
16,6 82.9 17.1 
11.3 82.,0 18,0 
13.4 87.3 12.7 
13.5 84.9 15.1 
9.9 88.4 11,6 
5.4 - 96.8 3.2 
12.4 86.8 13.2 
14.8 82.5 17.5 
12.5 79.9 20.1 
14.1 80.6 19.4 
16.4 81.9 18.1 
19.1 76.4 	, 23.6 
14.5 86.9 13.1 
21.9 78.8 21.2 
12,1 U:1 16s1 
Counti7 Con-, 	In, 	Con,- 
suzp- vest- sump- - 
' tion a/ inent 	tion á/ 
Source:. EUA, rn the oasis of official statisticp. 
a/ Not including Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica or Trinidad'and Tobago. 




exchange rates which give a clearer picture of purchasing power paritieso 11/ — 
Table 1-18 presenta the resulta of the camparisone It shows that there 
is a wide gap between the average regional coefficient when measured by 
the relative price structures in each country and the result of measuring 
the componente of the coefficient against the structure of relative 
prices in the United States, that is 17.1 as against only 12.1 per tent. 
In other wordn, the same investment coefficient in Latin America and 
the United States, reflecting a saving effort of similar proportions, 
would, in Latin Imariea, represent a smal l  er volume of real goods and 
services available for capital formation. This simply oonfirms the 
fazt that the relative prices of .capital goods are higher there than 
in the United States. 
Individual countries show a variety of differences in this respect, 
and their position may even range from positive to negativo, In a few, 
such as Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Honduras, the 
coefficients are slightly higher when expressed in dollars than in 
national currencies.12/  In others, such as the majority of the Central 
American countries, where the relative price structure is closer to that 
of the United States, the results are virtually the same. Eut in most 
cases, coefficients are much lower when calculated in dollars than in 
local currency. This is particularly true of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Peru. 
.1E,/ See the appendix to this chapter. 
This may also reflect the effects of differences in the structure 
of investment, particularly in the relative shares of construction 
and public works. It should be remembered that these ratios may 
vary considerably from one year to the next, as a result of changes 
in dcmestic relative prices (for example, a modification of the 
exchange rate has an immediate impact on the prices of imported 
capital goods). 
/Table 1-18 
The magnitude of the phenanenon is better illustrated by a 
reference to 1960, for which enough data are available to expresa the 




LATIN AMERICA:- INVESTMENT COEFFICIENTS CALCULATED IN NATIONAL 
CURRENCIES AND 1 	DOLLARS, 1960 
(cross fixed investment as a percentage 







Argentina 21.7 11.5 
Bolivia n.3 11,3 
Brazil 16.5 8,2 
Chile 15.4 16.0 
Colomb5 a 18.3 19.1 
Costa Rica 17.1 13.7 
Dominican Republic 10.4 1105 
Ecuador 13.4 13,6 
El Salvador 13.4 14,2 
Guatemala 10.1 10.5 
Haiti 5.5 5.2 
Honduras 12.6 15.6 
Memico 14.9 12.7 
Nicaragua 12.8 10,7 
Panana 14.8 13.8 
Paraguay 16.7 9.7 
Peru 18.7 13.8 
Urugucy 15.0 11.3 
Venezuela 18.0 21.9 
Total 17.1 
Source: ECIA, 
a/ Not including Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago. 
b/ In calculating these coefficients different exchange rates were used 
for the product and for gross fixed investment„ so as to reflect the 




The last outstanding aspect of the composition and trends of total 
demand is the structure of consumption, in terms of the division between 
Public and private consumption. Government consumption in Latin America 
as a whole accounted for approximately 11 per cent of the total in 1950. 
During the next ten years, its growth was fairly,rapid (6 per cent annually), 
and its share therefore expanded to 12.2 per cent, but this upward 
trend was subsequently reversed and by 1967 its share was slightly 
smaller than in 1950 (10.7 per cent). 
Levels and trends differ widely from country to country. In the 
group of countries where a government consumption represents a steadily 
growing proportion of total consumption, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela have raised it aboye the regional average; 
in Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico, on the other hand, the trend has been 
similar but at lower levels. The countries where the figuras are 
aboye the average, but where the trend of government consumption is 
declining are Brazil, the Dominican Republi.o, Ecuador, Panama and Paraguay, 
while the opposite is the case in Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala, 





LATIN AMERICA: COMPOSITION OF CONSUMPTION, BY 
COUNTRL!S, 1950, 1960 AND 1967 
(Percentages)  
ountl'y 
1950 1960 1967 
Govern 
ment 
12/Govern Private 	ment 
b/Govern Privatezi 	ment Private12/ 
Argentina 11.7 88.3 11.3 88.7 9.3 90.7 
Bolivia 7.3 92.7 9.5 80.5 10,2 89.8 
Brazil, 14.7 85.3 18,1 81,9 12.8 87.2 
Chile 11.6 88.4 12.3 87.7 12.0 88.0 
Colombia 7.5 92.5 7.6 92,4 70 92.2 
Costa Rica 10.0 93.0 13,5 86.5 14.1 85.9 
Dominjcan Republic 12.8 87,2 15.5 84.5 12.1 87.9 
Ecuador 15.2 84.8 14.8 85.2 14.1 85.9 
El Salvador 10.1 89,9 11.2 88.8 9.9 90.1 
Guatenala 7.5 92.5 8.6 91.4 7.1 92.9 
Haiti 13.4 86.6 8,3 91.7 8.5 91.5 
Honduras 8.1 91.9 10.8 89.2 11,1 88.9 
Mexico 4.7 95.3 5.7 94.3 6,4 93,6 
Nicaragua 10,8 89,2 9.5 90,5 9.5 90.5 
Panama 15,5 84.5 12.5 87.5 14.3 85.7 
Paraguay 14.2' 85.8 9.0 91.0 11.0 89.0 
Peru 8.0 92.0 11.3 88.7 15.3 84.7 
Uruguay 9.4 90.6 10.2 89.8 12.4 87.6 
Venezuela 19.4 80.6 21.6 78.4 21.5 78.5 
Total 2/ 1. 1.0. 89.0 12.2 87.8 10.7 89.3 
Sgurco: 	on the basis of official statistics. 
Not including Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago. 
12/ Including changes in stocks. 
/3,• Employment  
E/01,12/ 826 
Page I-50 
3. EmPloyment_problems  
(a) RrIplovment structure and trends  
Among the most salient features of the Latin American economies at 
the close of the nineteen-sixties are employment problems. Although they 
have been taking shape in the course of the regionis economic history, in 
recent years they have attained proportions such that far more importance 
must be attached to them in the diagnosis of over-all development problems. 
The already high gro-Ah rate of the manpower supply rose between 
11.90 and 1969, when the total volume of manpower increased by almost 
per eJnt; this implicas ars annul rae of 2.8 per cent, higher even than 
the 2,6 per cent recordad during tLe preceding decade (see table I-20). 
This over-all trend reflects the differing positions of different countries; 
a few - for instance, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela - showed annual 
increuents of more than 3 per cent, whereas others - Argentina and Uruguayj  
ex=pe matained the same rate as in previous years. 
These labour force trends were determined by a variety cf factors. 
In the first place, the Latin American population kept up and indeed 
increased its rate of growth which averaged 2.9 per cent per annum from 
1960 onwards (see table 1-21), 
Again;  from the second half of the nineteen-fifties onwards, the 
population groups of working age increased raster than the total populationj  
the ove-all 1950-59 trend being ultimately reversed (ee table T-22).19/ 
A break-down by urban and rural population reveals that the urban 
population expended rapidly, and will probably account for over 54 per cent 
of the total population in 1969 This expansion, largely attributable to 
inmigration.of surplus agricultural workers with their families, aggravated 
the urban unemployment problem, which was in any case gaining in magnitude 
as a result of the relatively slow rate of over-ali development and the 
application at least in the more dynamic sectors - of techniques that 
weaken manpower absorption capacity. Hence the spread of unemployment and 
under-employment in the various branches of activity was accompanied by the 
emergence of large groups of marginal urban population, engaged in occupations 
of minimal productivity, 
22/ As a general rule„ data for Latin America do not include Barbados, 
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LATIR AMER1CAil/ABáóRPTION OF LABOUH FORCE INCREMENT 
SECTOR&OF THE ECONOMY 














Totll lá.810 100.0 2s 6 18 276 100.0 2,8 
exc3udlag, 
33 642 2.5 15 891 .1specifj,:k1 activities 
A7rj.u1ture 3 865 26.1 1.3 4 465 24.4 1.5 
:oduztion and non- 
goods and 
basic services 4 212 28.4 3.1 4 590 25.1 2.1 
1,5n7;.ng 119 0.8 2.0 147 0.8 2i 
nufacturing 2 150 14.5 2.6 2 124 11.6 .-., 45,.."  9 4 
FActory industry 1 530 10.3 3.7 1 463 8.0 7.9 
Al'cisan-type industry 620 4.2 1.5 661 3.6 1.6 
venstruction 721 4.9 3.2 1 118 6:1 4.0 
B..alc services 1 222 8.2 4.6 1 201 6.6 3.4 
6 733 45›5 4.7 9 221 50.5 Z, -‘,  
Cc nmerce and finance 1 947 13.2 4.1 2 559 14.0 4.3- 
Miscellaneous services 3 619 24.4 4.5 4 277 23.4 4,0 
bh,..pecified activities 1 167 7.9 7.3 2 385 13.1 8.2 
rource: ECLA, on the basis of offici¿31 statistics. 




The distribution of the population between urban and rural areas 
also differs from one country to andther. For example, a comparison of 
trends overthe•lasttwo decades shows that in Argentina, Brazil and 
Guatemala the growth rate'of the urban population declined and that of 
the rural population underwent no change, while the retes of increase of 
the total population slackened in the first two countries and remained 
constant in the last-named. In Mexico„ the retes of expansion of the 
rural populátion cOntinued te stand at the same level and there was a 
slight acceleration of the urban population growth rate, with the result 
that the over-a]1 ráte rose sharply. In Nicaragua, downward fluctuations 
in the demographic glewth trend were mar'ked in the urban and slight in 
the rural sector, while similar movements took place in Ecuador, but in 
an utward direction; the ratos of increase of the total population were 
constant in Nicaragua and roce steeply in Ecuador. 
These trends were partly responsible for considerable changes in the 
structure of the economically active population. One of the most striking 
modifications is the decrea$e of the proportion corresponding to agriculture 
which by the end of the nineteen-sixties may represent only a little more 
than 42 per cent of the total working population, as against over 53 per 
cent in 1950, although in the meantime the rate of decline has gradually 
dwindled (see table 1-20). A seceed outstanding feature is the fact 
tiat the relative contraction in the share of agricultere is no'e reflected 
in significantly lar¿er proportions of employment in the sectors producing 
non-agricultura) goods and basic services, whose relative importance in 
this respect inceased little in the nineteen-fifties and by barely 
0.2 per cent in the nineteen-sixties. 
Special mention should be made of manufacturing, which accounted for 
a decreasing proportion of total employment because the share of factory 
industry was virtually frozen and that of artisan-type industry steadily 
deenneJ,at much the same rate in both decades. The labour force in the 
construction sector gained in relative importance in the nineteen-sixties 
just as it had in the preceding decade, but the proportion absorbed by 




In these circumstarices, the relEtiVe falling-off in agricultural 
employment was offset chiefly in commerce and finance and in the "other 
services" sector (general government and miscellaneous services). This 
.r.flects the pressure-of the labour supply on the activities in question, 
in face of the limited increase of employment opportunities in the sectors 
Droducing goods and basic services. A still more suggestive symptom is 
the sharp upswing in the share of "unspecified activities" (which in 
essence signify unemployment or employment in marginal services with 
extremely low productilrity), The proportion represented by such activities 
5n 1950 (2.3 per tent) had more than doubled by 1969 (reaching 5.6 per 
rent), and most of this increment can be seen to have accumulated from 
1960 onwards (see table 1-21), 
The decrease in the percantage of the total eccnomically active 
population corresponding to the agricultura' labour forro is more marked 
in sone countries than in others. In Venezuela, for instante, the sharp 
downward trend observable in the nineteen-:ities hardly weakened at all 
in. the following decade; in Mexico the decline, already rapid in the 
nineteen-fifties, continued at a still faster rate; elsewhere, on the 
other hand - in Brazil and Colombia, for example - the earlier rates of 
decrease were drastically reduced, The relative importar.ce of Ecuador!s 
agricultura' labour force, which had increased in the nineteen-fifties„ 
declined apprecably. 
Several countries where the proportion of manpower employed in 
manufacturing had risen considerably in the nineteen-fifties - including 
Arzentina, 	)111z1 Venezuela - witnessed a steep downturn in this trend 
in the following decade. In Chile, on the other hand, the reverse took 
place. 
The rates of increase of the labour force employed in the services 
sectors (commerce and finance, general government and miscellaneous 
services), which were. rapid in Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela in the 
nineteen-fifties, slowed down in the nineteen-sixties, whereas just the 
cpposite happened in Ecuador, The share of unspecified activities which 
is highly significant, as has been pointed out, inasmuch as it is 
/indicative of 
E/CN.12/825 
PageeI -51 - 
- - 
indipative.of thescale.of employment and under-employment in marginal 
services -inereased,very,fast in the nineteen-sixties in relation to 
thenineteen-fifties;,but,tte expansion was greatest in Chile, Colombia 
and Mexice, more mederate4n.Ecuador and Guatemala, and relatively slight 
in Argentina and Venezuela., 
To revert to Latin eAmerica as a whole, it may be estimated that 
in the ninpteen-sixties a little.over 60 per cent of the increase in the 
labour force,was actually absorbed into economic activities - a lower 
proportion than the 62,5 per cent recorded in the preceding decade. This 
ímplies that the annual groieth rate of the working population was higher 
in the nineteen-sixties than in the nineteen-fifties (2.6 and 2.8 per 
cent, respectively), but if the employment figures for "unepecified 
activities" are not taken into account, the real absorption rate falis 
from 2.5 per cent in the first of the two decades comrarcd to 2„3 per 
cent in the second (see table 1-22). 
If at!rention is turned to the contribution made by the various 
setters of econovic activity to the absorption of the labour force 
increment, it can be seen that in the nineteen-sixties the trends noted 
in the preceding decade continued, inasmuch as the expansion of employment 
in the sectors producing goods was inadequate, and it was still the 
services sector that showed the greater absorption capacity, During the 
decade in question, agriculture absorbed only 24.4 per cent of the total 
increase in the labour force. The intake in manufacturing was barely 
11.6 per cent, a proportion which eompares unfavourably with the 
previous decadc's figure of 14.5 per cent; the decrease was particularly 
significant in the case of factory industry (from 3.7 to 2.9 per cent). 
The absorption capacity of the mining sector slightly increased from one 
period to the next, while the proportion of the manpower increment tapped 
by the basic services dropped from 8.2 to 5.6 per cent. Within the 
services sector, different trends were pursued. "Commerce and finance" 
still constituted the group of activities that absorbed one of the largest 
shares of the increase in the economically active population; the 
proportion absorbed by "other services" decreased; and the percentage drawn 
into "unspecified activities" followed a rising trend, the significance of 




When the foregoing trends and structure of anployment are compared 
with the over-all and sectoral evolution of the product, certain points 
are brought to light that relate to productivity, defined in tercos of the 
product generated per worker. Broadly speaking, in the Latin American 
economy as a whole, increases in productivity were slightly smaller in 
the nineteen-sixties than in the preceding decade, since the average 
annual rate was 2.2 per cent in 1950-59, and in all likelihood was not 
more than 2 per cent in 1960--69 (see table 1-23). These are relatively 
low figures in comparison with the rates at which productivity improves 
in more advanced countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Japan, etc., and, in general with the indexes for the countries 
with centrally planned economies. 
The sectoral growth rates of productivity also compare unfavourably 
with ;hose achieved in other parts of the world. In agriculture, the 
rate of increase speeded up between the two periods (from 2.1 to 2.5 per 
cent)s, since the absorpticri of manpower in this sector la;* ed considerably 
behind the e;epansion of the agricultura' product. In minina, productivity 
increment were far smaller in 1960-69 than in the nineeen-fifties„ 
basically owing to a less dynamic growth rate of the sectoral product2  
for which Venezuelan petroleum was largely responsible. If Venezuelan 
petroleum is exciuded, the rate of increase of the sectoris productivity 
still shows a downward trend, but the decrease is much smaller (from 
3.1 per cent in 1950-59 to 2.8 per cent in 1960-69). 
If the rate at which productivity in manufacturing - especially 
in factory industry - improved between the two periods considered is 
insignificant by non-Latin-American standards, it is fairly rapid in 
relation to the Latin American economy as a whole, and moreover, higher 
levels are reached than in any of the regionts other economic activities. 
In this sector the growth rate of the product was relatively high and 
fairly steady in both periods; the labour force, on the other hand, expanded 
a good deal more slowly, especially in factory industry, where its ratee 
of increase dropped from 3.7 per cent in 1950-59 to 2.9 per cent in 
1960-69. The position is similar, altholgh the trends are more marked„ in 
basic services, while in the construction sector a comparison of the 
ratee at which.manpower absorption on the one hand, and the product on 
the other, increased between the two decades leads to the conclusion that 
productivity rose at a rate of 1 per cent in 1960-69, as against 1.4 per 
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In the "commerce and finance" sector, high rates of absorption of 
the labour force were accompanied in both decades by relatively rapid 
growth rates of the product, with the result that the annual increase in 
productivity was clOse to 1 per cent. It should be noted, however, that 
ín this sector it is not strictly possible to speak of physical output 
trends, so that the relevant indicator must rather be taken as reflecting 
income and, in essence, rates of profit. The "other services" sector, 
fermed by general government activities and miscellaneous services, of 
which the latter carry the greater weight in employment and product figures, 
shcwed a recovery in the declining trend of productivity - here again to 
be interpreted in tercos of incnme - which is mainly attributable to the 
fall in manpower absorption rates. If in addition unspecified activitie$ 
- in which the population increase is notorious - are taken into account, 
pluctivity would seem to have deteriorated in the ninetecn-sixties at 
much the same rate as in the preceding decade. 
(b) Characteristics and trends of unemrlovment  and unser-employment 
From the body of infomicu. that exists on the subject it is 
apparent that many of the.Latin American economies are finding it increasingly 
difficult to absorb an adequate amount of manpower finto productive jobs, 
particularly in the basic goods and services sectors. 
This situation is reflected particularly clearly in urban areas, 
where marginality is growing in a number of broad social strata. The result 
is that wliat have been labelled "unspecified activities" are acquiring 
ever-increasing importance in the structure of the labour force, as was 
pointed out earliw in this chapter. The decline in employment 
opportunities is also beginning to affect the rural-urban movements, as 
the vast differences between the living levels of the lower strata in the 
country and the toins are gradually ironed out. The outcome has been that 
unemploymeht and under-employment, which used to be relatively slight 
have become at least far more obvious in the nineteen-sixties. 
It is impossible to gauge the extent of this phenomenon from the 
statistics available. However, mainly for the sake of illustration, it 




.labour resources should distingulsh .between its three forms, namely, open 
unemployment, which is:fairly easy to assess; seasonal and oircumstantial 
unemployment; and -under-employmentl:whick.is very difficult to calculate. 
for, various.reasons,-although some'orders.of magnitude can be arrived at. 
In general, dt_4J•taken as axiomatic that there is more under- 
amployrent-thanTunemployment, Whether voluntary or involuntary. Some 
truth is siso attributed;to over-all estimates according to which the 
under-utilization,of human resources representa about a third of the total 
labour potential: voluntary and involuntary unemployment would account for 
lesa than half thn total volume of urder-utilized resources, hile under-
employment might cover as rnuch as tro-thirds„ 
To arrive at more precise,figures, it would be necessary to make 
more detailed study of there phenomena and their relation to the structure 
of population and of emplcyment. Any survey of this kind musa, however, 
bear in mirad the fact that the characteristics of unemployment tend to 
gloss over the real scope of the problem. Hence, it would be essentia1 
to consider such aspects as the followdng: 
(i) The census.figures for the economically active population that 
is. unemployed or seeking work for the first time are remarkably amall, 
and in some cases are even lower than the figures for unemployment recorded 
in the key areas of the differsnt Latin American countries, Post of the 
persona genuinely unemployed are described as belonging to the economically 
inactive population. 
(il) Nor do the records of persons out of work reveal the full 
extent of :Inemployment, either because the records are not complete or 
because unemployed persons whol as family workers, find occupation in 
such activities as agriculture, crafts, small-scale commerce and personal 
services, are not taken into account. They represent the direct conversion 
of open unemployment into underemploYment, about which more will be 
said 
(iii) Most of the people who fail to find employment, including 
those looking for their first job and those who have been unemployed for 
some time and may even have ceased to loOk for work, are classified in 




precisely this category of unemployment that forms the bulk of open 
unemployment and which cannot be quantified without analysing the rate 
of participation of the employed economically active population and of 
different population groups of working age, classified by sex and age. 
Broadly speaking, young people of both sexes between 15 and 20 years of 
age, who neither go to school nor work, although they are not classified 
as looking for their first job, belong to this category of unemployment. 
So do nearly all adult men of under 65 years of age who do not work or 
live in institutions, and a large proportion of non-working adult women 
of under 65 years of age The eize of this proportion is influenced by 
the kind of employment opportunities open to women of 20 to 40 years of 
age because of child-bearing, and by the difficulty that women over that 
age have in finding work if they have never been employed before. 
(iv) Voluntary unempleyment, which crcps up bo 	cconcmically 
active and the economically inactive population, is greater in '.he latter. 
The origins of this categoy of unemployment are varied, but the most 
troica' is that of persons who for a long time, have been unsuccessful 
in finding work that they consider compatible with their social status 
and who may therefore cease to look for any. Problems of a social nature 
may also lead certain strata in the younger age groups to vegetative. 
Some people are also employed in unoroductive marginal occupations which 
can be ry,Irded as marginal under-emnloyment. In short, the line of 
demarcation between involuntary and voluntary unemployment is clearly 
hard to draw, especially when someone has been out of work for a long 
time, and when there is no olear distinction between open and disguised 
unemployment. 
(v) The population unrecorded in the censuses, which is estimated 
from the census omissions, probably oomprises the peopleliving in marginal 
areas and, to an even greater extent, people in urban centres where the 
shortcomings of the census machinery and the extreme marginality of 
some population elements, who are prevented by circumstances from having 
any fixed abode, lead to omissions. In both cases, a large proportion of 




Between open unemployment ánd.under-employment there is an intermediate 
category of non-chronic)  seasonal and circumstantial unamployment. 
Seasonal unemployment:ordurs in agricultural work)  especially on 
land ownecUby.others or in industries that process agricultural commodities. 
It varíes in kind depending on the characteristics of the. work in 
question, and.is equivalent to the under-empioyment that exists among 
members of the labour force who work'for a_large part of the year on 
their own land. -This type of unemployment is particularly marked in 
Latin America, where means of using human resources during periods of 
unemployment have not yet been developed. 
The fluctuating levels of certain activities, and of construction 
in particular, are' continually throwing larde numbers of people out of 
work. This is especially true of unskilled labour, which is mainly 
rural in origín. 
The corollary to this situation is its depressive effect on the 
level of activity in a11ied industries - such as the building materials 
industry, particularly the wood products industry, which reduces 
employment still further. 
Typical under-employment, of a chronic or permanent kind, is found 
in occupations in which only a suall part of the available time is used 
or the effort involved represents a mere fraction of the personts 
capacity for productive work in the prevailing socio-economic context. 
There is, in addition, marginal,unemployment, which occurs in 
occupations that are totally unproductive and in fact simply mask open 
unenployment. 
Bcth types of under-employment represent an enormous volume of 
under-utilized labour resources. The former is'quantitatively more 
important but the latter tends to grow more rapidly. Under the conditions 
prevailing in Latin America, typical under-employment exists on a massive 
scale in ers21,-scale agriculture, crafts, cottage industry, small-scale 





Under-employment is seldom found in the activitiés that form the 
"modem" sector of the economy, but it is characteristic of the "primitive" 
sector.21/ In the "intermediaste" sector, the situation varíes: in 
industrial activities (manufacturing, mining, construction) in which 
enterprises of a relatively low technical level predominate, the under-
employment is also fairly limited, however, low labour productivity may 
be. The situátion is entirely different in agriculture and in service 
enterprises and units, which are usually small in scale. 
The quantitative assessment of unemployment, which has been 
analysed aboye in qualitative tercos, presents serious problems as regards 
the availability of information and the method of calculation. Arnong 
other ventures in this respect, an evaluation for 1960 by the Latín 
American Institute for Economic and Social Planning in conjunction with 
the Latín American Demographic Centre 22  provides data which give at 
least some idea of the magnitude of the problem. In. fact, it appears 
that unemployment and under-employment (with the latter expressed in tercos 
of equivalent unemployment) may involve about a quarter of the total 
economically active population, that is, about 25 million people 
(see table 1-24). The bulk is in agriculture, followed by "other servicea" 
and "unspecified activities", but there is also considerable unemployment 




21/ The térms "modem", "intermediate" and "primitive" are explained 
in the following section. 
22/ "Elementos ara la elaboración de una •olítica de desarrolló con 
integración para América Latina" (INST/5.3 L.3), chapter II. 
A large amount of unemployment is to be found in the economically 
inactive population. This has been confirmed by some preliminary 
internal studies recently prepared for the Ottawa Plan (see "Lasa 
disponibilidades de fuerza de traba'o en América Latina", preliminary 
estirnates for twelve countries). The tentative figures, which Will 
be revised, estímate that the number of unemployed solely among 
women of working áge engaged in household tasks amounted to 
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These aspects of labour unemployment will be reverted to later when 
the heterogeneity of the Latin American economies is discussed in terms 
of productivity strata. It will then tecomal quite olear that the 
I?under-utilization" of the labour force is unquestionably a question of 
criteriafor ~ocie grOwth, majar chánges in developnent patterns. and 
lang periods of time. 
(c) DistriburUon of the labour force by strata of productivity  
For a study in depth of employment problems in the Latin American 
cconomies it seems useful to analyse the marked disparities in productivity 
leveis between different strata in each sector of ecenewie activity. 
It is common knowledge that in most of the Latin American economies 
'.he ineorporation of technical progress. has not been a widespread process 
extending to a varying but considerable degree, to all sectors and branches 
of economic activity. Essentially, the assimilation of technical know-how 
has been concentrated in specific strata, while large segments of the 
economy have been completely excluded from the process, Thus ecollomi_c 
structure have gredually become markedly heterogeneous, with clearly 
differentiated productivity strata, in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms. One group, which may be described as the nmodern" stratum, 
ccnsists of economic units operating fairly efficiently as regards 
e7,7ganization, rising productivity, and with fairly high technological 
lcvels and amounts of capital per worker employed. At the other end of 
the scale is the "primitive" stratum, which comprises economic units 
operating at extremely low leveis of productivity, with scarcely any 
mechanizaticie and a negligible stock of capital, and using the most 
out-dated techniques. The. "intermediate" stratum lies eameWhere between 
the two extremes in regard to technical progress and productivity. 
This marked differentiation between strata from the standpoint of 
productivity is observable not only in the whole economy but also in 
each of the main economic sectors. In other words, the point is not 
only that average productivity is noticeably lower in some sectors than 
in others, but within each sector the disparities between productivity 




This makes for a development model which necessarily has considerable 
impact on the,characteristics of income distribution and employment 
problems. From the employment•angle, it is obvious that inasmuch as a 
large proportion of over-all economic growth is concentrated in the 
modern sector, the systemis ability to absorb an active population which 
is gro nig fairly rapidly depends upon the attainment of high rates of 
growth for the total product and the maintenance of equally high rates of 
capital formation. Otherwise, it would not be possible progressively to 
reduce employment,in the primitive stratum, and the already pronounced 
disparities in productivity between one stratum and another would be 
accentuated. The economic and social repercussions of a situation of 
this kird might necessitate a different policy for the absorption of 
technical know-how which, without neglecting the absorption of advanced 
techniques in selected activities, would be aimed mainly at improving 
productivity in the intermediate and primitive strata. 
Of course, there is not much point in trying to force decisions on 
such options at the levet of Latin America as a whole. Each specific 
situation will depend on the relative proportions of the different 
productivity strata, the stage of development reached, and other factors 
which vary considerably from ene Latin American country to another. 
A quantitative appraisal of thls phenomenon presents serious 
difficulties because of the lack of basic statistics. Thus all that can 
be done for the time being is to make sone provisional estimates, which 
will at least indicatethe scale and varying intensity of this phenomenon 
in the different countries and sectors of activity. 
Subject to.these reservations,. it is estimated that in the Whole 
of Latin America one-eighth of the economically active population is 
employed and about half the product is generated in the modern stratum. 
On the other hand, probably about one-third of the working population 
belongs to the primitive stratum, which qccounts for considerably less 
than 10 per cent of the total product. Thus sharp differences in manpower. 
productivity may be deduced, which is probable in a ratio of over 20 to 




As stated aboye, these relationships vary widely,from country to 
country over the whole of Latin America. In Argentina, for instante, the 
proportion of employment in the modem stratum is much higher than the 
average for the region and much lower than in the primitive. stratum; 
moreover, the modern stratum accounts for a higher proportion of the 
product and the primitive stratum for a lower proportion, which mákes 
the disparities in productivity less pronounced. The opposite is true 
oi other countries in the region, where the share of the primitive stratum 
is smaller, the modern stratum is less developed, and the productivity 
ratios reveal sharper disparities than for Latin America as a whole. 
T'ee differences noten in the economy as a whole reappear to varyinz 
extents in each of the major sectors of economic activity. For exampin, 
considering the agricultural sector for the region as a whole, the modern 
stratum probably represents less than 10 per cent of the total in tercos 
of employment, while its contribution is one-third to half of the total 
product. in the same sector, the importance of the primitive stratum is 
rclatively high from the employment point of view, while its contribution 
to the product is very low. 
The situation is entirely different in mining, which is probably 
the sector with the highest proportion of employment in the modern stratum 
(one-third te 40 per cent of the total) and the one which accounts for 
most of the proc3uct (about 90 per cent). Another notelle feature of 
mining is the persistence of a primitive stratum which still absorbs 
about one-euarter of the econornically active population employed in the 
sector and wiere the differences in productivity mith respect to the • 
modem stratum are probable greater than in any other sector of activity. 
In manufacturing, the situation in factory industry differs from 
that in artisan-type industry. In the former, the modem stratum 
probable represents about 30 per cent of total employment in manufacturing 
and accounts for some two-thirds of the product, its average productivity 
bcing about five times that of the ramainder of factory industry. This 
remainder might be said to represent an intermediate stratum, containing 




In artisantype. induetry, on'theother handl the primitive stratum 
predominates in terme:ofboth employment and the product; only a small 
propOrtion.of'this- segment',- Conalsting of recently developed activities 
which have sprung-up.aSSatellítés of some of the major industries, could 
be regarded.asa»múdern stratum.H 
• Eelationships:also vary-wideIY in the services sectors. In commerce 
and finance,for:exaMple, the:modem stratum absorbs perhaps one-sixth 
to one-seventhortotal employment in the sector and produces about half 
the product; the primítive stratum employs about 10 per tent of the total 
and its contribution to the product is very low. 
(d) 	Factors inf1_ue.n2iEg the emplol,nr1It situation and prospets  
The foregoing considerations help to forra an over-all picture of 
the kind of factors influencing the present and future employment 
situation in the Latin American económies. It seems useful to review 
the whole picture briefly. Although it involves somewhat arbitrary 
classifications, it may be useful to distinguish in this respect between 
structural.and institutional factors. 
(i) Structural factors. In its broadest sense, the rogt of the 
above-mentioned employment problems open unemployment rates„ degree of 
under-employment, and marked disparities in productivity levels lies.in 
the rate and, in particular, the pa'1.,tern of Latin American development. 
This developml.mt is bringing te light: the economic systems! growing 
inability to absorb the increase in manpower, especially in activities 
producing basic goods and services, and to provide reasonable levels of 
productivity and income. 
Cther sections of this study deal more fully with the eztent to 
which the over-all economic growth rate is weakening while the labour 
force is rapidly and steadily expanding. The same may be said about 
the ratos of capital' formation, to which may be added the absence of any 
great changos in the share of investment in directly productiva activities 
which provide stable and lasting employment, or in the amount invested 
in other activities connected with the expansion of housing and urban 





Among the productive activities themselves there is an evident 
tendency to invest a large proportion of the available'resources in 
capital-intensive activities with anall labour ábsorption capacity. 
Conversely, other sectors where those relationships favour an increase 
in employment are not expanding nearly so much. This means not only 
a decline in the product-capital ratio for the economy as a whole but 
also, in the case of many activities, a very high level of investment 
per worker (see table I-25), 
It is precisely these activities which form the modern stratum. 
Although their gnpwth is often a highly positive contribution to general 
economic development, consideriiig the erestion mainly fru: the employment 
point of view it is impossible not to perceive the implicit contradictions, 
inasmuch as,.at those levels of fixed investment per worker, they can 
absorb only a modest proportion of the annual increase in the active 
population 
Moreover, in many cases new up-to-date units are added, not to 
satisfy greater dernand, but merely to replace previously existing activities 
with lower productivity levels. This not only diminishes the capacity 
to increase employment but may even jeopardize existing employment 
levelsm?  
Purely for illustrative purposes, take a figure equal to half the 
lowest figure in table 1-25 (for example, 10,000 dollars per worker). 
The annual increase in the active population - some 2.35 million 
persons - requires the investment of about 24,000 million dollars 
at th e productivity levels. This would be equal to 20 per cent of 
Latin Americals present total product, and tiro and a half times the 
present volume of investment. 
251.  An investigation carried out in Cuba some time ago revealed that 
certain units belonging to the modern dynamic industries - including 
petroleum refining, copper rolling, and the manufacture of tyres, 
glass and glass products, fertilizers and cigarettes during the 
period 1952-58 stepped up their product by about '8 per cent annually 
(that of the non-segar industries rose by 5 per cent over the same 
period), while employment remained at the same level as at the 
beginning of the period. It is illuminating to examine the different 
measures adopted to solve the social . problems involved, which in 
some cases - for example, in cigarette manufactures - entailed 
continuing to pay a proportional wage to the surplus unskilled labour 
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These considerations do not suggest that employment needs are 
incompatible with the introduction of technical improvements aimed at 
attaining peak productivity levels in partiCular activities. On the 
contrary, such technical improvements might even be a prerecuisite for 
achieving over-all growth ratea which would reinforce the economic 
systems! capacity to absorb more manpower. They do suggest, however, 
that the role of the modern strata might have to be redefined and their 
development supplemented by more active policies governing employment and 
productivity improvements in other sectors of the economy. 
Naturally, the aboye relationships with respect to the heterogeneous 
distribution of the Latin American economies in strata with widely 
differing productivity levels are the result of, and in turn directly 
affect, other basic aspects of economic and social development. For 
example, the modem strata tend to receive a larger sbare of income in 
comparison with the intermediate and primitive strata. 
Concentration of income in the modern stratum, at the levels 
described aboye, leads to the concentration of effective demand in this 
stratum - that is, a substantial part of the market - and means that 
this demand is mainly for consumer goods, as a result of unequal income 
distribution and the influence of consumption patterns in the industrialized 
countries. These pressures determine a structure of production in the 
modem sector which is mainly characterized by the production of 
consumer goods, particularly consumer durables of a luxury type. Even 
the relatively small-scale production of capital goods is designed to 
reinforce the production machinery that is geared to consumption, to the 
detriment of a possible expansion of the capital goods sector which might 
bcost the development of the rest of the economy and ensure its ultimate 
capacity for self-sustained development. This last consideration is all 
the more important becáuse of the regiones difficult external payments 
position, which limits imports of capital goods and makes their supply 
from abroad highly 
Inasmuch as the modem stratum does not sufficiently influence the 
rest of the economy, by acting as a dynamic nucleus of development, a 




absorbed by,the non-modern strata; in practice, this has led to the 
formation of a "reserve army" of manpower, which directly or indirectly . 	. 	_ 
accentuates the disparitiesin income distribution. 
,In short, part_of the economy - the modem stratum - contributes 
most to the growth, of the product, mainly through a relatively accelerated 
increase in productivity, while absorbing little manpower. On the other 
hand, the non-modern strata are growing slowly and must somehow absorb 
the high proportion of the increase in the economically active popigation 
which is deprived of access to the modern strata; consequently, they show. 
little improvement in productivity. The sluggish over-all rate of growth, 
the effects of the relatively high concentration of income on the 
composition of demand, and the dependence on external technologies are 
other factors influencing this pattern of growth. 
Although all these factors must be oweidered in the broader context 
of general dovelopment problems, they none the less form part of a 
structural pattern of the basic causes underlying unemployment and under-
employment problems. 
(u) IwUkElikg10.1 factore, The structui.ia,limitations referred 
to aboye are usually accentuated by other factors which are institutional 
in character. This is the case, for example, with the levet„ 	skill 
of the labour force and the needs arising from the assimilatión pf 
technological progress. The fact that the labour force is not homogenous 
is Igen knnwn: most countries of the reglan have large surpluses of 
unskilled labour side by side with a relative dearth of skilled labour. 
Eesides creating a need for vocational training, this usually has a 
limiting effect on over-all labour absorption capacity. For example, 
the fact that not enough skilled labour is available often means that 
wodernization is pushed forward too fast, limiting both skilled and 
unskilled employment, a situation which is not at all uncommon in industry. 
Other factors of particular importante come into play in agriculture, 
which is exceptional in that increased modernization can help to expand 
rather than restrict employment opportunities. As land 4.8 used more 
intensively, modern fertilization techniques are applied, more rational 




changes, productivity and employment per unit of area increase proportionally. 
This can be a factor of great importance in view of the very high 
proportion of the economically active population still employed in 
agriculture and the influence of ruralurban migration on the problems of 
urban unemployment and under-employment. However, its potential is still 
largely unrealized because of well-known institutional obstacles, which 
include the characteristics of land tenure and, although of lesser 
importance, the scarcity of skilled workers in the rural labour force. 
The actual way in which technological improvements are introduced 
has a great deal to do with the contradictions that often exist between 
employment and productivity targets. In general, the improvements are 
assimilated passively - the technologies used in industrialized economies 
are merely copied -,access to the technical know-how depends on the 
availability of funds for investment in it, and there is a risk of it 
being capital intensive and absorbing little of the labour f orce. The 
proportion of technical progress achieved through regional te¿nnical and 
scientific research, which would help to ensure that the technologies 
used were more in line with the resources available to the Latin American 
economies, is much smaller. 
Another set of institutional factors related to the criteria used, 
in selecting production techniques, particularly by 'private enterprises, 
which are derived from the relative prices of capital and labour. Since 
capital is scarce and labour relatively abundant the relationship of the 
social ccsts of there two factors is completely changed if they are 
expressed in market prices. Several methods of stimulating investment 
actually tend to lower the relative price of capital goods, while the 
effect of social. policy measures is often to raise the relative price of 
labour. With regard to social policy, the effect of social security and 
the methods of financing it is of special importance; if it is fixed as a 
proportion of the total wage bill, then it becomes in effect a tax on the 
use of labour and thus encourages the use of more labour-saving technologies. 
This is another topic that has not been throughly looked int() with a view 
to developing new methods, although attention has been drawn more than once 
to the probable effect of financing social security through direct taxation. 
Very often, the choice between technologies with different implications 
for employment is made on the basic of extra-economic criteria„ as, for 
example, when preferente goes, for politico-social reasons, to production 
techniques that limit the number of persons employed in a particular 
/entere r,  
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enterprise; this hampers the formation or growth of trade unions. 	At 
other times, profits are reinvested in the same enterprise matead of being 
used to open up other limes of production; this leads t* unnecessary or 
premature replacement of machinery with a more mechanized equipment which 
affects, directly or indirectly the possibility of increasing employment 
opportunities. 
As long as situations such as these continue, and markedly weaken 
the ability of economies to provide employment for the growing economically 
active population, it is quite natural for some labour circles to exert 
pressure and to secure agreements which increase their opportunities of 
employment or safeguard the positions they have attained. h'ence the 
proliferation of posta created by statute in the public sector; the 
increase in the number of staff carrying out the same work, wh2'ch 
resulta in under—employment; the employment of staff without definite 
work who are not organically linked to the wtole; the contraction of 
working hours in certain activities; the creation of logus institutions 
to give marginal or semi—marginal employment; and the compulsory retention 
of staff hired under legal statute. The institutional repercussions of 
these pressures — as far as public administration and services tare concerned — 
usually take the forro of the creation of artificial jobs. In private 
enterprises, the most common forids are the compulsory retention of workers 
who have been hired; increasing the number of posts corresponding to particular 
functions; resistance to modernization, either organizational or technological 
or both, etc. In view of current unemployment and the fact that it is likely  
to ex5.st for some tire, the trend is to set up semi—institutional and other 
services simpiy because certain sectors of the labour fource are unemployed. 
Lastly, there are those activities and services in which employment is a 
mcnopoly, as with port workers, stevedores and the like. 
This kind of pressure is only really effective, however, when it comes 
from those segments of the working population which are in the modern sector. 
It is leas so when it comes from segments which are not in the modern sector, 
i.e., from precisely those segments in which unemployment and under—employment 
are most apparent. 
See The procesa of industrial development,in Latín Americe, (United 
Nations publication, Sales No.: 66.II.G.4) for a more th,Jiough 




1. In the first place, it was considered essential that the exchange 
ratos should be those which best ensured the comparability of income levels 
as between the Latin American countries themselves; alternatively between the 
reglen as a whole and other countries or areas. This principie carried 
fundamental weight in the final decision, which was also influenced by 
practical circumstances, such as the availability of data, and the practical 
of undertaking short—term supplamentary research which would 
provii' a complete set of purchasing power equivalents with alternative 
groupings of goods and services. 
2. The above—mentioned s-5udy on the measurement of real income in 
Iatin America put forward various formulae for measuring the dollar 
equivalent of the purchasing power of each Iatin American currency, 
depending on the weighting system adopted. The most interesting of 
these involved: 
(a) Weightings based on an average per capita expenditure pattern in 
Latin America 1960 (formula (3) in the mathematical appendix); 
(b) Weightings based on a per capita expenditure pattern in the 
United States in 1960 (formula (4) in the mathematical appendix); 
(e) A geometria crossing of the foregoing results, giving an approximate 
average expenditure pattern for both areas (formula (5) in the mathematical 
appendix); 
(d) Ari additional variant in which price relatives are weighted 
according to the per capita expenditure structure in each country (formula 
(6) in the mathematical appendix). 
3. The first of these formulae has the drawback of combining a Latin 
American average for physicai quantities of each of the goods and services 
comprised in the market—basket with United States prices. The objection 
can be raised that these prices, taken from a country with a high level of 
per capita incomes, result in a relative price structure that may differ 
widely from the average structure in Latin America. This assumes that a 
common currency for expressing Latin American prices on a uniform basis 
already exists. However, as this is not a priori the case, the formula in 
question could be accepted as a reasonable approximation. 
4. Formula (b) was also thought to be an unsatisfactory solution of 
the weighting problem, as it transfers to Latin America the average per capita 




conditioned by different. tastes and by an income level far higher than the 
Latin American average.:
:.. third formula (c) although also open to criticism, seemed 
the most zatisfactory,'. asits results, being in the form of an average, are 
based onza Weighting structure which deviates the least from each of the 
individual expenditure patterns for the different countries included in 
the comparison. Furthermore, it has the practical advantage of resembling 
formulae usad in 'similar income comparisons for other areas, thus making 
the resulta more easily comparable with estimates already available for 
other parts cf the world., 
6. The fourth variant was considerad an interesting possibility for 
binary comparisons, averaging individual country expenditure patterns 
with that of the United States. Clearly, however, it does not meet the 
requisite of maximum inter-regional and intra-regional comparability 
which was established earlier as a basic criterion for selecting a formula 
suitable for measuring the purchasing power of Latin American currencies in 
terms of dollars, and for calculating the income of the Latin American 
countries and of the region as a whole in this same currency. 
7. There is yet another problem. Although a single raarket-basket of 
goods and services has been referred to here, in actual fact estimates of 
purchasing power equivalents were calculated by applying the formulae 
described to groups of goods representative of private consumption, 
governmental consumption, fixed investment and inventory changes (the 
official exchange rate being taken as representative in the case of the 
balance-of-trade position). One way of estimating the real income of a 
Latin American country in terms of dollars would be to apply the corresponding 
purchasing power equivalents to each of the above-mentioned sectors of the 
gross domestic product, measured at merket prices and expressed initially in 
the currency of each country. The sum of these components would then give 
a total for the gross domestic product in dollars. This result would differ 
in absolute figures from the estímate obtainable when a single exchange rate, 
based on purchasing power parities but calculated with a single market-basket 
comprising both consumer and investment goods, is applied to the total gross 
domestic product expressed in national currency. In a similar way, differences 




rnplication when the country's gross domestic product, expressed in 
national currency, is related to the dollar total obtained by adding up 
the various components of expenditure. 
8. To reach á decision on this point, both conceptual factors and 
practical considerátions relating to the use of the formulae in ECLA 
studies were taken into account, and the decision was made to adopt a 
single exchange rate for the base year, calculated on the basis of a 
single market-basket of goods and services. The reasons for this decision 
was as follows: 
(a) By this means, maximum intra-regional comparibility is ensured. 
The application of differcnt purchasing power equivalents for each component 
cr expenditure in each country would on the other hand have implied weighting 
each country's expenditure in accordance with the size of its majos aggregates 
(in national currency terms). This would in turn distort comperability 
between countries or groups of countries within the region. 
(b) There are no purchasing power equivalents which can be applied 
to a breakdown of the gross domestic product by sectors of activity. 
Consequently, any sectoral analysis for the Latin American countries would 
have to use, for the time being, a single exchange rete, and this would 
give rise to a number of inconsistencies between analyses of national 
income by type of expenditure and by sector of origin. 
(c) The present application of the new exchange rates is regarded 
as an initial phase. Additional modifications may be made in the future, 
once further research is carried out to provide a neans of meeting the 
needs alluded to in sub-paragraph (b). 
(d) If purchasing power equivalents based on component sectors are 
used to determine an implicit exchange rate, practical difficulties arise 
since t e resultant rate fluctuates from one year to another, according to 
the differing composition of the gross domestic product. This happens 
even if data are expressed in constant prices for each country. The 
country's growth rate then differs, depending on whether it is measured in 
constant prices for a base year in national currency units, or at constant 
prices converted into dollars by the aggregative method described. 
(e) It is recognised, on the other hand, that analyses of expenditure 
components, such as fixed investment, can justifiably be made on the basis 




9. It should hówever be noted that there is one small exception to the 
general method of applying a purchasing power exchange rate based on a 
single market—basket ,representing the total gross domestic product, and 
therefore applicab1 to.all its components (whether by type of expenditure 
or by sector oforigin). As already pointed out, the balance—of—trade 
position is converted into dollars by applying the official exchange 
rato prevailing in:the base year. The.reason for this empirical decision is 
to avoid creating discrepancies in relation to existing balance—of—payments 
estimates in dollars, for which the official exchange rates are used. 
Mbreover, the trade exchange retes are considered satisfactory for the 
objectives in mind since they reflect the actual impact of this sector 
within a countryvs economy. 
The procedure described will give rise to a minor stati9tical discrepancy 




PURCHASING POWER EQUIVAIENTS OF LATIN AMERICAN CURRENCIES 


























































Souroe: ECLA, Special Studies Section. 
2/ Measurements effected in June 1960. Estimates of Latin 
American and United States market—baskets prepared by 
application of the geometric—mean formula. 
12/ In view of the basic data available for Brazil, it seemed 
more appropriate to adhere to the exchange rate previously 
used. 




The formulae for the aggregative-type and fixed-weighting price 
relatives are asf9110w4„:, 
L,P 	Pik Cji6  ku 
-7- Piu Q15 
p,F
ku 	
i=1 Pik Qiu 	 (2) 
Piu Ciu  
i=1 
(i = 1, 2, 3 0111•1,0j11.40010.1Ln items) 
(o = a, b, c 	k 	m countries) 
in which: 
k is any Latín American country, and u is the United States; 
Pik, Piu are the Prices of ítem i in countries k and u; 
":2 and WIti are average per capita quantities purchased of one and 
the same ítem in Latín America and the United States, 
respectively; 
L.P . 
l ku s a price index for country k relative to country u with 
quantitative weightings based on the Latín American consumer 
market-basket; 
P,P ku is a similar index with weightings based on United States 
expenditure patterns. 
As purchasing power is in inverse ratio to the level of prices, it will 
suffice to invert the preceding formulae to measure the purchasing power of 
any Latin American country k in relation to the United States. Formula (3) 
uses the average Latin American weightings and formula (4) those of the 
United States. 
mku 
Rku = \ / d9Piui,r1j.  
1 	n 






















The combination of the two formulae by geametric crossing will give 
the practical solution adopted in the present study, as follows: 
If weightings differentiated by countries were applied, the following 
formula would be obtained for a given country k: 
n 
= ,c11 	 (6) 
i-1 
The foregoing result could also be crossed with United States expenditure 
patterns. The formula obtained would be similar to (5), but with average 
per capita quantities for each country and for the United States, in every case. 
/Chapter II 
Pik oik 




THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
1. Background information  
The patterns of economic growth reviewed in chapter I - characterized 
by the heavy concentration of advanced technology in certain sectors, with 
a pronounced effect on the structure of production capacity, income 
distribution and labour absorption capacity - are also clearly revealed 
in the regional distribution of eeonomic activities. 
The high degree of geographical concentration and the marked 
disparities Between areas in a single country are also part and parcel 
of this pattern, and are distinguishing features of the economic structure 
of the region towards the end of the present decade. Looking back over 
the past history of the problem, there are sone indicatons that circular 
relationships exist in which these regional features both spring from and 
tend to accentuate specific aspects of the development proeess, 
The present regional division of Latin America largely emerged in 
the colonial era. The first Spanish settlements were established close 
to the natural resources which most interested the colonists and to the  
means of communication with the metropolis. Subsequent events did little 
to charEe this division into regions. This is shown by the fact that, 
towards the end of the sixteenth century, sixteen of the twenty Latin 
American cities which are most densely populated today had already been 
founded. Although subregional centres were established latero most of 
the principal cities continued to be those founded in the eolodial era, 
and they gradually accumulated all kinds of administrative, trade 
(including port), cultural, religious and military activities.i" In 
addition, the metropolitan areas gained more and more influence over 
the tele economic, political and cultural life of each country. 
See Jorge Enrique Hardoy, El rol, de la ciudad en la modernización 
de América Latina uadernos  dell. Centro de Estudios Urbanos  




During the stage of noutward-directed growthn, the inajor development 
nodes were located in the vícinity of exportable resources. It was these. 
resources, not the national resources as a whose, which deterrnined the 
layout of the transport network, whose essential function was to facilitat,e 
the rapid and cheap transportation of agricultura' or mining products to 
the export centre. Thus each development node was more closely linked 
with other countries than with the rest of the national territory, and 
it had even fewer ties with other development nodes in he region. 
process resulted in export-oriented regional economies which have good 
communications with the metropolis and the exporting port ofter one 
and the same - but are virtually isolated from one anothen. Other 
characteristics are the development enclaves in unoccupied or sluggish 
economic areas, and the disconnected economies in which a growth impetus 
2/ 
at one point does not generaily spread to the whole area.-' 
2/ 	This process is revealed, for example, ir. the Plan deDeearroehtg 
Económico y Social del Peril 1967-1970,  in which it is stated Lhat 
the marked disparities in the use of Peruts econonic space, are 
closely bound up with the way in which the countryto economy Inas 
evolved, and are one of the most significant indicators of its 
under-development. Up to a few years ago, Peru had in general 
maintained a production structure typical of the primary export 
economies: on the one hand, an export sector devoted te,  the 
exploitation of agricultural and mining eesources, with efficient 
techniques, high productivity and a small volume of employment; on 
the other, a subsistente agricultura based on the system of latifundia 
and feudal production relationships, which provided a livelihood 
for the bulk of the population, In these circumstances, the 
hinterland, where these two peodaction activities had to be carried 
on, could neither obtain any of the benefits deriving from export 
activities nor generate substantial saving in that part of the 
economy which was not associated with international trade. It was 
therefore impossible to initiate a self-sustaining proceso of 
capital formation, and stagnation was the general rule in the 
provinces. In contrast, Lima went from strength to strength, and 
appropriated most of the profits accruing from production which 
were not remitted abroad, through the comercial, administrative 
and financial services it provided. This naturally led to the 
emergence of a dynamic centre based on export activities, and with 
importo as its main source of supply. In other words, it became a 
point in geographical space which was economically separate from 
the rest of the country except as a port for- export:mg primary 
products and a centre for expert formalities, with little or ro 
power to radiate its own progreso to other areas (National Planning 




The subsequent industrial deve3opment in the "inward-directed 
stagen did little to change this geographical pattern. In the first place, 
import substitution was directed mainly towards the existing market for 
manufactured-consumer goods, in order to take advantr.qe of the 
demand from the cities, which was unsatisfied because of the inelasticity.  
of the import capacity. Accordingly, the aim was to éstabliT1 the e:sT:ort 
substitution industries close to the consumer centres. The concentration 
of industry at these points continued to attract new capital and population, 
It mas only when the possibilities of.import substitution were nearing 
exhaustion that other locations were chosen, closer to certain natural 
resources; but el-en then, administration and often the final stages of 
processing remained in the traditional centres. 
To some extent, industry proper took the place of an artisan-type 
industry which had a mider regional distribution. This e: tains the 
loss of relative importante of many,secondary urban centres over an 
extensive geographical area. First, the traditional artisan-type products, 
such as textiles, were replaced by similar imported manufactures at lower 
prices, and once these artisan-type activities had disappeared or been 
relegated to the local handicrafts level, imported products were 
superceded by domestic products from the modera areas. 
Similarly, as local industry was strongly protected and there was 
no great incentive to improve efficiency and productivity, extra-economic 
factors, such as the convenience of living in the major urban centre, 
had a great influence on decisions regarding location, 
Once a set pattern is established for the regional distribution of 
economie activities, it seems to be consolidated by a mide range-of 
factorá, whether or not the original factors underlying it Still exista 
Proximity to the consumer market, manpomer reserves, the urban 
infrastructure, better supply, the financial markets and the slib-e • 
contractingMarkets tend to have more influence than the advantagés that 
the more backward areás may offer or the incentives that might be 









2. Characteristics of Feggruhiclimncentrption 
The background sketched in aboye helps to explain the present high 
indexes of geographical concentration and the natural tendency for the 
existing characteristics of the process to become more mari:ed. For a 
better understanding of the situation as it is now, its results must be 
considered from two main angles: population distribution, and the location 
of production activities and regional income distribution. 
(a) Regional distribution of the agglation 
Flap 1-1 and 1-2 shows the distribution of population in Latin America 
at the beginning of the nineteen-sixties. The population was ccnc,mtr, 
in a few majar cities, and population density in the rural areas varied 
considerably. 
Rapid urbanization is frequently noted as one of the main features 
of Latin American development, particularly because it bears no relation 
to the population shifts from the country to the towns whicr.would be 
explained by the rate of industrialization and the opening up of new 
productive employment possibilities in the cities. Although the indexes 
vary widely from one country to another, it is estimated that by the end 
of the present decade the proportion °f urban population - defined as 
the population living in centres with 2,000 inhabitants or more - wiul 
represent not lens than 54 ner cent of the total population of Latin 
America (see table 1-26). 
By 1960 already, one-third of the population of Latin America was 
living in cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants, and nearly one-quarter 
in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Ten cities with more than 
1 million inhabitants therefore accounted for about 13 per cent of the, 
total population; in fifteen of the twenty-one countries of the region, 
half or more of the urban population was living in a single city. Other 
countries aleo showed very high indexes of concentration: 47 per cent in 
the capital of Chile; 70 and 40 per cent in the two largest cities of 
Ecuador and Brazil, respectively, and 40 per cent in the metropolitan 





LATIR AMERICA: PROJECTFD URBAN AND dURAL POPULATION, BY COUNTRY, 1950.80 
Country 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 198o 
Argentina Urbatx 11 124 13 095 15 015 16 839 18 674 20 553 22 491 
Rural 5 946 5 798 5 654 5 513 5 376  5 243 5 	7.,2 
Total 17 070 18 893 20 669 22 352 24 050 25 796 27 d-'0 
% Urban 65.2 69.3 72.6 75.3 77.6 79.7 c1.5 
Bolivia Urban 778 915 1 104 1 345 1 652 2 040 2 504 
Rural 2 235 2 407 2 592 2 791 3 006 3 237 3 471 
Total 3 013 3 322 3 696 4 136 4 658 5 277 5 975 
% Urban 25.9 27.5 29.9 32.5 35.5 38.7 413 
Brazil Urban 16 083 21 596 28 217 35 867 44 598 54 704 66 434 
Rural 36 095 38 900 41 924 45 183 48 694 52 1 79 56 558 
Total 52 178 6o 496 70 141 81 050 93 292 107 183 122 992 
% Urban 30.8 35.7 40,2 44.3 47.8 51.0 54.0 
Chile Urban 3 450 4 087 4 967 5 910 7 057 8 359 9 864 
Rural 2 714 2 767 2 821 2 876 2 932 2 990 3 048 
Total 6 144 6 854 7 788 8 786 9 969 11 349 12 912 
% Urban 55.8 59.6 63,8 67.3 70,6 73=7 76. 
Colombia Urban 4 135 5 556 7 257 9 257 11 665 14 601 18 191 
Rural 7 661 8 022 8 400 8 796 9 210 9 544 10 	0...  
Total 11 796 13 578 15 657 18 053 20 875 24 245 28 2 
% Urban 35.1 40.9 46.3 51.3 55.9 60.2 60.3 
Ecuador Urban 924 1 133 1 572 2 192 2 91i4 3 836 4 909 
Rural 2 458 2 615 2 782 2 960 3 149 3 350  3 5614 
Total 3 382 3 748 4 354 5 152 6 093 7 186 8 473 
% Urban 27.3 30.2 36.1 42.5 48.3 53.4 57 9 
Paraguay Urban 376 438 524 148 822 1 063 1 385 
Rural 967 1 089 1 227 1 382 1 557 1 754 1 )76 
Total 1 343 1 527 1 751 2 030 2 379 2 817 3 361 
% Urban 28.0 28.7 29.9 31.9 34.6 37.7 1'1-2 
Peru Urban 2 490 2 986 3 877 5 137 6 687 8 561 lo 78.'," 
Rural 5 479 5 804 6 148 6 513 6 899 7 508 7 741 
Total 7 969 8 790 lo 025 11 650 13 586 15 869 18 527 
% u Jan 31.2 34.0 38.7 44.1 49.2 53.9 58.2 
Uruguay Urban 1 472 1 675 1 877 2 074 2 268 2 470 2 682 
Rural 721 688 659 641 618 594 573 
Total 2 193 2 363 2 536 2 715 2 886 3 064 3 255 
% Urban 67.1 70.9 744 76.4 78.6 80.6 82.4 
Venezuela Urban 2 423 3 415 4 611 5 913 7 49, 9 439 11 756 
Rural 2 551 2 634 2 720 2 809 2 900 2 995 3 092 
Total 4 974 6 049 7 331 8 722 10 399 12 434 14 845 
% Urban 48.7 56.5 62.9 67.8 72.1 75.9 79,2 
/Te::,:e 1.26 (canal.) 
Tabla 1-26 (oonol.) 
E/CN.12/825 
Page 1-89 
Country 1950 1955 196o 1965 1970 1975 1980 














2 211 1 6  2	88  72
% Urban 29.1 30.2 31.3 32.4 33.8 35.7 38.1 
El Salvador Urban 530 627 787 1 001 1 309 1 724 
Rural 1 391 1 548 1 722 1 916 2 132 2 372 2 7 31) 
Total 1 921 2 175 2 509 2 917 3 441 4 096 4 910 
% Urban 27.6 28.8 31.4 34.3 38.0 42.1 46.3 
Gua 	mala Urban 732 917 1 095 1 305 1 587 1 981 2 527 
Rural 2 308 2 595 2 918 3 281 3 689 4 148 4 664  
Total 3 040 3 512 4 013 4 586 5 276 6 129 7 1,1 
% Urban 24.1 26.1 27.3 28.5 30.1 32.3 35.1 












2 603 ; 11: 
2 405 
3 771  
% Urban 17.4 18.3 20,8 24.0 27.8 31.9 36.2 

















% Urban 28.1 31.0 33.8 36.5 39 4  42,7 46.7 
Cuba Urban 2 700 3 216 3 802 4 432 5 113 5 844 6 621 
Rural 2 820 2 917 3 017 3 121 3 228 3 454 
Total 5 520 6 133 6 819 7 553 8 341 3 
339 
9 13 lo 075 
Urban 48.9 52.4 55.8 58.7 61.3 63.6 65<7 
Dominlean Rep. Urban 482 638 874 1 203 1 637 2 203 2 942 
Rural 1 761 1 949 2 156 2 386 2 140 2 921 3 	2_7' 
Total 2 243 2 587 3 030 3 589 4 277 5 124 6 1./ 4 
% Urban 21.5 24,7 28.8 33„5 38.3 w3,.0 47,,;-  
Haiti Urban 34o 401 513 683 927 1 274 1 751 
Rural 3 040 3 321 3 627 3 962 4 328 4 727 5 	3 
Total 3 380 3 722 4 140 4 645 5 255 6 001 6  
% Urban 10,0 10,8 12.4 14.7 17.6 21.2 ,.. 	3 
Mexioo Urban 12 131 15 338 19 467 24 777 31 319 39 496 49 80; 
Rural 1D 204 15 3146 16 579 17 912 19 351 20 906 22 52,7 
Total 26 335 3o 684 36 046 42 689 5o 670 60 402 72 392 
% Urban 46.1 50.0 54.0 58.0 61.8 65.4 68.8 
Panana Urban  343 433 555 710 906 1 1,4 
Rural 494 539 588 642 700 764 833 
Total 765 882 1 021 1 197 1 410 1 670 1 957 
% Urban 35.4 38.9 42.4 46.4 50.4 54.3 51.1 
Total Urban 61 227 77 382 97 275 120 783 148 581 181 855 221 774 
(20 oointries) Rural 95 4o9 101 855 108 851 116 461 124 712 133 678 143 409 
Total 156 636 179 237 206 126 237 244 273 293 315 533 365 183 
% Urban 39.1 43.2 47.2 50.9 54.4 57.6 60,7 
Source: ELLA estimates based on the hypothesis that the rural population (i.e., popu1a4-ion living in oentvcs. 
of 2,000 inhabitants or more) will inorease at the same rate as 1950-60. The figures for the urban 
population represent the differenoe between the estimates of rural population a,:d the figures for 
total population. 
/Talle I-27 
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RATIN AMERICA: INDEXES OR URBANIZATION AND URBAN CONCENTRATION, BY COUNTRY 
ACCORDING TO CENSUSES TAKEN SINCE 1920 
 
Census 
Peroentage of total population 
living in oentres vdth a 
apecified number of inhabitants 
 
Peroentage of urban 
population living in 
oentreu with a 'pec1.led 
number of inhabitlufts 
Country year 
  
   
Central Amer'ca 
Costa Rica 	 1927 	19.3 	- 	19.3 	 100.0 
195o 22.3 22.3 22.3 100.0 	100.0 
1963 	24.0 	24.o 	24.0 	100.0 100.0 
Cuba 	 1919 	 24.3 	14.7 	14.7 60.4 	60.4 
1931 27.6 18.5 16.o 	67.0 57.8 
1943 	30.7 	19.9 	17.4 64.9 	56.8 
1953 35.5 22,9 18.3 	64.7 51.4 
Dominloan Republio 	 1920 	3.5 	 3.,5 	 100.0 
1935 7.1 - 	4,8 67.6 
195o 	11.1 	8.5 8.5 	76.5 	76.5 
1960 18.7 12.1 	12.1 65.0 65.0 
El Salvador 	 1930 	 9.0 	 6.2 	- 	 69.0 
195o 12.9 8.7 	8.7 67.5 67.5 
1961 	17.7 	10.2 10.2 	57.6 	57.6  
Guatemala 	 1950 	 11.2 	10.2 	10.2 	91.0 	91,0 
1964 15.5 13.4 13.4 86,2 86.2 
Haiti 	 1950 	 5.1 	4.3 	4.3 	84.8 	84.8 
Honduras 	 1940 	 6.1 	 4.2 	- 	 69.1 
1950 6.9 5.3 - 76.6 
1961 	11.6 	7.1 	7.1 	61.5 	61.5 
Jamaica 	 1921 	 10.3 	 10.3 	 - 	100.0 
1943 16.3 16.3 	16.3 100.0 100.0 
1960 	24.8 	23.4 23.4 	94.0 	94.o 
Modo° 	 1940 	18.1 	10.2 	7.4 	56.4 	40.8 
1950 24.1 15.1 8.7 62.8 36.0 
1960 	29.6 	18.6 	8.1 	62.9 	27.4 
Nicaragua 	 1950 15.2 10.3 10.3 67.7 67.7 
1963 	23.0 	15.3 	15.3 	66.3 	66.3 
?anula 	 1930 22.3 15.8 - 71.2 
1940 	26.5 	19.4 	19.4 	73.3 	73.3 
1950 28.6 22.1 22.1 77.4 77.4 
196o 	33.1 	15.4 	25.4 	76.7 	76.7 
/Table 127 (001101.) 
E/CN.12/825 
Pase 1-91 
Tabla 1-27 (oonoll) 
Country Census 
year 
Percentage of total population 
living in centres with a 
speoified number of inhabitants 
 
Percentage of urban 
population living in 
centres with a speoified 
number of inhabitants 
    




or moro or more populated or more 
popu2ated 
oity 	 oity 
South America  
Argentina 	 1914 	38.0 	31.5 	25.8 	83.0 	68.o 
1947 49.3 40.0 29.7 81.2 60.3 
1960 	57.7 	47.5 	33.7 	62.3 	58.4 
Boliv'a 	 1950 	19.6 10.6 	10.6 54.1 	54.1 
Brazil 	 1920 	11,3 	8.7 	3.8 	77.0 	33...3 
1940 15.3 10.7 3.7 69.8 24.0 
195o 	20.2 	13.2 	4.4 	65.5 	21,9 
1960 28.1 18.8 4.5 66.8 16.2 
Chile 	 1920 	28.0 	18.4 	13.6 	66.2 	48.6 
1930 32.5 20.7 16,2 63,9 50.0 
1940 	36.4 	23.1 	18,9 	6„5 	52.o 
1952 42.8 28.5 22.7 66x5 53.2 
1960 	54.7 	33.3 	25,9 	60.2 	4:.; 
Colombia 	 1938 	23.2 	7.5 	4.1 	56.6 	314 
1951 23.0 15.4 6.2 66,.8 2).9 
1964 	36.6 	27.5 	9.7 	75.1 	26.5 
Eouador 	 1950 	17.8 	14.6 	8.1 82.3 	45.4 
1962 26.9 18.9 11.2 	70,2 41.4 
Paraguay 	 1950 	15.6 	15,6 	35.6 	100::0 	100.0 
1962 15.9 15.9 15.9 100.0 100,0 
Peru 	 1940 	14.2 	804 	8.4 	59.1 	59.1 
1961 28.9 18.4 14.5 63.9 50.2 
Uruguay 	 1908 	30.0 	28.0 	28.o 	93.3 	93.3 
1963 61.3 44.7 44.7 72.9 72.9 
Venezuela 	 1936 	17.0 	11.1 	7.8 	65.1 	45.9 
1941 18.7 12.4 9.2 66.2 49.2 
1950 	32.7 	20.6 	13.8 	63.0 	42.2 
1961 47.3 30.0 17.8 63.4 37.5 




Converselj, extremely low density indexes are recorddin some 
rural areas. In more than 40 per cent of_Latin,,AMerica.theindex is- less 
than one inhabitant per square kilometre, and in nearly two-thirds, it 
iSless than five. In more than half of Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil 
and Ecuador, it is leso than one inhabitant per square kilometre; however 
the rural population density.is high in Haiti, El Salvador, the Dominican 
:.Republic, Cuba and Guatemala, or in some parts of those countries 
(see table 
Bolivia is a striking example of sharp disparities in the density 
of its rural population. While there are large areas which are practically 
uninhabited, there is a high concentration of rural population in relatively 
small areas. Orle and a half million inbabitants (more than half the entire 
rural.population) live in the valleys, occupyiag an area of 24,000 square 
kilometres; Of these, nearly 900,000 live on the fíat land at the bottom 
of the valleys, with a density of nearly 38 inhabitants per 'jure 
kilometre. This leads to serious erosion problems causad by over-grazing 
and cutting clown the vegetation for fuel - so that it has becone necessary 
to cultivate poor land on the siopes, thereby creating minifundia„ as iil  
the Cochabamba valley, where only 0.37 hectares are cultivated per head 
of population, and even this small area is shrinking because of the 
population pressure. 
(b) Regional incone distribution and location ,of production activities 
In addition to the characteristics described aboye;  there is an 
even higher geographical concentration of economic activities, which is 
reflected inparked disparities in inoone 	between regions. 
This concentration is particularly marked in industry. A few years 
ago02/ it was estimated that the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires, Sao 
Paulo and Mexico City accounted for over a third of the total value of • 
Látin Americals industrial produCtion, and that in several countries the two 
main industrial centres represented a very high proportion of the nationfs 
industry: 66 per cent for the metropolitan area and•Rosarió- in Argentina;-  
80 per cent for the triangle formed by Sly Paulo, Guanabara -and Belo Horizonte 
in Brazil; 66 per cent for the cities of Santiago and Valparaíso in Chile; 
45 per cent for - Mexico City and Monterrey in Mexico; 56 per cent for the 
Lima-Callao area in Peru; and 75 per cent for the city of Montevideo in Urnp-:a- T, 
/Table 1-28 
2/ 	Ihe_process of industrial develo ment in Latin America Jnite 




LATIN APERIOA: RURAL POPULATION DENSITY, AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL 
RURAL POPULATION IN EACH COUNTRY 
Country 
Less than 1 
inhabitant 
per km2 
1 to 4.9 
inhabitants 
per km2 
5 to 9.9 
inhabitants 
per km2 
10 to 19.9 
inhabitants 
per km2 
20 to 49.9 
inhabitants 
per km2 




Argentina 30.1 43.3 25.8 0.8 - 100 
Bolivia 59.0 8.3 32.7 100 
Brazil 54.8 12.4 10.5 15.9 6.4 100 
Chile 55.4 13,8 6.9 17,2 4.7 100 
Colombia 34.1 23.9 1.8 22.3 16.5 1.4 100 
Eouador 50.5 - 5.6 6.1 37.8  100 
Paraguay 60.8 20.9 13.6 4.o 0.7 100 
Peru 43.3 14.7 21.5 16.0 4.5 ic(J 
Uruguay - 77.0 11.2 8.3 2.6 0.3 100 
Venezuela 49.8 25.7 10.1 7.8  6.5 0.1 100 
Sub-total 48.1 121 14,12 11.8 6,0 0.1 1...,) 
Costa Rica 18.9 44.2 34.4 5.1 100 
Cuba 23.0 77.0 100 
Dominioan Republio 2.1 3.8 50.5 43.6 100 
El Salvador - 100.0 100 
Guatemala 32.9 - 8.3 31.5 27.3 100 
Haiti - 100.0 100 
Honduras 14.8 29.7 2900 25.1 1.4 -.00 
Mexioo 3.7 38.2 13.4 30.8 12.3 1.6 loo 
Nioaragua 56.3 8.3 11.2 22.9 1,3 100 
Panama 34.0 24.8 38,0 3.2 loo 
Sub-total 4.8 3.221 11.4 27.9 17,5 5.d. 100 
Total Latín Amerlea 42.4 21.E 14.1 13.9 21.5. 0.8 100 




The primary industries, which must have a relatively large scale of 
production and therefore tend to be fairly concentrated are located 
in these centres. 
The location of services in the main urban centres — publia 
administration (even in countries with a federal organization), 
financial services' foreign trade and domestic wholesale trade —
also malees for the geographical concentration of economic activities. 
These services are more concentrated than would seem to be 
requiad by the distribution of the population and ecenomic activities. 
The disparities in rural pppulation density suggest that regional 
concentration also occurs in the agricultura) sector, where some areas 
are worked intewively and others are not cultivatedat all. In 
this respect„ the important factor is not only the proportion of new 
farm land brought under cultivation and the proportion still 
uncultivated, but also the type of land use. A large part cf the 
agricultura) product is generated in fairly small areas which have 
better irrigation and means of communication and where production is 
organized along more efficient lines. 
The electricity systems and transport facilities reflect'and 
reinfórce these patterns of the regional distribution of economic 
activity. In almost all countries, more than 40 per cent of the 
installed capacity of the public electricity system supplies a few 
major_cities: a few years ago in Argentina, 47 per cent,of the 
national total supplied Greater Buenos Aires; in Brazil, 57 per 
cent supplied Río de Janeiro and Sic Paulo; and in Mexico,.44 per 
cent supplied the metropolitan areas. 	The same is true pf transport 
facilities, both roads and railways..5/ 
See United Nations, Estudios sobre la electricidad en América  
Latina, Informe Documentos del Seminario latinoamericano de  
energía eléctrica United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.II.G.3), 
Vol. I, p. 111. 
See ECLA, El transporte en América Latina (United Nations publicatio_ 




For example, the Amazon area of Brazil, which covershalf the country's 
torritory, has only 1,000 kilometres of railway line, while the railway 
network in the states of Río de Janeiro and Sao Paulo is very dense; in 
Argentina the highly concentrated railway system in the provinces of 
Buenos Aires and Santa Fe contrasts with the few railway limes in the 
provinces of Santa Cruz and Misiones (see table 1-29). The regional 
imbalances in the distribution of roads (see table 1-30) are also quite 
striking: there are few roads in arcas with little economic activity, 
and such arcas malee little headway, inter alia, because they lack 
suitable roads. 
The fact that economic activity is more highly concentrated than 
population means that there are very marked differences between the income 
levels of the different regions. For example, it is estimated that 78 per 
cent of the gainfully employed population in the Brazilian l'ordeste has 
an income lower than the national average; other estimates.covering Brazil 
conclude that the average per capita income,indexes, as compared with the 
national average, are 51 for the north-west, 60 for the,north and ceatral-
west, 96 for the east and 144 for the south. In Mexico, average rural 
family income is slightly more than 40 per cent of its urban counterpart 
and, as compared with the average per capita income of the Federal 
District, the regional average income indexes are 35 for the Pacific, 
south and central arcas, 54 for the nórth and the Gulf of Mexico and 
93 for the north Pacific,2" Moreover, there is a concentration of income 
in the metropolitan arcas where the major part of modem industry is 
situated. It is estimated, for example, that 45 per cent of Argentinals 
gross domestic product is generated in. Greater Buenos Aires, 43 per cent 
of Chilelgin the province of Santiago> 35 per cent of Mexicols in the Federal 
District of Mexico City and 40 per cent of Peruts in the city of Lima.2/ 
6/ 	The data on regional income distribution was taken from ECLA, Estudios 
sobre  la distribución del ingreso en América Latina (E/CN.12.770/Add,1), 
2/ 	Thesources for these percentages are as follows: Argentina, Federal 
Investment Council, Bases para el desarrollo regional argentino, (Bue-ns 
Aire'1963),p.54; Chile, ODEPIAN, Políticas de Desarrollo Regional  
(Santiago; 1968),p.76; Plan de Desarrollo Económico 1122111 del Perú, 
1967-1970, vol, I, p.285; Mexico, CIAP, El esfuerzo interno y las mee..,:,  
Jades de financiamiento externo para  el desarrollo de yico 





REGIONAL DENSITY CHI~ THE THIM MAJO RAILWAY SYSTEMS* OF LiJIP AERICA 
Population 
per km2 





per 100 km2 
Kilometres 
of _vi ne 
per 1,0Y3 .' inhabitaJits 
Argentina: Total 7.1 43 923 1.7 2.23 
Province of Buenos Aires 16.8 14 368 4.57 2.79 
Province of Santa Fe 15.1 5 193 3.90 2.59 
Province of Misiones 11.6 77 0,26 n 	n,, 
Province of Santa Cruz 0.2 287 0.12 5.02 
Rrazil: Total 8.3 38 339 0,45 0.45 
State of Rio de Janeiro 79.3 2 787 6.49 0.82 
State of SZo Paulo 52.3 7 664 3.09 0.59 
State of Pará 1.2 449 0.04 e,29 
State of Goiás 3.0 498 0.08 0.25 
Mexico: Total 17.8 23 369 1.19 0.67 
State of Sonora 4.3 1 469 0.97 2.26 
State of Nuevo León 16.6 939 1.44 0.87 
State of Baja California 7.3 15 0,26 0.36 
State of Guerrero 18.4 103 0.16 0.09' 
Source: ECLA, El transrrrte cn América Latina (United Nations publication, Sales 




SOME EXAD1PLES OF HEGIONAL IIBALANCE Il,i TIE DD;fRIBUTION 
OF ENJADS, 1960 á./ 
Kilometres 















Santa Cruz 25.7 1 188.2 
San Juan 31.4 76.7 
Brasil: Mational average 56.0 71.9 
Sao Paulo 319.3 67.6 
Espíritu Santo 373.4 149.0 
Amazonas 0,2 4M 
Acre 1.6 14.j 
Chile: National average 78.1 75.9 
Valparaíso 229.8 17.2 
Maule 408.9 246.2 
Aysén 9.7 252.() 
Chiloé 28.2 51.1 
Mexico b/: Mational average 22.9 12.() 
Mexico City 96.4 10.9 
Morelos 120.4 15.4 
Baja California 21.2 191.3 
Chihuahua 7.6 15.4 
Source: ELLA, El transporté en América Latina (United Mations publication, 
Sales No.: 65.11.0.7)   p. 17. 
1/ Including roads which are impassable at certain times o2 crear. 
12/ Excluding local roads, since their distribution among federal agencies 




In contrast to this high concentration of income in metropolitan 
areas, there are large groups of population with very low income and 
productivity levels in, for example, the yalleys of Bolivia and the 
Brazilian Nordeste. In the latter region, which has been termed the 
largest area of poverty in the western hemisphere, there are 25 million 
peopIe with an average annual per capita income of less than 100 dollars.-1  
This kind of disparity is becOming more and more useful for an 
understanding of the problems of under-development. Sone experts stress 
that the phenomtnon is independent in character and suggest that some 
areas are lagging further and further behind, not so much because they 
are isolated from the,over-all economic process,but because income is 
transferred from theml through various channels, to the more advanced 
areas which to some extent base their expansion on this appropriated 
income. 
There is no research which supports this argument; on the contrary, 
one of the few attempts that have been made to construct a forre of inter- 
regional balance of payments points to the opposite conclusion. This was 
a study on Argentina,V which showed how a large economic centre - the 
metropolitan area actually absorbs resources generated in the provinces, 
but the transfer of income is not homogeneous, nor is it in the same 
direction in all cases: it involves a transfer of incorne from the richer 
agricultural areas to the metropolitan area, and a subsidy from the 
metropolitan area to the poorer provinces. Hence, there are two areas 
that benefit - the metropolitan area and the poorer provinces - and an 
area which subsidises them - the highly productive agricultural provinces 
and two provinces producing wool and oil (see tableI-31). The metropolitan 
area, made up of the Federal capital and Greater Buenos Aires, texportsf 
manufactures and timportst agricultural products so that relative prices 
influence income transfers. For example, the terms of trade for the 
metropolitan area improved by 21.7 per cent between 1956 aná'1959: the 
price índex of its timportst rose by 263.6 per cent while that of its lexports 
rose by 234J per cent. Furthermore it is in the metropolitan area that the 
services used by the other provinces particularly financing, insurance 
and export facilities are located. 
1/ 	Celso Partado,'Llitá pelo rdeSte e a estrategia da SI:-dere 
(Recife, 1962), mimeographed,p.2. 
/ 	See Bases para el desarrollo regional argentino, 07.)«cit. /Tabl3 1-31 
E/CN.12/825 
Page 1-99 
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of pesos at 
1953 prices) 
Inter-provincial trade balance on 
the inter-provincial balance o2 
payments on current account 
(millions of pesos at 1959 prices) 
Total 2.. / 
	
Domestic "2/ 
Metropolitan area 7.6 -27 175 -34 477 
Remainder of the province 
of Buenos Aires 8.1 12 750 12 322 
Catamarca 2,8 -663 -663 
Chaco 4.1 777 468 
Chubut 9.3 -210 1 284 
Córdoba 5.3 9 566 11 970 
Corrientes 3.1 293 610 
Entre Rios 4.2 -492 -492 
Formosa 2.9 117 -32 
Jujuy 5.2 645 1 107 
La Pampa 8,2 1 818 1 956 
La Rioja 2,9 -238 -217 
Mendoza 6.5 2 654 3 479 
Misiones 2.1 -1 016 -720 
Neuquén 3,8 414 551 
Rio Negro 6.2 727 860 
Salta 4.0 -1 266 56 
San Juan 5.0 679 906 
San Luis 3.8 -449 -398 
Santa Cruz 14.8 -1 832 1 790 
Santa Fe 6.4 4 085 -308 
Santiago del Estero 2.3 -739 -313 
Tierra del Fuego 20.5 81 128 
Tucumán 4.2 -645 40 
Source: Federal Investment Council, Bases para el desarrollo ranional 
argentino (Buenos Aires 1963), pp. 56 and 98. 
a/ Including international trade. 
b/ Excluding international trade. 
ftp, ,,ne poorer 
E/CN.12/825 
Page I-1C0 
The poorer provinces, on the other hand, are subsidized to an extent 
that in absolute terms may be small, but the amount is significant if 
compared with their gross internal product. These subsidies consist 
mostly of the allocation of resources by the national government for 
public works or current expenditures on education and health. 
The provinces in which these resources originate are those in which 
modern farming is carried on a large scale, and they zererate rou¿hly 
three-quarters of the countryis,crop and.livestock production (remainder 
of the provine of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe, Mendoza and La Pampa), 
added to which are the two provinces producing wool and oil (Santa Cruz 
and Neuquén). These are all thriving provinces with high per capita 
incomes that, with the exception of Neuquén„ are aboye the national average 
and very Glose to incomes in the metropolitan area. Thus a situation exists 
in which a large industrial area - the metropolitan area - absorbs economic 
resources from the modern agricultural areas through paymenbs for services 
and relative prices and also absorbs labour, particularly from ne 7oorer 
provinces, while at the.same time subsidizing the poorer provinces, but 
to a much lesser degree. 
In contrast, the fíve wealthy agricultural provinces and the two 
wool and oil provinces subsidize the metropolitan area to a large extent. 
They generate 73 per cent of the national crop prcduct and 75 per cent of 
the national livestock product, at a relatively high level of,productivity, 
but they are dependent on the metropolitan area for financing, domestic 
marketing, exports and for most of the manufactured goods that they use. 
The poorer provinces, on the other hand0'are a source of labour 
unskilled for the most part - and recover what they lose in respect of 
the payment of services and relative prices through government subsidies. 
It is difficult to estimate the extent to which this phenomenon 
occurs in other Latin American countries, particularly if it is borne in 
mind that Argentina is relatively speaking not a typical case since 
regional differences are less pronounced than in most of the other 
countries, as are.population pressures in its more backward areas. It 
is olear, however, that, even if the experience of Argentina could be 




in income and living conditions would tend to level out of their own 
aeoord. Something more than a transfer of real income in the form of 
social services is needed before the backward areas can achieve 'more 
dynarnic economic growth. 
3. somleumles of regional development 
in Latin America  
The fact that there has been no spontaneous effort to achieve a 
better regional distribution of economic growth or to prevent regional 
disparities from becoming- more pronounced, and no definite development 
proposals in this respect, had led some countries to take action and to 
initiate policies to promote regional development that in some cases have 
significance on a national scale. Some experience has been accumulated 
in this way covering various approaches and methods of action. 
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the type of motivation 
behind regional development policies. The National Planning Office of 
Chile has defined the reason for regional planning as the need to eli7linatc 
the huge di;Jparities separating one area from another; regional development 
policy is thus 	multipurpose instrument designed to improve the conditions 
for regional integrationn.12/ Three goals are sought in regional 
integration: at the physical level, to achieve satisfactory aecess to 
all points in the country; at the economic level, to provide similar 
rewards for the factors of production and equality of opportunity 
irrespective of geographical location; and at the socio-political level„ 
to establish a single institutional Framework and equal levels of 
participation in social life and decision-wking. 
The Venezuelan national plan (1965-68) calls for the formulation 
of regional plans as instruments to promote economic integration, to make 
better use of potential resources and to channel internal migration. For 
this purpose, the Plan indicates that it is necessary to: (a) channel 
investment towards the exploitation of the resources of backward areas 
in order to integrate them with the more advanced industries, regions 





or areas; (b) make both the technology and the financing and information 
required to improve production accessible to backward areas; and (c), 
channel interregional population movements in order to control the 
urbanization process. 
In Brazil, the ten-year economic and social development plan outlines 
the stages through which regional policy has passed, starting with 
assistance (primarily public works), then an attempt to alter the economic 
structure of the region in order to promote development, and finally a 
national-regional policy promoting the integration_of the various areas. 
At this final stage the ten-year plan was prepared, basically corsisting 
of the creation of a.self-sustained development process in each region, 
with an appropriate growth rate being fixed for each, and the 
incorporation of this process finto the main stream of national integration 
with a view to reducing the economic differences Between regions and 
establishing an integrated national marketo 
On the basis of these general guidelines, specific criteria can 
be worked ouv, for the allocation of resources in terms of three development 
options, according to which either the regional product, or regional 
employment or regional balance Will be increased to the maximum. Chilels 
regional de`ielopment policy, for example, focuses on the arcas with the 
greatest potential, "in which development can get going most rapidly", 
in order tr make the best use of investment resources. Hence, priority 
á-a given to the areas which already have an infrastructure or known resou:. as; 
althou¿h account is also taken - as a conditioning factor of secondary 
importance - of the need to redistribute in fine among the regions. 
The Brazilian plan,states that developing countries must prevent the 
over-all growth rate from falling, however slightly, to the benefit of 
particular region, because of the risk of slowing down the whole 
development process. Consequently, a different growth rate should be 
established for each region, in line with the national rate and the 
possibilities for self-sustained growth. 
The Venezuelan plan points out that a backward regional economy 
needs a continua' inflow of resources until it has passed the !criticar 




conceritrate resources on a limited number of backward regions until each 
of them passes the critical point, and then do the same for other regions, 
on the assumption that the resources would be lost if they were dispersed 
among a large number of regions without any single region achieving self—
sustained growth. 
With regard to population matters, it is argued — for example by 
ODEPLAN in Chile — that action should be focused on the regions with the 
greatest developmert potential, while according to another view, it is 
justifiable in the short tem to subsidize through public works, for 
instance certain regions which are incapable of providing full employment 
on their own. Similarly, as in the Venezuelan plan, an attempt is being 
made to guide the urbanization process by channelling population movements 
among the regions and preventing excessive growth in a small number of 
cities. 
Once the over—all aims and methods of action are established, then 
national policies have to be defined which can be effective in ensuring 
their practical application. There are two tain approaches: either an 
attempt is made to develop backward areas with a view to iuproving the 
living conditions of large segments of the population, or the main aim is 
to open up new areas in order to exploit resources that are of importance 
for national development. In the first case, stress is laid on income 
transfers, mainly through public services and State action to modify or 
improve the bases of production of the region. In the second case, the 
stress is on investment in the infrastructure and other direct State 
investment. In both cases, a number of direct incentives can be used, 
mainly tax exemptions, 
The prograunes for the Brazilian Nordeste and the Guayana area of 




(a) The Nordeste of Brazil 
The Nordeste programe in Brazil is an outstanding example of 
action designed to raise the level of living of a large population 
groiip in Latin America. Its aim,is to promete development in án area 
of 1.57 million square kilcuetres, 11 with 	 lnahltants and 
an average per capita income of less than 100 dollars. The-programme 
has two basic objectives: to promote industrial development and to 
increase the supply of food. An executing agency - the Department for 
the Development of the Nordeste (Superintendencia de Desenvolvimeato 
do Nordeste - SUDENE) was established to achieve these objectvn, and 
plan for industrial development and the expansion of agricultural 
supplies, and pre-investment plans in connexion with natural and human 
resources were launched. The main policy instrument used, and the most 
original of its kind, is the tliiscal rreditu mechanism uridf r article 
34/18, which is described below. 
In the field of industrial development, the programe is aimed. 
at promoting private investment in industry through the creation of 
tax, credit and exchange incentives, and the construction of an 
infrastructnre (particularly for energy and transport); the purpose 
of the agricultural plan is to bring new farm land unser cultjmation, 
and to improve productivity; and the twin aíras of the pre-invesment 
progranne are to train manpower and carry out research on natural 
resources. 
11/ Corprising the States of Maranhlo, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do 
Nirte? Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahía and part 
of Minas Gerais. There are four large subregions: the mata 
or humid area, the east coast, the sertio or arid región, and 




Th3 establishment of SUDE NE was basically a new way of tackling 
the Nordestets problems,12/ since it was considered essential to adopt 
an over-all development approach in order to tackle the main problems 
simultaneously. Sone important propositions stem from this approach; 
one of these is that the situation is most serious in the humid area, 
where resources are less efficiently utilized than in the semi-arid 
regions, with the result that problems which are apparently unrelated 
to the drought, such as unsuitable farming methods and urban unemployment, 
are given priority attention. 
The industrial development plan. The proposed development of 
industry is based on the processing of local raw materials for export 
(to the southern central area of Brazil and to other countries), since 
import substitution is United by the small local market. The 
cornerstrne of the plan is private investment, stimulated by tax, exchange 
and credit incentives, the conJtruction of an adequate infrJ:,5tructure 
and, as a supplementary measure, the establishment of public and semi-
public industrial enterprises. 
12/ For several decades, the serious consequences of the periodic droughs 
in the agreste area (lying between the humid regions) and the 
sertIo - with their reperoussions on production and employment -
had been focusing attention on the regionts economic problems. 
Thus the National Drought Relief Department was establibhed, which 
did what it could to deal with the problem by building datas and 
highways. The Companhia Hidroelftrica do San Francisco, a semi-
public co-operation in which the Government had the controlling 
interest, began operations in 1948 and by 1955 it had completad 
the construction of the Paulo Alfonso hydroelectric plant. The 
Banco do Nordeste do Brasil S.A,, was established in 1952 after 
the 1951 drought. Followdng a further drought in 1958, the Federal 
Government strengthened the Nordeste working group which had been 
attached to the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico (WDE) 
sine 1956 and it prepared a diagnosis and a development strategy 
for the Nordeste. Its report highlighted the basic causes 
underlying the region's unequal development, which include the 
shortage of land which is suitable for cultivation by the 
techniques known in the region, the scanty rainfall, the 
unsatisfactory distribution of income, especially in the sugar-
growing area, and the predomínance of subsistence farming in 




Thestrongest stimulus was provided by tax incentives, which were 
appiied on a large séale and along original lineemhich facilitated the 
transfer of resources from the southern central area to the Nordeste. 
Thus: it was established that under certain conditions legal entities 
throughout the country could obtain a rebate of up to half the amount of 
their income tax if they invested that amount in the Nordeste (article 
34/18); they were also entitled to a rebate equal to 75 per cent of the 
value of any shares purchased in the Fondo de Investimerto do Nordeste 
(they would thus be exempt from tax if they purchased shares to a value 
of one and one third times the amount of the tax) and up to 50 per cent 
of gross taxable income if it was used to buy shares in companies which 
SUDENE oonsidered of interest to the Nordeste. Companies already 
operating in the area would be granted a 50 per cent reduction in their 
income tax and additional taxes from June 1963 to 1973; and activities 
initiated after July 1963 would be tax-free for a per:lod o.,7 ten years, 
which might be extended to fifteen. 
The a:„ohange privileges consist of exemption from taxes and plior 
deposits in respect of imports of equipment for the Nordeste to which 
SUDENE had assigned priority. In addition, the President,of Brazil may 
authorize imports without prior "exchange cover", that is, regardless 
of the amount of foreign exchange available under that head ir the 
exchange budget. 
Credit financing is mainly the responsibility of the Banco do 
Nordeste do Brasil, SoA.„ which Will lend up to 50 per cent of the 
total invpstnent required for a project and 80 per cent of the fixed 
investment, and the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econbmico, which 
p"ovides up to 60 per cent of the fixed capital. The Fondo de Investimento 
do Nordeste:  which is administered by SUDENE, can in its tern buy 
preference shares, without the right to vote, in Nordeste enterprises. 
SUDENE used its own resources for the infrastructure projects 
(construction of energy and water supply systems, organization of 
transport and urban services, surveying of natural resources, and 
manpower trainíng), but it mainly co-ordinated the action of various 




creating such "external economies" absorbed most of the resources 
earmarked for industrial development, since the industrial enterprise 
itself generally remained in charge of the private project. 
SUDENE has established public or semi-public corporations to carry 
out different activities and participates in them to a varying degree. 
The two most important enterprises, both owned mainly by the State, are 
the Usina Siderúrgica de Bahía - in process of installation - with a 
production capacity of 130,000 tons of thin steel sheet and tinplate, 
and the Companhia Pernambucana da Borracha Sintética, which manufactures 
butadiene and polybutadiene from cane alcohol. Moreover, SUDENE has 
shares in twelve electric power companies and in sone enterprises engaged 
in specific activities (Artesanato do Nordeste S.A., Companhia de Aguas 
e Esgotos do Nordeste, Companhia Nordestina de Sondagens e Perfóra9oes) 
whose relatively small capital has nearly all been provided by SUDENE. 
21211221221111111.1121. The main purpose of the agricultural plan 
is the supply of food. This is being achieved through four projects: 
mere intensive land use in the humid areas, utilization of public lahd, 
land settlement in MaranhZo, and improvement of farming methods. The 
first project provided for capital investment in sugar-growing in 
order to increase productivity by means of irrigation and mechanization, 
At the same time, the cultivation of food crops was to replace the 
cultivation of sugar-cane in sane areas. This project was abandones, 
however, because of a sudden change in the conditions in which it was 
to be carried out; the old sharecroppers becane agricultural wage-earners, 
and the sugar economy was able to stand this increase in costs only 
because more sugar was exported at preferential prices owing to Cuba's 
exelusion from the United States market. 
The second project relates to the organization of farms for the 
production of foodstuffs on 25,000 hectares of public land within easy 
access of population centres. In addition, it was planned tr bring 
250,000 hectares under cultivation in MaranhZo„ 30,000 hectares of, 
which would be devoted to market gardents and fruit farms. Lastly, 
a programe of research was initiated with a view to discovering 




which tiad not been solved by the usual farming methods (for example, 
improving the soil of 3 million hectares of tableiand with enough 
rainfall but a low level of fertility). 
Administrative nlanning and organization. SUENE did not prepare 
, a real over-all development plan for the Nordeste; The three "master 
plans" which 	has-drawn up so far merely group the main investment 
projects within the context of an over-all strategy. It also co-ordinates 
the work of all the national agencies operating in the area. 
SUDENE has a secretariat and a Deliberative Council;12/  the former 
is responsible for ensuring the adoption of technical solutions, and the 
latter for co-ordination at the poliov-Jalzin:5 level. It is fillw,ced by 
2 per cent of Federal tax revenue, and by whatever funds are allocated 
tn it in the Federal budget for implementation of the Easter Plan. It 
also uses 50 per cent of the convertible exchange earnings on foreign 
exports from the Nordeste to pay for its own imports. 
Some results in the field of industrial development. The results 
of SUDENEts action reveal notable progress in industrial development 
programes. 
SUDENE gave considerable impetus to industrial development thanks 
to the influx of resources from the south-central area under the "fiscal 
credit" system. It wasthus successful in applying policy inztruments 
which were specially designed to further regional development and were 
necessarily different from thoss that have traditionally launched or 
aided the process at the national level. Tariff protection, which 
embraces the country as a whole without discrimination between regions, 
was not applicable in these cases, and the peculiar combination of 
..01~1.1.•■••■■•■ 	
12/ The Deliberative Council is composed of Governors of the states 
within the purview of SUDENE and representatives of the Einistries-
of Agriculture, Education and Culture, Finance, Industry and Trade, 
Eines and Energy, Health, Labour and Social Security, .Transport 
and Public Works; of the Banc dn Brasil S.A., the Banco 
Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico and the Banco do Nordeste 
do Brasil S.A.; of the Armed Forces, and of the CompanEla 
Hidroel&trica do San Francisco; in addition, the Head, of SUDE VE, 
the DirIctor of Grought Relief Works and the Director of the San 




overvaluation of the currency and import contro1,31( which 
resulted in high prices for Brazilian manufactures and subsidized the 
purchase of equipment and intermediate goods, was not operative either. 
In order to promote the concentration of industries in specific 
locations, recourse was had to indirect methods which went even beyond 
the construction of infrastructure works and the grarting of tax priyeges 
for local activities. Although the execution of public works 
particularly for transport services and energy supply was a big step 
foreward compared with the previous situation, the advantages it brings 
are nct necessarily big enough to compare with the external econgmies 
which already exist in more developed areas, Moreover, experienoe with 
tax exemption shows that this is not a decisive factor in choosing a 
location, since although it affects costs, it does nothing to reduce 
the risks and possible losses involved in an unprofitable investment. 12/ 
Hence the importance of the additional advantages offered 17 the "fiscal 
credit" system used in the Nordeste of Brasil, whereby the funds for 
payment of up to 50 per cent of income tax, which would otherwise ha;re 
constituted a direct transfer cf income from entrepreneurs to the pabilo 
sector, may be used to subscribe part of the capital of l'ew Nordeste 
enterprises. 
Twenty—five, 50 or 75 per cent of the capital investme`, comes 
from the funds provided under article 34/18, the proportion depending 
on the priority assigned to the project by SUDENE. Furthermore, the 
Banco do Nordeste do Brasil may lend up to 50 per cent of the capital, 
without any adjustment for inflation. Thus, in higkiy important 
projects the entr7;preneurts contribution may be as little as 12.5 per 
cent of the necessary capital. This system has resulted in 
considerable industrial growth. Up to April 1967, 254 projects had 
been approved with a planned investment of 840 million new cruzeiros. 
14/ See Albert O. Hirschman, "Desenvolvimento industrial  do Nordeste 
Brasileiro e o mecanismo de crédito fiscal do artigo 34/18", 
Revista Brasileira de Eco22H12)  December 1967, p. 24. 
15/ Ibid., p. 26. 
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The payments mide under,article 34/18 increased from 59 million, new 
cruzeiros in 1962 to 252 million in 19661, and their share in the income 
tax revenue collected from limited companies rose_from 9.5 per cent in 
1962 -to 50 per cent in•1966;.nearly four-fifths of those,deppsitS cacle 
from the states of SIo-Y4u10-and Guanabara. 
There has been some discussion of the question of whether or not 
it is justifiable or desirable to transfer a significant volulAe"Pf 
fiscal resources to private industry, which is what the "fiscal .credit" 
mechanism in fact entails. Ta some extent, this is also linked to the 
degrée-tó which the profits generated by the new enterprises are ploughed 
back and are absorbed by the economy of the Nordeste, or the extent to 
which they areremitted to the south-central area, particularly after 
the first stage, when the main flow of resources was natur4ly in the 
direction of the Nordeste. Other questions have also ariscn, such as 
the capital-intensity of the new enterprises in relation te the original 
employment situation,, and whether the system would be in operation long 
enough for the process of industrial development to become self-sustaining.11/ 
(b) The Venezuelan Guayana _area  
The work,being done in the Venezuelan Cpayana area is a typical 
example of a programe for the utilization o±' unexploited rescurces and 
the construction of a large industrial centre in a region rich in natural 
resources; particularly hydroelectric powerl.mining products (coal, 
dolomite•and quartz) and forests. 
This regional programme is organized on a very,jifferent basis 
from that of the programme,for the Nordeste area ofBrazil, since this 
`;'`:is a sparselypopulated region which has never really been part of the 
nacional económy, and the primary consideratioa is the efficient utilization 
of itslüge'natural resources potential. 
The problems - encountered and the instruments for their solution 
are also quite different. There is no question of changing existing 
eituationeor harming vested interests; in particUlar„ the problem hete 
is to prepare- land for cultivation which has been virtually abandoned, 




rather th.an to disrupt and transform a long—established agrarian 
structure. On the other hand, it is necessary to mobilize human and 
capital resources on a considerable scale with a view both to facilitating 
direct production activities and to establishing an urban centre 
— Guayana City, at the confluence of the Orinoco and Caronl rivers, the 
population of which is expected to grow from 2,000 to 250,000 between 
1950 and 1980. 
The programe consists mainly in constructing an industrial centre, 
producing hydroelectric power on a large scale, cultivating new land, 
establishing a city, and training manpower. Its execution has been 
entrusted to the Venezuelan Guayana Corporation (Corporación. Venezolana 
de Guayana), which was established at the end of 1960 as an autonomous 
institute under the Office of the President of the Republic.12/ The 
Corporation may take direct action or operate through subsidiary bodies, 
and it is authorized both to mobilize the government rosowJc,s assr.pd 
to it and to participate in specific projects financed jointly with 
foreign capital and domestic private capital. Thus, through one 
subsidiary body it is building the Guri dam and managin7 the electricity 
supply system, and through another it is installing a stcel plant. At 
the same time, it is associated with foreign investors in a project for 
the production of aluminium, and with domestic irvestors in the operation 
of a pulp mill for the manufacture of paper and paperboard. It is also 
laying a gas pipeline, which Will enable the foreign company mining iron 
ore to smelt it, and in general it is providing the necessary infrastructune 
— including the construction of the new urban centre — for the 
establishment of private industry. 
The guiding principle of all these new activities is that they 
must be effectively integrated in the over—all domestic economy, so that 
17/ The assets and functions that had formerly been those of the Survey 
Committee for the Electrification of the Caroni and the Venezuelan 
Iron and Steel Institute were transferred to the Venezuelan 
Guayana Corporationnalso, It has a President, who is responsible 
for all executive functions, and á Board of Directors corzorod 
of four members, all of whom are appointéd by the President of 




even though a good deal of the región's nroductien ís to be exported, 
the new'development node will not result in enclaves whole contribution 
to the rest of the domestic eccinoby is confined to the payment of royalties 
and taxes.12/ 
The proposed indtstrial centre comprises a steel plant, an aliminium 
plant and a pulp and paper mili. The steelmaking programe is administered 
by Siderúrgica del Orinoco C.A., which built and is now managing the 
Planta-.Siderúrgica del Crinoco, with a capital of 2C0 million bolívares. 
This company- belongs to-the Venezuelan Guayana Corporation and carne into 
being as a result of a change in the legal status of the Steel Division. 
The construction and administration of the aliminium plant is in the hands 
of-,the Compañia Alumina del Caroni S.A. (ALCASA), which is owned on a 
fifty-fifty basis by the Venezuelan Guayana Corporation and the Compañia 
Reynolds International. Consruction started in February 1966 at hatanzas 
(Guayana City), and the aim is to build a reduction plant .por ingots and 
billets. - The Sociedad Pulpa Guayana is establishing a paper and paperboard 
plant which Will draw itsjraw materials from the huge forest resources in 
;theGuayana ama.. This eompany comprises the Venezuelan Pulp and Paper 
Corporation, Cartones Nacionales S.A. and Cartón de Venezuela S.A. 
Besides these projects, there are others under study or in course 
of execution. For example, it is expected that, upon completion of the 
Anaco-Nayana City gas pipeline, the Orinoco Mining Company will produce 
-briquettes with a high iron content by a process of reduction with natural 
gas. Other projects include the manufacture of liqUid ammonia for export, 
a slag cement plant which would make use of material obtained from the 
steel plant -0 wheat and maize flour milis, and food-processing plants. 
The ,hydroelectric potential of the Caroní River is ore of the main 
natural resol4rcel of-the area. The-'Cdmpahía CVG - Electrificación del 
Caroni C.A. - was set up as a subsidiary of the Venezuelan Guayana 
. 	_ 
Corporation for the purpose of constructing the hydroelectric morks and 
'distribution network and of managing the whole system. It is at present 
12/ See Alexander Ganz, La planificación regional, clave de la 91121 
"actual del desarrollo económico de América Latina: el caso de 
Guayana, una región nfronterall, paper presented at t'ne ::;eminar on 
State Planning organized by ECLA and ENDE at Rio de Janeiro 




managing the Macagua I plant and is responsible for the power transmission 
and distribution limes, interconnexion of the regional electrical system 
with those in the east and centre of Venezuela, and the construction of:, 
the Guri hydroelectric dam and plant. 
The Venezuelan Guayana Corporation is engaged directly or through 
contractors in the building of Guayana City.  The use of land .and the 
prbvision of public services for both government and private activities 
are laid down in the plan for the town. Work has already begun on the 
Alta Vista centre; some areas have been set aside for industry and other 
sectors are being urbanizad. 
It is planned to develop the Orinoco delta in orden to solve the 
problem of food supplies for the region, particularly Guayana City. This 
area of some 20,000 square kilometres is periodically devastated by. 
floods. As part of the bank protection works the first step has been 
to close the Mánamo channel and to build dikes, Irrigation projects are 
also being carried out in áreas near Guayana City, such as Culies, and 
forestry and fisheries studies are being undertaken. 
As regards human resources, community development programmes have 
been launched, with the establishment of Social Welfare Boards which -• 
encourage the people themselves to take part in stu.dying and solving 
their common problems. In the field of education, the programe for 
the establishment of primary schools and technical trainj.ng facilities 
for adults has been worked out in the light of a protection of manpower 
needs over the next ten years; a regional centre for research, programning 
and educational services has also been established. 
4. Regional development  prospects and policies  
However widely the objectives, scope'and patterns of the aboye-
mentioned regional development programes may vary, a feature cora on to 
them all is the increasing importance attached to regional questions in 
national development policies as a whole. In all probability, this 
tendency will become even more marked in the next few years, both on 
account of situations already existing and as a result of the possible 
repercussions of other factors - including Latin American economic integration 
and the prospects and demands of agricultural and industrial development - 




It would therefore be.appropriate to devote fuller consideration 
to the er-iteria that should be applied in defining a regional development 
policyl but the difficulty is that in the end, an analysis of this kind 
covers the eame ground as a global development strategy and an over-all 
policy for the allocation of resources. nthout overlooking the need to 
envisage thé subject in this broad context, the following paragraphs Will 
touch upon a few points relating mainly to the two alternatiVes represerted 
by concentration or wider regional dístribution of resources, and to other 
factors which are coming increasingly to the fóre as determinants of the 
location of economic activity. 
(a) Over-all development and zoning  
The first necessity seems to be to discussthe basic guidelines 
for a policy'relating to the regional allocaton of resources$ in the 
light of its predictable effects on the.over-all rate of growth, the 
capacity to maintain or increase that rate in the futUre, 1-md the extensión 
of the benefits of development to the majority of each'countryis population.,  
In a first approximation, it might be arguedthat the concentration uf 
resources in a metropolitan area would represent at once a requisite for 
the expansion and diversification of the-structure of the economy$ and 
an optimum'allocation from the standpoint of the over=all growbh rate, 
since it would constitute a mean of taking MaYirrUM advantage of external 
economies.- Secondly, it might likewise be assumed that the enlargement 
and consolidation of this central focus of development mould niake it a 
radiation factor^ that would promote the development of the rest of the 
economy. Wers this to happen, the p7:oblem would not be strictly one of 
regional development requiring the adoption of policies deliberately 
designad to tackle it. The only trouble would be the Jack of 
synchronization between the period of consolidation of the metropolitan 
area and the process of radiation throughout the rest of the system; and 
in the course of time that process would spontaneouály bring about the 
integration and unification of the national economy. 
Several aspects of Latin Americals experience appear to suggest 
that the first of there postulates is línked to specific stages of growth. 




Unquestionably„ throughout one entire phase, a "polarized" type 
of development represents an allocation of resources which is economically 
justifiable and implies substantial progress from the standpoint of the 
possibilities.of improving the populationis levels of living. It is also 
true, however, that these merits will hold good only as long as the 
following two requisites are fulfilled: the productivity of the resources 
invested in the more advanced development nodes must be hig5er 	ít 
would be in newly-opened-up or backward areas; and there must be evidente 
of capacity to impart dynamism to the rest of the system. and to absorb 
an increasing proportion of the national population at adequate levels 
of productivity and income. Hence the content of a regional policy cannot 
be defined irrespective of the specific stage of development through which 
the economy is passing, and from another point of view this means that 
the wide variety of situation existing in the various Latin American 
countries may invalídate any generalization formulated for Latin America 
as a whole. 
(i) The significante of external economies. It is common knowledge 
that factors relating to external economies carry a great deal of weight 
in the economic analysis of location options and decisively influence the 
regional distribution of investment. In orden to study their sijnificanca 
in relation to the present characteristics of the Latin American 
economies, a distinction must be drawn between two categories of 
determinants of the external economies in question. The factors more 
directly linked to a specific production unit and to questions of 
supplies of inputs, access to financing and sub-contracting markets, 
proximity to the decision-making centres and to technical research and 
manpower training services, etc., must be differentiated from those 
connected with the infrastructure usuall3r the responsibility of the 
public sector - required for the development of productive activity, 
such as transport and means of communication, and urban infrastructure 





This distinction is important both from the stand.point of the real 
duration of the external economies conterned and from that of the 
incidence of each type of factor on private and public decisions as to 
the location of investment. 
Generally speaking, it may be granted that the factors directly 
linked to production units go on increasing the external economies they 
signify for an indefinite length of time. The more a specific development 
node expande and the more activities are concentrated in it, the more 
substantial and widely varied will be the advantages it offers to new 
activities in this respect, But the same is not necessavily true of 
factors of the second type, in particular, those relating to urban 
infrastruCture. 
Theoretically, once a specific urban centre has been established 
on a firm footing and adequately provided with the appropriate public 
utilities, it will be in a position to accomodate the more numerous 
population justified by the installation of new enterprises. The general 
facilities already available will be more intensively utilized, and 
every additional person will therefcre mean a decrease in costs. 
This ratio cannot be of the linear type, since in the utilization 
of certain services successive saturation points will inevitably be 
reached, and at each of these critical junctures relatively substantial 
investment in expansion will have -U> be effected, opening up new 
possibilities of external economies, until the next time a similar 
situation arises. For example, suppoSing that in a given city the 
potable water or the electric power supply is sufficient for 
100,000 inhabitants, once this linit is exceeded an aqueduct will 'have 
to be built, or new generator gxoups installed, which Will serve the 
needs of a population of 300,000; and when that number is reached the 
problem will again recur., 
Hence it is clear that the external economies linked to the 
establishment of new population settlements in a given region are 
contingent'Iipon each individual situation and point of time. An important 
longer term question is whether the cost of urban infrastructure tends 




concerned„ Little empirical research has been conducted on this subject, 
and its findings are not always consistent even for one and the same 
country. For example, in a study made by SVIMEZ in Italy in 1956, the 
costs of fixed social investment per inhabitant of an urban centre were 
estimated at 123,000 liras in towns with 30,000 inhabitants, 194,000 liras 
in those with 30,000-200,000 inhabitants, and 357,000 liras in those 
• 
with a population of,over 200,000.12/ In contrast, anoter study, also 
carried out in Italy, assigns the highest costs of construction, 
installation of facilities and maintenance to towns with about 
100,000 inhabitants, the figures being lower both for smailer and for 
larger towns.22/ 
At all events, it should be borne in mind that in many Latin American 
countries there are other factors currently in cperation which may wcaken 
or thwart the possibilities of utilizing the greater external economy 
potential of metropolitan areas. Suffice it to recall the extremely high 
urban concentration indexes already attained (high both in comparison 
other more developed countries and in relation to the natu.re of the nrbaa 
economy concerned), the speed of the in-migraticn process, and the 
cumulative social service deficits that are so marked in the metropolitan 
areas in question. 
In many instances, urban development has outstripped the capacity 
to meet demand for public utilities, understandably enough in view of 
the fact that during the nineteen-fifties the increase in the urban 
population was 71 per cent in Latin America 21/— (as against only 18 per 
cent in Europe), It often happens that in towns which have grown very 
12/ See SVIMEZ, 	localizzazione industriale ed i costi sociali 
dell:insediamento di nueva únitá lavorative", Informazioni SVIMEZ, 
Rome, May 1957. Quoted by Alessandra Busca and Salvatore Cafiero 
in "Costo social del asentamiento", Cuadernos de la Sociedad  
Venezolana de Planificación (August 1966), p. 40. 
22/ See TEKNO, Ricersa sui costi  di insediamento urbani ed industriali  
in varíe cia díItalláj  Milan, 1963. Quoted by BuSca and Cafiero 
in "Costo 'social del asentamiento", op.cit., p. 41. 
21/ Of this increase, about one-third - in decreasing proportion in the 
larger countries -- is due tó the new towns with more than 
20,000 inhabitants; the rest may be ascribed to the population 




fast the ability to provide such services efficiently declines, and 
serious inconvenientes ensue, especially in respect of intra-urban 
transport and connunications. In some metropolitan areas, tens of 
thousands of persone living at distantes of anything from 30 to 
60 kilometres from their place of work are depende-A upon daily transport; 
the cost of this commuting has not been measures, but indirectly it 
undoubtedly implies an increase in working hours and a drain on wages, 
in addition to the direct cost of transport facilities. 
The cumulative shortfalls in social services, in their turn, 
reach abnormal extremes, For exampley the urban housing deficit in , 
Latin America was estinated at 14 million housing units in 1961, and, 
to nake matters worse, shows a rising trend, About 30 per cent of the 
urban population has no piped water suppiy. As regards education, in 
1960 there were 40 million illiterate adults in the region as a whole, 
and the adult population had not received more than 2.2 years of schooling 
on the average. 
In there circunetances, it is doubtful whether the expansion of 
many of Latin Americafs metropolitan areas would afford opportunities 
for external economíes. On the contrary, in sone instantes the 
per capita cost of urban infrastructure entailed in the establishment 
of entirely new towns would be lower than that of expanding the najor 
urban centres aiready in existente. For example, in the case of the 
underground railways in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, the cost per 
kilometre oí' track is estimated at 10 million dollars, 
Clearly, therefore, the significante of external economies and 
consequently of criteria for the regional allocation of resources 
differs greatly acébrding to whether they are envisaged from the 
standpOint of a particular énterPrise or project'or from that of the 
national economy as a whole. In the firstncase, as long as foreseeable 
operational resulta are related to directly productive inyestment, the, 
advantages Will be on the side of unlinited agglomeration„ and this is, 
in the last analysis, one of the chief principies on which priVate 
investment. decisions are based. But such estimates of productivity 




public investment (national or municipal), which sometimes has to be 
on a substantial scale, and in practice represents an indirect subsidy 
to enterprises. In other words, the national economy might derive more 
benefit from the location of new enterprises in second- or third- 
category development nodes, where they might help to further the 
modernization process, than from their installation in major urban 
centres, in so far as these latter record rising costs for the expansion 
of infrastructure and public utilities. Unfortunately, no data are 
available for testing the validity of this judgement, even in relation 
to some of the metropolitan areas of Latin America. 
(ii) Concentration of resources  and incentives to  regional 
development. Despite the foregoing reservation, the possible advantages 
of concentrating resources in a few development nodes would still hold 
good, in so far as these centres were capable of acting as instruments 
for radiating progress to the rest of the economy and for oromoting 
economic growth. A prerequisite forndefining the advantages in question 
is to investigate the relations between the major urban centres, on the 
ore hand, and, on the other, the secondary urban centres and the vq3Ple 
of the rural periphery. This is another field in which very little 
research has been undertaken in Latin America. 
In their early stages, industrial development and the diversification 
of the economy call for a relatively high degree of regional corcentration 
in the allocation of resources, and can make advantageous use of a 
set of external economies. In addition, the development and consolidation. 
of the centres of economic growth implies that income is diverted to 
them from traditional activities, either directly, through the 
channelling of part of the investment capacity generated in such 
activities towards the centres concerned, or indirectly, through the 
transfer of surpluses by means of taxation (mainly taxes on prinary 
exports at first). At a later stage, especially in the conditions 
attendant upon the development of Latin America, the major urban 
centres find other ways of appropriating surpluses from the rest of 
the economy; for example, in a framework of strongly protected industrial 




progress are transferred throuh reductions in the prices of manufactured 
goods, but that re]ative prices tend to favour the urban centres, to 
which real income is-thus transferred from the rest of the system. 
A process,of this kind might be regarded as a temporary.necessity,. 
required cantil the more advanced development nodes were firmly 
established and were capable of engendering on their own acceunt 
sufficient surpluses to safeguard their subsequent expansion, while at 
the same time bringing the higher levels of productivity and better 
living conditions by which they are óharacterized.within reach of an 
increasing proportion of the countryis population, and. divertin part 
of the surplus to the rest of the economy in order to rake the system 
as a whole betLer integrated and more homogeneous. 
The investment levels attained are much lower than might be, 
expected in view of the high degrees of income concentration, and the 
production techniques in use are increasingly capital-inte:Isive and 
employ relatively little manpower. These two circumstances in conjunction 
considerably reduce the capacity of modem activities in the metropolitan. 
economy to absorb a growing proportion of the labour force. Thus, the 
development nodes fail to increase their potential as instruments for 
imparting dynamism and homogeneity to the rest of the economy; what is 
more, the rapid tempo of migration from the rural areas to the towns 
is óreating within the metropolitan areas themselves a steadily growing 
population sector which has to fin&employment in activities where 
`Productivity and income are minimal, with the result that internal 
disparities are created which are jimct as striking as the differences 
between the metropolitan area as a whole and the rest of the country. 
The very structure of production capacity tends to reinforce this 
process, inasmuch as it is geared to the consumption patterns of the 
upper income strata and therefore places emphasis on the expansion of 
more highly capital-intensive activities próviding lens employment per 
unit of product, while increasing diversification is demanded which 
involves the disadvantage of unduly small scales of production. 
The special conditions in which the development of Latin America 
is taking place, however, do not seem propitious to euch a process. 




much lower tan might be expected in view of the high degrees of income 
concentration, largely because of the ways of living and consumption 
expectations of the social groups receiving those incomes; and since at 
the same time the production techniques in use are increasingly capital—
intensive and employ relatively little manpower, the capacity to absorb 
the labour force is reduce& Thus, the development nodes fail to increase 
their potential sufficiently as instrumente for imparting dynamismto 
the rest of the economy; what is more, the rapid tempo of migration from 
the rural areas to the towns is creating within the major cities a 
steadily growing population sector which has to find,employment in 
activities where productivity and income are minimal, with the result that 
internal disparities are created which are just as striking as the 
differences between the urban areas and the rest of the country. The, 
very structure of production capacity tends to reinforce this process, 
inasmuch as it is geared to the consumption patterns of the upper income 
strata and therefore places emphasis on the expansion of more hijhly 
capital—intensive activities providing less employment per unit of product, 
while increasing diversification is demanded, which. increases their 
coste because of the unduly small scales of production. The procese is 
further consolidated by means of price mechanisms and the tapning of 
financial surpluses through the bank system. Accordingly, the economic 
system tends to accentuate the disparities in regional development. 
(b) Other factors destined. to influence regional development policies  
The foregoing considerations point to the necessity of formulating 
a regional development policy which would fit finto the framework of an 
over—all development policy. In the special conditinns prevailing in 
each country, it would be necessary deliberately to alter the traditional 
pattern of location of economic growth. Thus, the efforts that are 
already being made in several Latin American countries, as described in 
an earlier section, would take their place within a more general programe. 
There are also other factors which enhance the need for an active 
regional development policy and which will in all probability influence 




(i) Latín American economic integrAlkan). Outstanding among these 
factors are Latin Americals economic integration prospecta. The 
traditional deVelopment centres) cut off from one'another as they are)  
could hardly constitute the baSis 'for a more closely integrated Latin 
American economy, 
The difficult.y líes not mérely in the vast distánces and tcpographical 
obstacles involved)  but aiso in the principies which governed the 
establiáhMent of the Latin American transport and comrui-iications 
The - whoie of the transport network was constructed in line with the needs 
of the export trade)  and the golden rule was to follow the easiest, mute 
from the. production site to the foreign consumer centre. Generally 
speaking, each individual country's transport system was designed to 
serve foreign markets)  with the seáports forming its axisl and the 
interconnexion With points in the interior was neglected. Similarly)  at 
the International level there was no regular lihkage)  eitler by sea or 
by land)  between different Latin American countries. 
If the resulting Pattern of regional distribution of economic 
activity did not even serve definité integration objectives within the 
national economies1 much less could it have taken intó a ccount the 
possibilities of complementarity among the Latín American countries. 
There were even specific stages at which intra-regional conne:ions that-
had previously been established tended to disappcar. 
Signs of what the subsequent course of the Latin American 
integration movement may mean in terma of each country-1s regional 
development are already discernible. Án exCellent illustration is 
afforded by the regional agricultural policy pursued in the Central 
American Common Market, which)  as it operates at the level of the 
five countries in conjunction) has permitted the restructuration and 
zoning of agriculturál production. This hás led toa form of 
specialization by areas which may revolutionize the structure of 
/agricultural produc Ion 
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agricultura? 'production in each of the countries concerned.22/ In the 
future, moreover, the subregional integration projects of the Andean 
Group and the countries of the River Plate basin may imply a radical 
change in the structure and location of demand, which will necessarily 
affect•the location of the activities intended to satisfy it. 
A Latin American integration programe based essentially or solely 
on the activities and potential of the existing centres of economic 
activity might still further accentuate the existing disparities, unless 
a strategy for regional development is adopted. 
(ii) I221122rements of agricultura? development. Whatever the 
requirements of Latin American integration with respect to the geographical 
allocation of resources, a concurrent pressure will be exerted by internal 
needs themselves. Agricultura? development prospects constitute an 
illustrative case in Point. 
The existing food shortage, population grouth and the need to 
increase and redistribute income will necessitate a very rapid expansion 
of agricultura? production. It may be estimated that during a fairly 
representative period (for example, ten or fifteen years) these demande 
can largely be met by increasing productivity in the areas already farmed; 
but even if yields are relatively high, much more land will still have to 
be brought under cultivation. According to the studies that are being 
22/ See ECLA, Evaluación de la integración económica en Centroamérica  
(United Nations publication, Sales N°: 66.II.G.9), PP. 60 et sec. 
This document, which is publish,Jd orly in Spanish, was partly based 
on a study prepared for presentation at the ninth session of the 
Economic Commission for Latín America (E/CN.12/CCE/327/Rev.1)„ 
from which the following passage is taken: l'Greater possibilities 
for the zoning of production are afforded by the vide range of 
variations in climate, physical conditions, soil fertility and 
distribution of water resources in Central America as a whole„ as 
well as by the marked extent to which one country differs from 
another in respect of the relations between the size of the rural 
population and the quantity and quality of the resources available 
for agricultural production. All this would enable the economic 
use of the less productive areas to be given a new structure, and 
would facilitate More intensive farming of the land best suited 





carried out by the ECLA/FAO Joint Agriculture Division, by 1975, if 
reasonable agricultural consumption targets are to be attained, farm 
land in Latin America should be expanded by 70 million hectares, of 
which 35 million would have to be used for crops and 35 million for 
livestock production.22/ It should be recalled that in 1965 the total 
area under crops amounted to 80 million hectares, and prazing lard 
measured in terms of artificial pastures represented 222 million 
hectares (65 million of artificial pastures and 157 million of natural 
pasture equivalent). Expansion on the scale indicated would involve the 
'plementation of a regional policy aiming at bringing under cultivation 
equivalent of one-fourth of the existing agricultural area. 
This implies not only the construction of infrastructure to facilitate 
access to the areas opened up, but also significant changes in agricultur71 
location patterns. But the procese cannot stop there; in one way or 
another, the incorporation of new agricultura' land will bririg new urban 
centres into being, and will afford opportunities for new regional 
development nodes to spring up on the oasis of more diversified econonies, 
(iii) Industrial development policy. In the past, industrial 
development has unquestionably been one of the factors that have done 
most to promote the geographical concentration of development. 
Nevertheless, especially once specific stages of industrial gro-fath have 
been attained, the continuance of this concentration is not necessarily 
inherent in that of the industrialization process. 
Generally speaking, apart from the external economies already 
discussed, the location of industry in the major cities has beendetermined 
by certain principies of manufacturing development which are unlikely to 
carry out the same weight in the future. As long as industry was geared 
to import substitution in respect of consumer goods and to the satisfaction 
DI Per capita agricultural consumption in the lower income groups 
- 50 per cent of the total population - will probably rise from 
62 dollars per annum in 1965 (at 1960 prices) to 103 dollars in 1985; 
at the sane time, per capita consumption in the higher income groups 
.- the other half of the population should increase from 145 to 
151 dollars. This would mean that the agricultural consumption of 
the lower income groups would reach what is at present the average 




of the,growing and increasingly diversified demand of the upper income 
strata, a location pattern other than agglomeration in the large urban 
areas was hardly conceivable. With the exhaustion of import substitution 
possibilities in the field of final consumer manufactures, however, 
industrial development is compelled to seek means of utilizing and 
processing natural resources, with a view both to the domestic market 
and to exports of manufactured goods. By their very nature, mapy such 
industries are bound to be located near the resources concerned, 
irrespective of the markets afforded by the traditional development centres; 
and this implies new regional patterns of industrial distribution. 
Other factors of regional location are linked to the strategy for 
development policy. Obviously, a policy will have to be adopted in which 
priority is given to raising the productivity of the non-modern economic 
sectors and the real income of the population living in subsistente 
conditions. The considerable increase in demand. for intermcdiate, capital 
and consumer goods, besides,the large-scale agglomeration which such a 
policy is likAy to promote, would require the development of new centres 
of development which would have to be given deliberate impetiis 
In so far as ah this involves significant changes in. income 
distribution, other factors will emerge which would also facilitate a 
broader regional distribution of the industries producing consumer goods. 
If the population of,rural areas and of new urban centres obtains a larger 
share in real income, the structure of demand for consumer manufactures 
will alter in favour of wage goods, which in their turn are precisely those 
for which requirements in respect of scales of production and concentration 
in large units are less exigent, and which therefore lend themselves 
better to more balanced regional location. 
(c) Criteria for regional allocation of resources  
Taken as a whole, the considerations set forth in the two preceding 
sections suggest that the formulation of a regional development policy 
aiming at the opening-up of new areas and the establishment of new 
development nodes does not necessarily represent a sacrifice of resources 
justifiable only in the light of income redistribution criteria or by 




Strict adherence to a profit-cost criterion based on short-term 
prospecta is not enough, since in most cases the conclusions to which it 
led would be unfavourable to the broader regional distribution of resources. 
As a general /lile, when profit-cost ratios are calculated no account is 
taken of the indirect investment required to expand.infrastructure and 
urban services, and there is good reason to doubt whether these would 
continue to afford opportunities of benefiting by external economies in 
several of the Latin American metropolitan areas. 
Purthermore, it is essential that decisions of this type sbould be 
based en a sufficientiy long-term outlook. Naturally, the yields that 
may derive from the establishment of development centres in potentially 
wealthy areas which have not, however, been selytled or developed, can 
only be properly assessed over the medium or long termo ,Hydropower, , 
irrigation or land settlement projects and road-building, for example, 
which permit the development of new areas, entail investmart that is slow 
to mature, but is often more than justified by the direct and indirect 
benefits subsequently reaped; what is more, ín many in5tances it is 
precisely such economic penetration projects that have given the Latin 
American economies their present structure. Cases in point are such 
projects as those relating to the valleys of the Rivers Negro and 
Papaloapan (in Argentina and Mexico), to land settlement in P,raná 
(Brazi1)0 and to the areas of Tingo María Pucallpa in Peru and Putumayo 
in Colombia. Through these undertakings, not only have sources of wealth 
been created, but markets have also been established or expended, giving 
rise in their tern to new investment, No lesa significant is the potential 
of other projects not yet completed, such as that of the Carretera Marginal 
de la Selva. Latin America abounds in undeveloped areas of great potential 
wealth, where the establishment of new development nodes would be 
justified. Thus a snowballing process similar to that which determined 
the concentration of economic activity in the existing centres would be 
reproduced in a different setting, en a different scale and with different 
objectives. Obviously, however, in sueh cases economic expendiency 
cannot be evaluated project by project, but must be assessed from different 
angles and on the basis of a comprehensive comparison of various programmee 




Lastly, in relation to sone regional undertakings at least, it 
should be recalled that the problem cannot alwavs be stated in terms pf 
options for the allocation of a given quantity of aggregate resources, 
since regional development policies themselves may result in the 
mobilization of additional resources which would otherwise remain idle, 
In other words, a more active regional development policy may not only 
imply a different pattern for the allocation of resources by regions, 
but may also serve as an instrument whereby a larger volume of donestic 
resources can be nobilized for capital formation purposes 
This involves recognition of the need for broader approaches to 
investment questions than those traditionally adopted. Hitherto, attention 
has been alnost entirely concentrated on the mobilization of financial 
resources and the removal of obstacles to increases in monetary saving; 
on the other hand, much less heed has been paid to the potential capacity 
of substantial unemployed or under-employed human resources te contribute 
to real capital formation, particularly in agricultural in.frastructure 
expansion projects. This potential would be difficult to harness 
efficaciously anywhere but in the local environment, where it is easier 
to mobilize relatively numerous groups of workers for the attainment of 
objectives capable of providing them with rnotivations. 
Another point to bear in mind is the possible significance of a 
policy for regional díssemination of techriical progress and economic 
activity in relation to the establishment or expansion of a genuine 
domestic market. The existing disequilibria, whose intensity and 
influence varíes according to each countryts situation, make up a 
heterogeneous body of conditions which militate against internal 
integration and the possibilities of trade within the national economy. 
Just as at the international level economic relations are more dynamic 
between diversified or industrialized producers than between the centres 
and the periphery, so too, at the national level, the network of trade 
will tend to spread wider in so far as the various parte of the territory 
take a real share in it, on the basis of more diversified supply, From 
this standpoint, it may be contended that the emergente of a trae donestic 
market represents an external economy of vital importante for the whole 





THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
The relativa importance still attaching to the external sector in 
the present structure of the Latin American economy has already beun 
discussed in the preceding chapters, particularly in connexion with the 
structure of aggregate supply and demand, The object of this chapter is 
to build up a fairly substantial body of data that will give an up-to-date 
picture of the situation and indicate the major trends of both foreign 
trade and external financing and external capital movements si ce the 
mid-nineteen-fifties.1/ 
1. Characteristics and trends of fóricalrade 
(a) General features  
The essential features of Latín Americals foreign trade at the 
present time may be summed up as follows: 
(i) A relatively anall and steadily dwindling share of total world 
trade; 
(ii) Little diversification of exports, which still largely consist 
of a limited number of primary commodities; 
(iii) Little momentum in export trade, owing to the instability and 
slsw growth of external demand for this type of goods, growing 
competition from other areas and the protectionist policies of 
the industrialized areas aimed at self-sufficiency; 
(iv) Greater dependence on importe for domestio supplies, not only 
of complex industrial goods but also of primary commodities, 
mainly raw materials with some foodstuffs; 
1/ With regard to foreign trade in particular, the aim of presenting as  
much detailed information as possible by areas and types of products 
has limited the period covered to 1955-66. The data given in Part Two, 
which reviews events in 19680can be used to update some of the more 
important series, although they are less detailed in coverage. In 
view of the way in which the data are set forth in the basic sources, 
trade has been divided into six categories of products: three for 
primary commodities (food, raw materials and fuels) and three for 
manufactures (chemical products, machinery and equipment, and other 
manufactures), 	 /(7) A 
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(v) 	high degree of concentration'in thé géographical 
distribution of trade, a particularly large volune -f 
transactions with the industrialized countries being set 
against very little trading abong the Latin Anerican 
countries themselves, and between them and other under- 
developed regions or -socialist countries; 
Ehrked disequilibria, in trade balances with the 
industrialiZed countries, which have led to a Bort of 
three-cornered trade, in which there are appreciable 
export sw-pin.ses in trade mith Europe and import surpluses 
in transactions with the United States. 
These charactaristics have becpme accentuated in recent years at a 
time when world, trade has been growing exceptionally fast and has undergone 
for-reanhing structural changes. The follov.ing ato some of the main 
futures of there changes and their repercussions on Latir' Arerica's foreign 
trade: 
(i) The share oí industrial products in world trade flows has 
increased enormously at the expense of primary commodities; 
(ii) The major industrialized regions have greatly reduced their 
deficit position in world commodity trade and, in some cases, 
have become net exporters; 
(iii) In the fase nf these changes intra-Latin Am5rican trade is 
making insufficient progrese, and trade between Latin America 
and nther under-developed regions seene te have come to a 
standstill; 
(iv) Import substitution in manufactures has not prevented a rapid 
deterioration from taking place in the deficit position of 
chemical products and machinery in Latin Americals foreign trade, 
and has merely served to stabilize the negative balance for 
"other manufactures", while the absolute value of importe has 
been rising; 
(v) Although Latin America has favourable net trade balances for 





of regional imports has remained constant for fuela only, 
while imports of foodstuffs and raw materials have continued 
to increase, 
Data bearing out most of there general arguments are presented in 
tables IT12.and 1733, 
It vill be seen that primary commodities accounted for nearly 87 per 
cent of the regiones entire exports up to 1966, and as much as 95 per cent 
of semi-finished non-ferrous metal products, which,appearunder the 
heading cf Hother manufactures", are included. About 73 per cent of its 
imports consist of industria! goods. If trade within LatfLn America is 
discounted, the shares cf primary commodities in exports and of 
manufactures in imports both increase, 
These•figures make. it olear that there have been no appreciable 
charges in the structure cf Latin Americanas foreign trade. The process 
of industrialization, which is based essentially on import substitution, 
is not reflocted in the composition of exports, and has had relatively 
little effect on the structure of imports. Where it has, it has mainly 
altered the relative : importance cf different types of manufactures, for 
example, the share.-of "other manufactures',  has decreased while those of 
chemical products, and of machinery and equipment, including motor 
vehicles and parts, have expanded, 
In this sense, intra-Latin American trade shows a different pattern, 
although in absolute tercos it carries little weight in over-all trade. 
In 1955, nearly 90 per ,cent was primary commodity trade, while manufactures 
accountcd for 1-;es than 11 per cent. By 1966, the latteres share had 
rasen to over 30 per.cent (70 per-cent of the regiones. 86 million donarse 
worth of exports of machinery vent to the Latin.American countries„ as 
did a fifth of the miscellaneous manufactures and more than a third of 
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Generally speaking, the persistence of this type of structure with 
primary commodities predoninating in exports ánd manufactures in imports 
is matched by the geographical distribution of trade. In the last few 
years, about three-quarters of Latin Americats exports, have.been 
chanrelled towards the industrialized areas, and this proportjen rises 
to 80 per cent if the socialist countries of Eastern Europe ar.3 included. 
On the side of imports, these areas together supplied 85 per cent of 
Latin Americats purchases. Only a fifth of its exports go to the 
developing countries and mainland China. About half of this represénts 
trade within Latin Anerica, which, added to exports of Venezuelan petroleum 
to Aruba and Curaçao totals 17 per cent. Thus only 3 per cent is left 
for exports to Asía, Afrj.ca, the Middle East and mainland China. The 
geographical origin of Latin Americats imports is divided in much the same 
way. 
Some of the changos that took place in the benchmark period were 
largely due to Cuba, since the shift in its trade flows raisod the share 
of the socialist countries. Trade with the developing opuntr::_és fefl 
off slightly, but in this case the main cause seens to have been the 
decline in-exports from Venezuela to Aruba and Cura9ao. 
If specific industrialized areas or countries are considerad, it 
Will be sean that fairly pronounced changes occurred. For instance, the 
United Statest share of Latin American exports dropped considerably 
betweén 1955 and 1966, both in over-all tercos and in each category of 
products. In 1955, the United States market took 44 per cent of Latin 
Americats exports, whereas in 1966 it received only 33 per cent. 
Foódstuffs were particularly affected, as their share shrank from 51 to 
less than 34 per,cent, and total sales declined as well, The United 
Statest share of.Latin Americats imports also dwindled, except ín raw 
materials, but less than in the case of exports. In other wórds, while 
Latín Americats trade with the United States slackened off in relative 
tercos, the balance of their transactions changed in magnitude and nature, 
since from being a net exporter in 1955 ( with a surplus of some 200 million 





Latin American exports to the group of countries forming the Europeah 
Economio Community (EEC) increased considerably from 15.6 per cent in 
1955 to nearly 20 per cent in 1966, while its imports remained at 
approximately the same level (just over 17 per cent). Thus, from having 
a more or less even balance of trade with EEC in 1955, Latin Lmerica 
achieved a large export surplus by 1966. 
The group of countries that make up the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) have lost ground in Latin Americars exports and imports, 
and Latin America continues to hold an export surplus of about 200 million 
dollars a year with them. This deterieration in relative and absolute 
terms has been largely due to its trade with the United Kingdom, since 
Latín America imports more from the other EFTA countries than it sells 
to theme 
Owing to these balances, Latin Americats trade wi¿h the main 
industrialized arcas is three-cornered and this, apart from difficulties 
arising from the structure of trade itself, helps to prevent the region 
from developing its trade with markets that are relatively more dynamic 
but with which it already has sizable export surpluses. 
In Latin Americats trade with other industrialized areas, Canada 
ranks foremost, since the region, while still a net importer, is stepping 
up the volume of its transactions with that country, Its deficit p7)sition 
is largely due to the fact that trade is still on a unilateral basis. 
Fuels are virtually the only ítem in which Latin America has increased 
its exports, and it remains a net importer in all other groups. 
if the United Kingdom is excluded from EFTA, Latín Americars trade 
with the other countries shows a constant and larger deficit than with 
Canada, Its only important export is food„ and those of raw materials 
and fuels are marginal, whereas its purchases of manufactures are rising 
steadily, To offset these deficits, Latín America is compelled to 
maintain a surplus with the United Kingdom, which limits its possibilities 
of building up its trade with that country. 
Japan is gaining in importance as a buyer and supplier for Latín 




in 1966, with increases in the three categories of primary commodities, 
raw materials in particular, Between the same two years, Latin Americats 
imports from Japan expanded from 2.5 to 4,5 per tent, which has given it 
a fairly considerably credit balance, 
Among the developing countries, Latin Americats trade with the 
Middle East is relatively very small and shows a deficit. AltPlough the 
Middle East is a net importer of food and manufactures, and, to some 
extent, of raw materials as well, Latin Americats chances of acquiring a 
larger share of that market are limitad by its capacity to export 
nanufactured goods and by competition from the industrialized areas in 
the supply of primary commodities. Hence, trade consists almost entirely 
in an exchange of food for petz.oleum and even so is adverse for Brazil, 
Argentina and possibly Chile, although the first two have the biggest 
potential for exporting food and raw materials, and all three produce 
textiles, clothing and footwear and durable consumar goods. Despite the 
fact that the Middle East imported 810 million dollarst worth of food 
in 1966, Latin Americats share of the supply was only 62 m'ilion dollars, 
and it provided no consumer manufactures whatsoevar although the Middle 
East bought 1.56 million dollarst worth in that year. 
The pattern is repeated in trade with Asia, now a net food importer, 
where Latin Americats long-standing deficit is rapidly diminishing, more 
because of a contraction in imports - due tP import substitution - than 
because of an increase in exports. In 1966, Asiats food imports rose to 
2,6 million dollars in value, in which Latin Americats share was no more 
than 62 million. More than half the total value carne from the 
industrialized countries, and the bulk of this from the United States, 
As Cubats trade was reorganized and gearedto Eastern Europe, and 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, México and Uruguay also traded with that 
ama, though on a lesser scale, Latin Americats share of the total 
increased. Cuba has a deficit position, while the countries generally 
have export surpluses, having met with sone difficulty in attempting to 
build up their importe from Eastern Europe, Cuba has aleo set the pace 
in the expansion of trade with mainland China, while other countriest 
transactions have been largelycircumatantial, e.g., Argentinats sales 




As regards the structure of Latín Americals trade by types of 
products and geographical areas, the foregoing observations show that it 
has been steadily losing ground in world trade flows, owing to a number 
of factors connected with international trade policy and modes of internal 
development and, aboye all, with the changes in the structure of world 
trade after the Second World War. These have been so drastic that they 
should be considered at greater length, as they are an essential element 
for seeing Latín Americats current foreign trade problems in the right 
;erspective. 
(b) Latín America in the structure and trends of world trade 
The expansion cf the industrialized economies, at least since the 
mid-nineteen-fifties, was accompanied by a very high rate of growth in 
world trade, although trade in primary commodities and trade in manufactures 
develop along very different linee. Since demand for primary commodities 
did not increase at the same rate as demand for manufactures, the structure 
of world trade was substantially modified; relatively speaking, foodstuffs, 
raw materials and fuels steadily lost ground, while chemical products, 
machinery and "other manufactures" steadily gained (see table 1-34)0 
In 1955, primary commodities and manufactures had an equal share of 
world trade, but the share of the three categories of primary commodities 
has steadily decreased since then. In 1966, primary commodities made up 
only 40 per cent of total world trade, while manufactures increased 
their share to 60 per cent. This means that the growth rate of trade in 
primary commodities was much lower than that of trade in manufactures 
- little more than half, in fact. 
Among primary commodities, raw materials (hides, fibres, fertilizere, 
etc,) lost the most ground. This was due to a number of factors, but 
mainly to the fall in the prices of primary commodities on the world 
market, which reduced the current value of importe and exporte of these 
commodities, thus accentuating the effects of the sluggish growth in 
the volume of world trade, and of the appearance of a growing number of 
synthetics as a result of technological progrese. In addition, from the 
viewpoint of the exporting countries, some influence was exerted by changes 
in the exporte themselves, since some primary commodities were given more 





STRUCTURE AND TRENDS OF WCRLD TRADE 1955-66 
1955 1960 	. 1965 1966 
Cumulativo annual:ratos 
of inorease 
1955-60 1960-65 1966 
Total 	(millions of dollare) 93.540 127.879 186 390 203480 2111_ 7£5 
Ycldstuffs (O and 1) 
Milhous of dollars 18 400 22 310 30 990 32 850 3.9 5.8 6.o 
Pereentage of total 19.7 17.4 16.6 16.1 
Ray materials (2 and 4) 
Millions of dollars 17 48o 21 32o 24 77á 26 210 4.1 3.1 5.8 
Peroentage of total 1817 16.7 13.3 12.9 
Puels (3) 
Millions ›f dollare 10 270 12 640 17 920 19 050 403 7.2 6.3 
Peroentage of total 11.0 9.9 9.6 9.4 
Chemioal produots (5) 
Milton* oí dolláre 4 270 7 520 12 220 13 68o 9.8 10.2 11.9 
Perdentage of total, 54-  5.9 6.6 6.7 
119£1112x (7) 
Milliono of donare 16 92o 27 77n 45 690 51 540 10.4 1O.g 12.8 
Peroentage of total 18.1 21.7 24.5 25.3 
Other manufaotures (6 and 8) 
Milhous of dollare 24 200 34 86o 51 820 56 94o 7.6 8.2 9.9 
Peroentage of total 25.9 27.3 27.8 28.o 




The relativé share of foodstuffs also declined appreciably, but to 
a lesser degree. Added to the long-term factors behind the slow growth 
of world trade - mainly lack of elaeticity in demand compared with total 
expenditures on foodstuffs was the declining trend' in prices over the 
period, especially for coffee, cocea and segar. 
Fuels lost comparatively lees ground than the other two categories 
of primary commodities, and the decline - which was moderate on the 
whole affected the main supplying areas to differing degrees. 
In contrast, the three categories of manufactures strengthened their 
position, The annual rate of growth for chemical products, and particularly 
for machinery, rose to 10 per cent or more; and, although "other manufactures" 
did not expand at the sane rate, they grew appreciably :Easter than primary 
commodities. 
These very pronounced changes in the structure of world trade within 
a relatively short period are mainly responsible for the decline in the 
share of the under-developed countries in general, and of Latin America 
in particular. Other factors also exerted a specially strong influence 
in Latin America, In the foflrwing sections, the cénsequences of these 
changes are discussed in terms of the share of the various regions in 
w„xld trade, beginning with the majar geographical regions and ending 
with selected countries having the largest shares in world trade. 
(i) World trade by major regions. In very general terms, a 
distinctien can be drawn between the developed and the deve1oping regions; 
this distinction coincides with a relatively high level of specialization 
in the exports produced and with a kind of international division of 
labour which is clearly reflected in the structure of their trade. The 
special features of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe make it 
advisable to place, them in a separate group. 
Table 1-35 gives an historical breakdown of world trade by regions 
and by categories of goods, In 1966, exports frrm the developed regions 
totalled more than 140,000 million dallare, while exporte from the 
developing regions were lens than 39,000 Million dollars, and from the 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe approximately 21,000 m'ilion dollars. 
Compared with 1955, these figures represent an increase of more than 100 per 
cent for the developed regions, roughly 60 per cent frr the developing 
regions and 125 per cent for the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. 
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With regard to the features of the trade of each region, the trade 
balance of the developed regions as a whole showed a favourable trend 
during the decade, With an export surplus of 2,600 million dollars in 
1960 and slightly more than 2,000 million in 1966. This trade surplus is 
the outcome of a sizable contraction in their imports of foodstuffs, raw 
materials and fuels, and large surpluses in their exports of chemical 
products, "Qther manufactures" and especially machinery. At the same time, 
however, beginning in the mid-fifties, appreciable changes occurred in 
the relative size of the surpluses and in the volume of trade PS compared 
with other regions, 
This is particularly striking in the case of foodstuffs, The 
developed regions,  position as a net importer declined in both absolute 
and relative terms: net imports of foodstuffs decreased from some 
4,200 million dollars in 1955 to slightly more than 3,600 million in 1966, 
In other words, while exports of foodstuffs from the developed regions 
more than doubled during the period, imports rose by not more than 70 per 
cent, The significance of these changes will be readily appreciated if it 
is remembered that in 1955 the developed regions exported 18 per cent more 
foodstuffs than the developing regions, against 80 per cent more in 1966. 
There were similar trends, although less pronounced, in trade in 
raw materials, In absolute terms, net imports from the developed regions 
rose between 1955 and 1966, but their exporte of raw materials climbed 
more steeply than those of the developing regions. The only category of 
commodities in which the developed regions increased their net imports 
was that of fuels, 
The developed countries export surpluses rose sharply for the first 
two categories of manufactures - chemical products and machinery - and 
remained relatively constant for "other manufactures", 
A glance at the changes in the composition of the imports of the 
developed regions brings out the significance of these trends. In 
1955, primary commodities made no more than 54 per cent of the total, 
compared with less than 41 per cent in 1966. This contraction affected 
all three categories; foodstuffs dropped from 21.9 to 16.3 per cent, 




These changes in the composition of the developed countries total 
imports and the sharp increase in their exporte, of primary commodities 
were the result of such factors as the tercos of trade, technological 
progress in the production of synthetic substitutes for natural raw 
materials, domestic agricultural development policies, restrictions nn 
iMports of primary commodities from under-developed regions, and growing 
support for the establishment or maintenance of exportable sur tuses 
(through price policies or special financing arrangements). Hence, the 
developed countries: former dependence on imports of primary commodities 
gradually lessened while their lead in exports of manufactures increased. 
The other side of the picture can be seen in the trends and 
composition of trade in the developing regions. Of the three categories 
of commodities, only in fuels did they strengthen their position as net 
exporters in relative and absolute terne between 1955 and 1966. The 
slight increase in the export surplus of raw materials (lees than 20 per 
cent over the period) was actually a decline in relative tercos; since 
their imports increased at a considerably higher rate than their exporte. 
There was not even an improvement, in absolute tercos, in the over-all 
position with regard to foodstuffs; there was a slight increase in exporte 
(less' than 30 per cent) but a much more pronounced increase in importe 
(round 80 per cent),. 
Thus, in contrast to what happened in the developed regions, the 
changes in the composition nf the trade of the developing regions were 
not very significant. Primary commodities still nade up more than 
30 per cent of total importe, a decrease el some 35 per cent over 1955, 
almnst entirely due to the fact that there was only a very slight increase 
in fuel imports. The combined share of foodstuffs, raw materials and 
fuels in total exporte dropped from 87.1 to 80.7 per cent during the 
period, while the share of the three categories of manufactures, 
especially "other manufactures", increased slightly, to some extent 
a result of increased exporte of some semi-processed intermediate goods 
which were still essentially primary commodities. 
From the aboye it would seem that the traditional pattern of trade 




world trade. While the developing regions continue to concentrate mainly 
on the export.of primary commodities, the industrialized regions are 
tending to become self-sufficient in teme of these commodities and to 
generate ever larger exportable surpluses in competition with the 
developing countries, while at the same time retaining their position as 
almost the only suppliers of chémical products, machinery and, to a lesser 
extent, other manufactued consumer goods, 
The over-ali result isthat the external trade problems of the: 
developing regions are becoming more and 'more acute, Instead of fostering 
new trade.flows and outlets which would increase their participation in 
world markets, the abandonment of the traditional pattern of trade which 
was not favourable to the developing countries has only meantfresh 
restrictions, with all that that involves for the growth of the demestic 
market, 
(ii) Trade in the developed countries. The general coments aboye 
on the changes in the structure of trade in the developed ,regions cannot 
be applied equally to each of the countries concerned (see table 1-36)0' 
The trade structure of one group of countries - Australia., Canada, 
New Zealand and South Africa - is similar to that of the developing 
regions: net surpluses on their trade in foodstuffs and rawmaterials and 
a net deficit on their trade in manufactures. Nevertheless, apart from 
other sizable economic differences (income levels, leveis of -living and 
economic growth rates), the trade of these countries has de-;releped in a 
very different way, helped in some measure by the preferential treatment 
which they enjoy but which is not extended to«latin America. Their 
exports of foodstuffs and raw materials have Brown much more rapidly than 
their imports of these commodities, considerably strengthening their 
position as net exporters. Moreover, although they continue to be net 
importers of fuels, the amounts they need to import are becoming appreciably 
smaller. Also very eignificant are the differences in their trade in 
manufactures (see table 1-36). For example, although it had'a large and 
growing adverse trade balance in respect of machinery, Canada exported 
machinery to a value of nearly 2>000 milhion dollars, which represents 
almost a séven-fold increment between 1955 and 1966. In "other manufactures", 
Canada also had a favourable net balance, while Australia, New Zealand and 
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The rapid growth of these countries exports of foodstuffs and raw 
materials necessarily affected the trade of the developing regions, 
which have surpluses of these commodities; however, the development of 
United States trade had a far greater effect and was the major reason for 
the changes in the structure of world trade and the decline in the 
relative position of the developing regions, In 1955, the United States 
had a net deficit of more than 2,000 million dollars on its trade in 
foodstuffs and raw materials, but during the next ten years the situation 
changed rapidly and in 1966 it had a surplus of more than 1,000 million 
dollars, Between 1955 and 1966, United States exports of foodstuffs 
expanded much more rapidly than its exports of manufactures, increasing 
by two and a half times. Its imports of foodstuffs and raw materials over 
the same period grew by only 40 and 14 per cent respectively, while the 
steady increase in the United States adverse trade balance on fuels and 
"other manufactures" did not mean that these developing regions supplied 
a larger quantity of those commodities. 
In contrast to these trends in United States trade, trade between 
the developing countries and the EEC and EFTA countries and Japan, 
continued to be charaoterized by greater complementarity and specializations. 
This position is also tending to deteriorate, however, owing to 
competition from other developed regions and the establishment of common 
markets, 
Between 1955 and 1966, REC trade virtually tripled in value, 
totalling more than 50,000 million dollars in 1966. This confirmed the 
fact that EEC was the largest and fastest-growing market in the developed 
regions, and strengthened its position as a net importer of the three 
categories of primary commodities. The rapid growth of its imports, 
however, was not reflected in a corresponding growth of exports from the 
developing countries, since the increase was due to trade between the 
developed countries, which accounted for some 45 per cent of the total. 
Hence, in the period 1955-66 the 1-1F,C countries raised their level of 
self-sufficiency from 24 to 33 per cent in foodstuffs and from 13 to 
21 per cent in raw materials. Only in fuels was their degree of self-
sufficiency reduced (from 33 to 22 per cent), which was presumably 
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The determining factors behind the changas in the size or the type of 
the trade balances vary from region to region, dependihg on the goods 
concerned. In Latin America,the increases in the export,surpluses of primary 
commodities"Were the result of similar increases in exports and imports 
of foodstuffs and of the fact that the absolute value of imports of raw 
materials and fuels remained virtually constant. In other words, impórt 
substitution had relatively more influence in some cases than increased 
exports. 
Between 1955 and 1966, the disequilibrium in the developing countries)  
trading manufactures became more pronounced, particularly in chemical 
products and machinery, in which exporte from the developing countries are 
still small in absolute terma and for which they still depend largely on 
imports. There was substantial progrese in exporte of "other manufactures", 
although these were basically semi-processed primary commodities, while 
there was a parallel inerease in importa of these manufactures. As a 
result, the unfavourable trade balance in respect of "other manufactures" 
rase considarably in the Middle East, remained constant in Latin America 
and Africa, and fell slightly in Asia. 
The disequilibria in the trade balances onehemical products, 
machinzry and "other manufactures" were offset by the net surplus on 
primary commodities. Throughout the period, this net surplus was more. 
than enough to cover the deficit.s in Latin America and the Middle East, 
while in Asia the deficits increased, and in Africa they were not covered 
until 1966, when there was a net export surplus.for the region as a whole. 
Latin America achieved this result thanks to slower growth of its importe 
thanany other developing region - less than 50 per cent between 1955 and 
.1966 - while Asíais imports almost doubled, Middle Eastern importe more 
than doubled and Africais rose by 80 per cent. 
(iv) World exrort trends. Since the míd-fifties, the Share of 
manufactures in world trade has increased, while that of primary 
commodities has declined.- This is due to a number of factors, which 
include differing relative price trends for the two types of goods, more 
dynamic growth in the industrialized economies, and the efforts of these 
economies to achieve a greater measure of self-sufficiency in primary 
Cotmodities.. 	 /In view 
E/CN,12/825 
Page 1-149 
In view of its importante, the problem should be looked at from 
other angles, for example, in tercos of the world export trends, by 
countries and regions and categories of goods (see tablas 1-38 and 1-39). 
World exports have sustained a relatively high growth rate, which 
has been more rapid in.the sixties than in the second half of the fifties. 
This was the case in almost all regions, except in Eastern Europe (where 
the rate did not rise so much although it remained aboye the world 
average) and mainland China, 
Throughout the period 1955-66 the exports of the developing 
regions grew at a higher rate than those of the industrialized regions and 
the countries of Eastern Europe, and - logically enough - the differelice 
between the two was greatest when the prices of primary commodities ware 
at their lowest. Between 1955 and 1959, when the prices of primary 
commodities ft-11 steadily, the annual growth of exports from the 
developing countries was only 2.9 per cent while that of exporte from the 
industrialized countries was 7.2 per cent. During the following period 
(1960-66), the fact that prices for primary commodities were more stable 
and sone even recovered lost ground, and with world trade in a more 
buoyant state, the exports of the developing countries did grow more 
rapidly. But even so, they still did not grow so East as the exporte of 
the developed countries, the annual rato of increase being 6 per cent 
compared with 8.8 per cent for the developed countries. 
Hence, the share of the developing regions in world exports steadily 
declined, dropping from 25.4 per cent in 1955 to 21.4 per cent in 1960 
and 19.1 per cent in 1966. Over the same period the share of the 
industrialized countries rose from 64.7 per cent in 1955 to 66.8 in 1960 
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Sone industrialized countries - for example, the United States, the. 
EFTA countries, and Australia and New Zealand Showed growthrates that, 
were beloW- the over-all average, and their relative shareá only just 
remained constant or even declined. In contrast, Japanfs.exporte greca 
very rapidly, at an annual rate of 15 per cena as did those of the EEC 
countriesl.to á lesser extent (10 per cent), and Canada. As a Coneequence, 
the EEC countries maintained their share of exports - the largest for-the 
industrialized regions Japan more than doubled its share, and Canada 
recovered sone of the ground it had previously lost. It is noteworthy that 
the growth, nf the REC countries' exports was increasingly due to the 
expansion of trade within the Community, so that gains in intra-regional 
trade helped to cushion the effect of the decline in their share of 
morid exports. 
Among developing regions, the Middle East slightlY increased its 
share of exports, while Africa lost sone ground.' In both thése cases', 
the most positive factor was the favourable trend of the world petroleum 
market. Particularly during the period 1960-66,.the boom in 'petroleum 
exports from Libya, Nigeria, and to a lesser degree Algeria, was the 
reason for the relatively rapid increase in exports from Africa; but 
even so, the growth rete did not equal that of world exports as a wholé. 
Export trends were much less favourable in Latin America and Asia, 
whose exports -grew at a slower rate than those of any other region, thus 
substantially reducing their share of world exporte. 
A clearer ricture of other aspects of this process can be gained 
from a consideration of export trends by types of goods, which are 
closely linked to the changes in the shares of the various regions. 
As noted aboye, nanufactui"es (machinery, chemical products and 
"other manufactures") had the highest growth rate of all world exports, 
while exports of primary commodities (foodstuffs, raw materials r nd fuels) 
grew at a much slower pace, 	This in itse1f would be enough to increase 
/ Taking 1 as the average rate of growth of world exporte, the relative 
growth ratee were as ftllows: machinery, 1.5; chemical products, 1.4; 
"other manufactures", 1.1; fuels, 0.8; foodstuffs, 0.7; and rew 
materials, 0.5. In other words, on the average, in relation to total 
exports,' exports of machinery grew three times as fa3t as exporte of 




the share of the developed regions; but the situation is made much 
worse by the fact that the exports of primary commodities from the developed 
regions grew faster than those of the developing regions. 
The average annual growth rate of the industrialized countries 
exports throughout the period 1955-66 was 2.4 times that of the developing 
countries for foodstuffs, and almost double for primary commodities; 
only in fuels did the developing regions achieve a favourable trade 
balance (see table 1-37). 
Comparing the three main food-supplying areas in 1955, Latin Anericaís 
share of world exports (20.4 per cent) was much larger than those of the 
United States (11.4 per cent) and the EEC countries (13.1 per cent). In 
1966, the share of the United States and the BEC countries had risen to 
15.8 and 15.3 per cent respectively, while Latin Americals had fallen to 
15.5 per cent, i.e., a 25 per cent drop. During the sane period, 
United States exports of foodstuffs outstripped all three categories 
of manufactures, while the annual growth rate for the EEC countries was 
some 7 per cent. In general, the formation of large exportable surpluses 
combined with policies to promote self-sufficiency in the developed 
countries reduced potential export markets for Latin American foodstuffs. 
In addition, the special financing arrangements for placing exportable 
United States surpluses (Public Law 480), together with the protectionist 
tariffs applied by the EEC countries and their efforts to find other 
sources of supply did not encourage Latin America to expand its 
production of foodstuffs. 
Exports of foodstuffs from the EFTA countries, and from Australia 
and New Zealand also increased appreciably, particularly in the sixties. 
The annual growth rates of Japants exports, were higher than those of 
any other industrialized country particularly in the latter half of the 
fifties; however, since its imports grew at almost the same rate, its 
net deficit increased in absolute terms. 
World exports of raw materials developed along much the same unes 
as exports of foodstuffs, although there were significant differences 
between one developing country and another. Between 1955 and 1966, 




increased from 48.$ to 54.7 per cent, while the share of the centrally 
planned economies rose slightly and that of the developing countries 
declined. Most of this decline was attributable to Asia, whose share 
fell from 18.4 to 12.2 per cent, sine those of Africa and the Middle 
East fell only slightly, while Latin Americars remained practically 
unchanged. In the case of Asia, whose exports dld not increase even in 
absoluto terms, the drop was to some extent due to a policy of exporting 
raw materials with a higher degree of processing, and oven in the form 
of final consumar goods applied by India, Hong Kong and China (Taiwan), 
for example, to their exports of textile and leather goods and ready—made 
clothing, and also to increased exports of metals from other Asian 
countries. 
Looking at the situation as a whole, however, the major cause of the 
deterioration in the position of the developing countries on the world 
raw materials markets was growing competition from the synthetic substitutes 
manufactured by the industrialized countries and the exportable surpluses 
of the United States. During the sixties, United States exports of raw 
materials slackened compared with the second half of the fifties, while 
the opposite was true for the EEC countries. 
In brief, the only one of the three categories of primary commodities 
in which the developing countries strengthened their position in world 
trade was that of fuels (their share rose from 57.8 per cent in 1955 to 
64.1 per cent in 1966). The three industrialized regions lost ground, 
especially the United States as a result of its policy of stockpiling 
strategic materials. Australia and New Zealand increased their exporte 
of fuels substantial1y, but their exports are still small compared to 
the world total. There was also a considerable expansion of Canadats 
fuel exporte, as a result of increased purchases of Latin American 
petroleum for refining and export to the United States in the form of 
petroleum products. 
These changes mainly benefited the Middle East, whose share in 
world fuel exports rose from 24 to 31.3 per cent, and Africa, which 
increased its share significantly (from 0.3 per cent in 1955 to 10.4 per 
cent in 1966). Latin America and Asia, however, lost ground; Latin 
Americars share fell from 18.3 to 14.2 per cent and Asiars from 5.3 to 
3.4 per tent. 	 /As to 
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As to world trade in manufactures, the industrialized countries 
maintained their strong lead with a few variations (approximately 88 per 
cent of world exports of chemical products, 87 per cent of machinery 
exports and 70 per cent of exports of other manufactures). The relatively 
favourable trend of exports from the developing regions particularly 
in machinery and other manufactures, exports of which grew at a faster 
rate than in the industrialized regions - can be considered a good 
ornen; but the quantities involved are too small and their share of world 
trade too rncdest for this to mean any real change in view of other rnuch 
more adverse trends. In particular, Latin America and Africa lost 
ground in chemical products and "other manufactures" and Asia in chemical 
products. The Middle East, however, gained ground in the three categories 
of manufactures, although still at very low levels. Also worthy of note 
is Asiats increased share in exports of machinery and particularly of 
other manufactures, mainly as a result of the increased sales of teztile 
and leather goods and clothing, 
(v) Origin of imports to the main markets. In the over -all 
picture sketched in aboye clearly shows the decline in Latin Americats 
share of world trade, not only compared with the developed regions.but 
also compared with the other developing regions. This is due to a 
number of different factors, of both internal and external origin, zany 
of which are outside the scope of this chapter. It is relevant here, 
however, to examine the extent to which these factors were influenced by 
the degree to which they were linked to the different characteristies and 
diasimilar trends of individual markets. The following paragraphs, 
therefore, examine the origin of imports to each of the main markets - the 
United States, EEC, EFTA and Japan which absorb almost 70 per cent of 
Latin Americats exports. 
United States imports. Between 1955 and 1966 the value of total 
United States imports more than doubled, totalling some 24,000 million 
dollars in 1966. Over the sane period its imports from Latin America 
rose by only 10 per cent, Latin Americats share in the United States 
market declining from 30.8 to 15.7 per cent (see tables 1-40 and 1-41). 
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These-figures put most of Latin Anericals external trade problems in 
a nut shell. They also illustrate, perhaps over-dramatically„ the intensity 
and nature of the changes that have been taking place in morid trade. 
One of the most decisive factors is the fact that while primary 
commodities made up approximately 63 per cent of United States imports in 
1955, the,proportion had fallen to 40 per cent by 1966. United States 
purchases of machinery increased almost ten-fold over the same period„ and 
purchases of chemical products and "other manufactures" increased two and a 
haif times; but purchases of foodstuffs rose by less than 40 per cent, raw 
materials by only 14 per cent and fuels by 90 per cent. 
Since there mere no correspondingly significant changes in the capacity 
to export of the developing regions, these modifications in the composition 
of United States imports necessarily involved substantial changes in their 
geographical origin, Between 1955 and 1966, United States proportion of imports 
from the developed regions rose from 51 per cent to more than 69 pes' cent, 
What is most significant, however, is that this increase was not duz solely 
to the change in the composition of imports - in which, as has been eeen, 
manuf:,Ictures predominated - but also to the fact that the developed countries 
rapidly increased their share of United States imports of primary commodities 
from 24 to 41 per cent for foodstuffs, from 52 to 60 per cent for raw materials 
and from 5 per cent to almost 22 per cent for fuels. 
The decline in Latin Americals share in the United States maret was 
especially marked in the case of foodstuffs, since Latin Americals 1,hare of 
United States imports of foodstuffs dropped froM 61.5 per cent in 1955 to 
less than 40 per cent in 1966, and even declined in value in absolute termp. 
This is only partly attributable to the diversion of Cuba's trade to other 
markets, since its United States sugar quota benefited other Latin American 
countries; neither can it be considered the result of the drop in coffee and 
cocoa prices, The United States began to import a substantial proportion of 
its supplies from other regions, partly because of health restrictions, and 
partly because of changes in consumption patterns. Over this period United 
States imports from Asia and Africa rose by 65 and 83 per cent respectively, 
those from Australia and. New Zealand increased sixteen-fold, those from 




With regard to raw materials, United Etatee imports from other 
industrialized regions increased considerably to the detriment of the 
developing countries. Although Latin America was able to maintain its 
relative share while the shares of Asia, Africa and the Middle East 
declined - total United States imports of raw materials increased very 
slowly, the inelasticity of the deMand for raw materials being due to 
growing.competition from synthetic substitutes. 
With respect to fuels, too, the developing countries lost ground, as 
a result of the increase in United Stateé imports of fuels from 
industrialized regions, especially Canada. The different developing regions 
were affected to differing degrees: Asia managed to maintain its mall 
share and Africa increased its share, while Latin Americats share declined 
(frcm 59 to 43,5 per cent), ás did that lf the Middle East (15,8 to 
12.1 per cent). Canadian exports of fuels to the United States rows from 
4.8 per cent to 20.2 per cent, mainly as a result of increased re-exports 
of refined Latin American petroleum and sales of its surpluses of natural 
gas, coal and electricity. 
Uaited States importa of chemical products, machinery and other 
mamfactures increased, with the developed regions still maintaining their 
streng lead and no significant change occurred in the small, sDare of the 
developing regionn. As was noted above,Latin Americals share uf impJrts 
of "other manufactures,' fell substantiálly while Asiats grew. 
ERC imports. There were also chances in the composition of EEC imports 
which reinforced the trend towards increased trade between the industrialized 
regions and the relegation of the developing countries to a peripheral 
position in relatinn to world trade as a whole. 
Between 1955 and 1966, EEC imports of machinery quintupled, chemical 
products quadrupled and "other manufactures!' more than tripled; these 
increases are far higher than any increase in imports of primary commodities 
;(see tables 1-42 and 1-43). Mbreover the proportinn of raw materials and 
;foodstuffs imported fr9m other developed regions increased considerably, 
the developing regions being able to improve their position Pnly with 
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Unlike the United States, EEC imported more foodstuffs and raw 
materials from Latin'America than fromOther developing regions. 
Latin Americats share of the market remained the same, which'meant that 
it doubled its exports of foOdstuffs and increased its exporte of raw 
materials by 57 per cent. 
EEC imports of fuels mainly carne from the developing regions, which 
as a group increased their share of the market from 49.5.per cent in 
1955 to 64.5 per cent in 1966.' The improvement hoWever„ was confined to 
the African countries, since the position of the Middle East - the major 
supplier deteriorated somewhat and there was a marked decline in the 
shares of Latin America and Asia. 
The dynamic growth of EEC imports of chemical products, machinery 
and other manufactures benefited suppliers in industrialized regions, 
which continued to improve their already strong lead, more than the 
developing countries. The most significant feature of the latterts trade 
with EEC salas the increase in importe ef "other manufactures" from Asia,, 
which even increase its share of the market. 
In other words, despite the fáct that its share of the FFC market 
declined, the growth of Latin Americats exporte of foodstuffs and raw 
materials to EEC countries partly offset the decline in its share of 
the United States market; on the other hand, unlike other developing 
regions, it had no share in the increase of EEC importe of manufactures. 
EFTA importe, As in other industrialized regions, EFTA importe were 
aleo characterized by an increase in manufactures and a decrease in 
primary commodities, and by increased purchases ef primary commodities 
from other developed regions. When the sluggish rate of growth of total 
EFTA importe (comparec2 with FRC, Japan and the United States), is taken 
into account also it is understandable that the position of the 
developing countries should have.been seriously weakened, so much se that 
exporte of foodstuffs remained constant, exporte of raw materials fell, 
and only exporte of fuels and, to some extent, "other manufactures" roee 
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The increased EFTA imports of foodstuffs ala carne from Eastern 
Europe and the industrialized countries, including the EFTA countries 
themselves, the EEC countries and other countries of Western Europe. 
EFTA imports of raw materials from the developing regions declined in 
value, even in absoluto tercos, principally because of the sharp fall in 
purchases from Asia and, to a lesser extent, from Africa and the Middle 
East, while purchases from Latin America increased. On the other hand, 
the developing regions increased their sales of fuels to EFTA and improved 
their share of the market (from 44.3 per cent in 1955 to 58.9 per cent 
in 1966) as a result of increases in the share of Africa, and to a lesser 
extent, those of the Middle East and Latin America. 
For other types of goods, "other manufactures" were the only goods 
for which the share of the developing regions attained significant 
proportions. The increase was mainly attributable to the Middle East and 
Asia, and to a lesser degree Africa, while Latin Americats share declined. 
In other words, EFTA imports of foodstuffs from Latin America 
remained statinnary while there was unly slight movement in its imports 
of other goods; hence Latin America lost ground, tn the benefit c'f the 
industrialized countries. 
Japanese imports. Of the regions referred to aboye, Japanis is the 
only import market in which primary commodities have the major share, 
which facilitates specialized trade with the developing countries, Whiie 
the proportion of primary commodities in total imports declined between 
1955 and 1966 (from 84.5 to 74.1 per cent), this occurred in circumstances 
which fe-rced Japan to increase its total imports from abroad: the total 
value of its imports grew at are annual rate of close to 13 per cent, 
imports of fnndstuffs increased two and a half times, imports of raw 
materials almost tripled, and imports of fuels increased more than seven-
fold (seo tables 1-46 and 1-47). 
There is also another important difference: the proportion of 
Japants imports from the developed regions, after rising in the second 
half of the fifties, began to fall in 1960, and by 1966 had returned to 
their 1955 level (slightly less than 53 per cent). The share of the 
developing countries thus remained at approximately 40 per cent, Eastern 
Europe-and mainland China making up the remainder. 
/Table 1-46 
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The various'developihg regions evolved differently, but lecause of 
the high rate of growth of Japanfs total importe, even those regions whose 
'-sháre declined considerably increased the value of their total sales, For 
example, Latín Americats share declined from 10.6 to 7 per cent, but the 
value of its sales increased two and a half times, Roughly the same 
happened with Asia. The deterioration in the position of these two 
tegions was Jffsetl however, by increases in the shares of the Middle East 
and Africa. 
An outstanding feature of the composition of Japanfs importe was the 
developing regionst marked loss of ground with respect to foodstuffs, 
although the value of their sales doubled, while the share of the 
industrialized regions (mainly the United States) and mainland China 
increased. The share of the United States.- the main supplier of the 
industrialized regions - in importe of raw materials began to decline in 
1960, while Eastern Europe increased its share, mainland China recovered 
lost ground and the developing countries maintained their share at around 
43 per cent, within which Asiats share shrank while Latin Americats 
share recovered from its decline in 1960. The developing countries 
increased their over -all share of fuel importe; Latin Americats share 
remained small, the Middle East increased its share, while Asia's share 
declined. 
In the sphere of manufactures, importe from the developing regions 
gained some ground, although the relative positions of the regions 
changed somewhat: Asiats share declined, Africats increased significantly, 
as did those of the Middle East and Latin America to a lesser extent. 
Looking at the situation from the viewpoint of Latir America, it 
may be concluded that although Latin Americats share of the Japanese 
market is still relatively small, the rapid growth of Japanfs importe 
and the use of a greater number of countries as suppliers hold out hopes 




2. The balance of payments and movement of capital 
The characteristics of Latin Americats foreign trade and its relative 
position in world trade, discussed in the preceding paragraphs, are basic 
factors whose operation haS had the ultimate result of placing the region 
in a special situation where its balance of payments is concerned. 
The sluggishness of external demand for the products traditionally 
exported by Latin America in combination with unfavourable price trends, 
has in many cases prevented the capacity to import from keeping pace with 
demand for imports. The use of monetary reserves could do little to cover 
the resulting gap, and that only for a short time, so that in the main it 
has been bridged by intensive and increasing recourse to autonomous and 
compensatory external financing. In turn, the commitments deriving from 
such financing are looming steadily larger in the external transactions 
picture, and have given rise to an "indebtedness spiral" (as it is 
commonly called), and to great instability in most countries ► balance of 
payments, by making the capacity to import inordinately dependent upon 
the inflow of new capital. 
The figures for the region as a whole bear eloquent witness to 
the sharpness of these trends. Between 1955 and 1966, the average annual 
growth rate of the volume of exports was 4.6 per cent; that of their value 
was 3.9 per cent, owing to price declines; and that of their purchasing 
power was only 3.3 per cent, because of the rising trend of imort prices. 
The current value of imports increased in the meantime at an average annual 
rate of 3.8 per cent. 
The pressure exerted by the slow growth of the purchasing power of 
exports was reinforced by the speed of the upswing in service payments on 
foreign capital (profits, interest and loan amortization), which increased 
at an an mal rate of 8.9 per cent. To give a better idea of what this 
implies, it should be recalled that the ratio between service payments 
and current income from exports of goods and services rose from 20.7 per 
cent in 1955 to nearly 35 per cent in 1966. 
The rise in service payments was accompanied by a decrease in the 
net foreign capital contribution to the financing of Latin Americats 




this figure was slightly reduced in the period 1960-64, for which the 
average was'185 míllion donará, and subsequently plunged downward as 
the rete of increase of service payments speeded up. ,In 1965 and 1966 
there mere actually net transfers of resources abroad, amounting to 
830 and 360 million dollars, respectively. Although the balance became 
positive again in 1967 and improved still further in 1968, these trends 
show how fár the capacity to import is influenced by unduly rigid 
commitments in respect of remittances abroad for capital servicing 
purposes, and by the marked instability of the inflow of new capital. 
International reserves - including the International Eonetary Fund 
position helped to cushion the Impact of these variations on the level 
of importe. Thé reserves in questíon totalled 2,870 million dollars in 
1955, and in 1962 dropped to 2,135 million, which was the lowest level 
recorded in the period under review; but laten they had to be reconstituted„ 
at the cost of a reduction of importe, so that by 1966 they exceeded 
3,000 million dollars. 
Hence a characteristic feature of Latín America's balance of payments 
has come to be the considerable relative importance of capital transactions 
in comparison with movements of merchandise proper. A clearer idea of what 
this means can be formed from the provisional figures for 1968, which are 
analysed in detall in Part Two of the present Survey. In that year, a 
capacity for external payments totalling more than 18,000 million dollars 
had to be obtained from exporte of goods and services and gross inflows 
of foreign capital in order to finance importe whose f.o.b. value was 
approximately 10,000 million dollars. The difference between these two 
figures was absorbed by non-financial import services, payments of 
amortization, interest and profits on foreign capital, and moderate 
additions to international reserves. 
With a view to more comprehensive evaluation of the structure and 
trends of the balance of payments, the development of each of its componente 
will next be considered, still with reference to the period 1955-66. 
At the same time, from the data presented it will be possible to see how 





(a) Balance-of-payments transactions on current account  
(i) Merchandise transactions, From 1955 to 1959, the merchandise 
account in the balance of payments for the region as a whole showed that 
exports exceeded imports by approximately 1,000 million dollars (see table 
1-48). Subsequently, the effect of the increase in outflows other than 
import payments was to boost this surplus to such an extent that by 1965 
it had doubled; from the peak then attained (about 2,100 million dollars), 
it declined in more recent years as a result of the reactivation of capital 
inflows. The servicing of these will have fresh implications in the near 
future and will very probably originate a new upward trend in the export 
surplus. 
With the exception of the exports of Venezuela, Colombia and Haiti, 
which remained stationary or turned downward, and those of Brazil, Uruguay 
and the Dominican Republic, which expanded relatively little, the other 
countriest sales of goods greatly increased in value in relation to 1955-59. 
This applies particularly to Chile, Peru, Panana, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua. 
In Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay the export surplus was 
considerably strengthened, after the deficit shown on the merchandise 
account in earlier years. But whereas Argentina, despite the expansion 
of its exports„ practically kept its imports down to a certain approximate 
level throughout the period in order to improve its external payments 
position, Uruguay was compelled to reduce its imports for the same motive, 
in face of the slow growth of its external sales. Exports from Chile 
and Peru expanded fast enough - especially in Peru 1 s case - to permit of 
a considerable increase in imports (with slight restrictions to generate 
surpluses on the merchandise account), supported by the inflow of capital. 
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Outstanding among the countries with a tradition of mevchandise-
account surpluses is Venezuela. The decline in petroleum prices and 
the limits set to demand for Venezuelan oil by competition and by the 
preferential treatment accorded to other geographical areas as suppliers 
of the leading world markets caused a relative stagnation of exports 
throughout the period under review. In addition, Venezuelats external 
payments position was difficult at the beginning of the nineteen-sixties, 
and outgoings under the head of direct foreign investment incorne remained 
high. Corsequently, a substantial surplus on the merchandise account had 
to be rnaintained on the basis of restriction and reduction of imports. 
The situation was much the same in Brazil. The fail in coffee prices and 
the rigidity of demand made for slow and fluctuating export growth rates„ 
which determined a similar behaviour pattern for imports. The surplus was 
heavily depleted by import requirements in 1960-64, but owing to the 
persistence of the balance-of-payments deficit it had to be inereased 
again, on a very large scale, towards the end of the period urder 
consideration. Ecuador and Honduras also achieved a surplus on the 
merchandise account every year, but in contrast to the situation in the 
foregoing countries, their export trade forged ahead and their imports 
increased. This was especially true of Honduras. 
Among the countries whose trade balance deteriorated, El Salvador 
and Nicaragua showed surpluses on the merchandise account based on the 
steady strengthening of their export trade, which likewise enabled them 
to expand their imports; but in 1966, with the stagnation of exports and 
the continued growth of imports, the surpluses were transformed into 
deficits, financed by means of big:er capital inflows. In the case of 
the Dominican Republic, the political events by which it was affected in 
1965 marked the close of a period in which exports liad exceeded imports. 
The recovery of the export trade in 1966 was slight and the value of 
external purchases high, with the result that there was a fairly large 
deficit on the merchandise account, financed by the inflow of capital. 
In Colombia, external rigidities and the doinward trend of coffee prices 
were reflected in more or less constant export levels. This, in combination 
with the fluctuations of capital flows, meant that the evolution of both 




Lastly, there were some countries that showed a chronic deficít 
on the merchandise account. Among these, MeXico„ Bolivia, Paraguay, 
Haiti, Panana and Costa Rica, were aleo CharaCterized - except for 
Haiti - by a dynamic export'and import trade and a súbstantial inflow 
of capital. In the case of Mexico and Panama, deficits on the merchandise 
account were offset by favourable balances on non-financial service 
transactions, in particular travel and tourism, and miscellaneous services. 
Elsewhere, deficits on aggregate service transactions and on external 
factor payments were superimpbsed on the imbalance on the merchandise 
account, thus widening the gap and augmenting external financing requirements. 
In due course this would mean that increasing capital servicing comnitments 
would lead to the restriction of imports, íf the growth rate of exporte 
were not speeded up to a greater ex-tent. Bolivia and, in a Lesser measure, 
Paraguay, were able to alleviate their payments position by virtue of 
the transfer payments received. Although similar resources were available 
to Haiti; imports were restricted because of the limited expanion of 
exporte, largely imputable to internal supply problems. In Costa Rica, 
the growth of exporte and a considerable inflow of capital allowed the 
high rate of increase of importe to be maintained. 
The sluggish development of Latín Americals export sector was partly 
due to the deterioration ofprices and the rigidíty of demand for Coffee 
and petroleum. These factors particularly affected the countries which 
are among the leading world suppliers of the products in queátion: 
Venezuela and Colombia, and, in a lesser degree, Brazil. In othér countries 
(Haiti and Uruguay, for example), unfávourable external factors were 
combined with internal supply difficulties. 
Import restrictions were aleo applied in the same group of countries, 
as well as in Argentina. In almost all of them (the exception being Haiti) 
the predominant need was to increase and maintain or create merchandise-
account surpluses by curtailing importe, in order to improve the external 
payments position or prevent it from deteriorating still further. In the 
other countries, the growth of importe outstripped or kept pace with that 
of export earnings, which were supplemented by increasing inflows of 
capital. 
/(ii) Freight,  
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(ii) FreiRfht insurance and other 	transactions, travel  
and miscellaneous services, Latin Americats position as a net importer 
in relation to these services as a whole is determined by deficits on 
transport and miscellaneous services, partly offset by surpluses on the 
travel account. With the exrlusion of Mexico and Panama, and, in recent 
years, Uruguay, the other countries of the region show a negative balance 
on total transactions under these heads, which tended to decrease up to 
1965, as a result of the import restriction policy pursued by some countries. 
In 1966, hpwever, further increases in the deficit are observable 
(see table 1-49). 
The aggregate net deficit on these services absorbed an appreciable 
proportion of the surplus on the merchandise account, although their share 
dropped from 77.2 per cent in 1955-59 to 46.6 per cent in 1966, with the 
corresponding reduction of their relative importance in the externa 
deficit on current account. 
Freight, insurance and other transport transactions, in respect of 
which all the countries are net importers, are the most important itero 
in the body of services under discussion, and determine the trend followed. 
Freight charges are closely linked to import values, and in so far as 
imports were restricted by some countries, expenditure on freight did not 
increase. Influence was exerted in the same direction by the progress of 
the Latin American countries' own merchant fleets and the degree to which 
they gradually gained control of external freight traffic in countries such 
as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia where certain levels of development 
had been attained. 
Latin America is also a net importer of miscellaneous services 
(general government and other services), notwithstanding the surpluses 
obtained under those heads by Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Panana, 
Costa Rica and Guatemala. These only partly offset the deficits shown by 
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In contrast, surpluses were achieved on the travel account which 
partly counteracted the negative balances recorded for the two preceding 
items. The decisive influence, however, was that of Plexicots net earnings 
under the heads of tourism and border trade, although smaller contributions 
were nade by the travel surpluses shown in Uruguay, Haiti, Panana, Costa Rica 
and Guatemala. In recent years, Guatemala and Haiti have become net 
importers where travel is concerned, whereas Chile, Ecuador and Paraguay 
obtained net income from this source which they had not previously enjoyed, 
In the last analysis, net positions were affected by different 
factors in each country. In Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, 
the fluctuations of the agregate deficit on the services accounts in 
question has its explanation in import trends and the restriction of 
expenditure on travel and misceilaneous services. In Mexico and Panana, 
the surpluses on these services offset the deficits on the merchandise 
account, and in Uruguay surpluses under both heads jointly provided mean 
of meeting external commitments, Despite the expansion of Chilets imports, 
its net expenditure on non-financial services was kept clown by virtue of the 
increase in tourism or travel earnings, and the same was true of Ecuador 
and Paraguay. In Haiti, on the other hand, with the reduction of its 
income from travel, the services deficit increased, and the same thing 
happened in the Central American countries, with the exception of 
Costa Rica. 
(iii) Investment income, Over and aboye the external pressures on 
the balance of payments deriving from adverse trade situations, indebtedness 
and the international reserves position carne to aggravate the existing 
rigidities. The chief effect of borrowing was the rapid increase in 
payments under the head of foreign investment income: profits, dividends 
and interest (see table 1-50). Since these payments expanded raster than 
exports, countries where the pressures they generated were severe had to 
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Latin America receives sone income from its assets in the rest of the 
world, but the amount is insignificant in comparison with the sums it has 
to pay out to meet its external liabilities deriving from direct investment 
and from foreign loans. These service payments rose from 1,226 million 
dollars in 1955-59 to 2,124 million in 1966 — i.e., by 73 per cent, or 
twice as fast as exports of goods during the same period — even though 
in Venezuela external investment income remained virtually constant, 
fluctuating around 600 to 700 million dollars. Its relative importante 
within total service payments decreased from 57 per cent in 1955-59 to 
33 per cent in 1966. 
Thus, the rapid growth of external investment income payments, was 
concentrated outside Venezuela, in particular in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Peru and Colombia, where the figures were significant in absolute 
terms. Elsewhere, although the sums concerned were much smaller than in 
the foregoing group of countries, the increases recorded were bigger in 
relative terms, except in Ecuador, Bolivia, Haiti and Panama. 
A break —down of external investment income shows that profits on 
direct investment lost some of their relative importance, which declined 
from 86.6 to 71.5 per cent between 1955-59 and 1966; the proportion 
represented by interest on loans, on the other hand, rose from 13.4 to 
28.5 per cent during the same period, in consequence of the more important 
role which loans were gradually assuming in the financing of the external 
deficit on current account. Even so, the relative position of profits 
was still the determinant of the level attained by external investment 
income, mainly because of Venezuela's situation. With the exclusion of 
Venezuela, the share of profits in total investment income would fall from 
69.4 to 58.5 per cent between 1955-59 and 1966, and that of interest would 
increase from 30.6 to 41.5 per cent in the same lapse of time. 
If foreign investment income payments are related to income from 
exports of goods and services, it can be deduced that the ratio between 
them climbed from 13.4 to 16.2 per cent between 1955-59 and 1966, while 
if amortization and other service payments are included, the corresponding 




Up to 1962, net external investment income payments amounted to more 
than the surplus on the merchandise account. From 1963 to 1965 the latter 
increased sufficiently to offset the payments in question and reduce the 
gap, but in 1966, when the surplus once. again diminished, it feil below the 
level of external investment income. 
(iv) Private transfer payments. The negative balance shows by the 
region as a whole, under the influence of the large transfer payments 
effected by Venezuela, became favourable in 1966 as a result of the more 
rapid incxease in transfer payments received. These increased from 43 to 
150 million dollars between 1955-59 and 1966, while outward transfers rosé. 
from 118 million dollars to 148 million during the same period (see table 1-51). 
The private transfer payments received were strongly concentrated in 
$razil and Haiti; their value followed an upward trend, but at a lower level, 
in Hexico, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Guatemala; and they 
decreased in Chile, Peru and Colombia. In the other countries, with the 
exception of Uruguay, they showed relatively significant increases, but 
here again the figures were smaller in absolute terms. 
The largest proportion of outward private transfer corresponded to 
Venezuela (immigrants? remittances) and next, in arder, but a long way 
below, carne Plexico and Panama. These three countries and Uruguay were 
the only ones with net deficits in the region as a whole, since Argentina, 
which also traditionally recorded negative balances, transformed thern into 
surpluses by drastically reducing its debts. In the other countries, the 
deficits on current account were lessened by surpiuses deriving from 
private transfer payments received. 
(v) Balance-of-paynents rositions 	current  account. The goods 
and services transactions to which reference has been made resulted in 
different kinds of pressures on Latin Americals aggregate balance on 
current account. As long as the surplus on the merchandise account 
increased to a greater extent than the deficit on services (financial and 
non-financial), the external imbalance on current account dwindled steadily. 
These trends, consequent upon the policy pursued by the.monetary authorities 
in certain countries with a view to improving the balance-of-payments 
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Hence the deficit on current account was reduced from 1,050 million dallars 
in 1955-59 to 420 million in 1965. In 1966, when some countries relaxed 
their restrictions, largely because of the improvement in exports and the 
increase in the net inflow of capital, eXternal purchases once:again 
expanded faster than sales, with the result that the surplus on the 
merchandise account decreased. This circumstance, in combination with the 
larger negative balance on the services account, raised the deficit on 
current account to about 1,100 million dollars, and sparked off a new trend 
towards the expansion of net external financing (see table 1-52). 
The decrease in the deficit on current account was at first attributable 
to Venezuelats surplus (1960-64), to which those of Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay were then added, together with substantial reductions of the deficits 
shown by Chile and Colombia (1965), in which countries payments difficulties 
arase and the monetary authorities applied stringent measures to improve their 
net position. Generally speaking, the improvements achieved were based on 
import restrictions, except in Chile, and in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, 
on the expansion of exports, which boosted the surplus on the merchandise 
áccount. In another group of countries (Bolivia, Haiti)  Paraguay, Panama and 
Guatemala), pressures were counteracted by assistance received in the form 
of grants and donations. 
In Ecuador the deficit on current account stood at a constant 
proportion of export earnings, but at a fairly low leve], 
The other countries (Mexico, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua) show trends towards increasing use of 
external hnancing, supported by the expansion of their exports of goods 
and services - except in the case of the Dominican Republic - and the inflow 
of non-compensatory capital. In 1966, when the external deficit on current 
account once again increased, pressure in that direction continued in the 
last-named group of countries, as well as in Brazii and Colombia and to a 
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(b) Capital account  
(i) Financin of the'current, deficit: 'As mentioned aboye, the 
balance-of-payments deficit on current account - the equivalent from a 
different standpoint of net external financing - which Latin America 
maintained from 1955 to 1966 followed an uneven course during that period: 
it remained at a relatively high level up to 1962, dropped sharply in 
1963-65 and increased again in 1966. 
Naturally, this trend was largely deternined by balance-of-payments 
difficulties in several countries. Notwithstanding the differing situations 
in the various countries, a feature common to them all was the intensive 
use they made of external financing in order to stabílize the current 
account; this measure was all the more necessary inasmuch as export earnings 
were increasing at a siower paco than the servicing of foleign capital 
itself. At certain times, great efforts were made to lessen the 
disequilibrium by mean of import restriction policies, but these were 
kept within the Units and were necessarily of a temporaly nature because 
of the requirements of the domestic economies. 
External financing was used with varying intensity according to 
country or period. Therefore, the over-ell picture is best reflected in 
the cumulative figures for the movements of capital which helped to cover 
the deficit on current account over a certain number of years (see table 1-53). 
It is thus concluded that Latin Americats cumulative net external financing 
in the years 1955-66 amounted to 11,365 million dollars. Excluding 
Venezuela, which showed a net external dissaving during that period, the 
total for Latin America was 12,287 million dollars; 78 per cent of this 
sum was concentrated in Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Colombia and 
Peru, the first two of these countries absorbing 54 per cent; the rest 
of Latin America accounted for 22 per cent, two thirds of which went 
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Since the distribution of net external financing is influended by 
the absolute size of each of the national economies, it mould be as well 
to consider it also in relation to the countries respective current 
foreign exehange earnings (credit for exporta of goods and services and 
private transfer payments). This ratio for the reglan as a whole-over 
the entire period was 9.2 per cent. Only El Salvador, Argentina, the 
DominicansRepUblic and Honduras recorded lower percentages,..while Venezuela 
showed a negative ratio on account of its net external dissaving, and the 
rest showÉd higher ratios. Some countries considcrably exceedod the:oyer-
a"' average for Latin America, reaching very high coefficients. This is 
true of Bolivia, with 38,3 per cent, followed by Costa Rica with.22.4 per 
cent, and Panana, Chile, Paraguay, Haiti and Guatemala with ratios ranging 
from 18 to 20 per cent. In Mexico the.average was 15.9 per cent, and in 
Peru, Uruguay, Brazil2 Nicaragua:  Colombia. and. Ecuador it ranged from 10 to 
13 per cent. With the éceptio or Chile, the highest coefficients for the 
use of net external financing were recorded by the relátively less.developed 
countries; but Chis did net reault.in eyternal payments preasures, partly 
because of the volume of official transfer payments received and of loan 
granted'on easier tercos. Thóse recording the lowest ratios, nowevel,', were 
also - except for Argentina and Venezuela - the relatively'less developed 
countries, which relied more on their export capacity to finance the ; 
increases in importa. This was the posítion of El Salvador, Honduras, 
Ecuador and Nicaragua, altheugh the trend Mas to increase the volume of 
net external financing towards the end of the period. The remaining 
countries carne somewhere between these two extremes, but they also had to 
face external payments oressures owing to the existing condítions of their 
financing, generally short- and mediumr-term, with repayments growing faster 
than both exporta and grosa capital inflows. The situation became 
particularly critical when exporta and capital inflows remained stationary 
or declined. Despite the coefficients recOrded by Venezuela, Argentina and 
Chile, their external payments préssures were similar to those affecting 
the last group of.countries, although Venezuelals position has been 
somewhat alleviated by the accelerated aiortization of its external 




In addition to the net external financing required to cover the 
deficit on current account, there were other negative flows consisting 
mainly of net movements of domestic autonomous or non-compensatory 
capital or assets, the gross movement of international reserves, and errors 
and omissions (see table 1-53). If these items are taken into account, 
it will be seen that the net balance of total external capital amounted to 
some 18,100 million dollars during the period under review. In other words, 
the net inflow of capital exceeded the volume of net external financing 
required, thus enabling most of the countries to increase their gross 
international reserves 	and to cover other net outflows of domestic 
capital or assets recorded in the balance of payments, and of unidentified 
funds included in the errors and omissions account. 
From an even more general standpoint, if amortization and service 
payments, which amounted to 20 thousand million dollars, are added to the 
net inflow of external capital, it will be noted that the gross inflow of 
compensatory and non-compensatory capital during the period amcunted to 
nearly 38,300 million dollars, 52.6 per cent of which had to be used for 
amortization payments. 
Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, in particular, had to effect 
amortization and service payments amounting to about 65 per cent of the 
gross inflow of capital. In Colombia and Chile the proportion was over 
50 per cent, and in Mexico 45 per cent. Except for Panamal in the 
remaining countries it ranged from 30 to 45 per cent. In general, the 
gap between gross and net inflows of capital in these countries and the 
size of this gap in some of them help to explain why accelerated payments 
had to be nade to alleviate balance-of-payments pressures. 
Of Latin Americats total net inflow ef capital, 91 per cent were 
movements of autonomous capital and 9 per cent of compensatory capital. 
A major proportion of net external non-compensatory capital (78 per cent) 
As indicated later, the increase in gross international reserves 
(697 million dollars) was more than offset by the increment in 
compensatory capital (1,558 million), which affects the monetary 
authorities' liabilities, so that the net position of the monetary 




was in the forro of direct investment (40 per cent) and medium- and long-
term loans (38 per cent), and the remaining 22 per cent comprised short-
tem liabilities and official transfer payments. Net inflows of 
compensatory capital consisted mainly óf resources derivipg from trade 
arrears and their refinancing -.balance-of-payments loans, deferred 
import payments and swaps - and, in a lesser proportion, IMF contingency 
loans, whose repayment terne - generally short-terco - determined the 
position with regard to compensatory financing. 
Mexico and Brazil together absorbed 38.4 per cent of total external 
autnnomous and compensatory capital; Argentina and Chile received 198 per 
cent; Venezuela, Peru and Colombia, 21.4 per cent; Uruguaya Bonvia, 
Guatemala and Panama, 10.7 per cent; Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Ecuador, Nicaragua and El Salvador, 7,6 per cent; and Paraguay, Honduras 
and Haiti, 2.1 per cent. 
If the net inflow of funds is broken down into autonomous and 
compensatory capital, other characteristics aré revealed, In Uruguay, 
for example, the high proportion of compensatory capital is one of the 
causes of its present external payments difficultles. In Chile, Argentina, 
Colombia and Brazil, the share of compensatory capital was also fairly 
substantial, and it combined with medium- non-compensatory loans to créate 
external payments pressures. This happened also in Venezuela, whose 
accelerated payments are noticeable only if the gross capital inflow is 
contrastad with the net movements. Besides these countries, the Dominican 
Republic, Costa Rica and El Salvador also record a relatively high 
proportion of compensatory financing. 
As stated aboye, external autonomous or non-compensatory capital 
was mainly in the forro of direct investment, According to the balance-of-
payments entries, these flows were concentrated strongly in Brazil and 
Mexico (45.2 per cent), to a lesser extent in Venezuela and Argentina, 
(33.5 per cent) and Peru, Chile and Colombia (10.4 per cent), that is„ 
nearly 90 per cent was absorbed by these seven countries. Direct investment 
is at present channelled towards the more industrializéd countries like 
Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, since that received by Venezuela constituted 




relatively less developed countries, those recording a sizable volune of 
direct investment were Panama, Guatemala, Bolivia, Ecuador and Costa Rica, 
where it accounted for a fairly high proportion of total external non-
compensatory capital, as occurred also in Nicaragua, El Salvador and 
Paraguay, but at lower absolute levels. 
The net inflow of,medium- and long-terco non-compensatory loans 
mainly benefited Mexico, which absorbed 24.8 per cent of the total owing to 
somewhat longer repayment periods than those extended to Argentina and Brazil, 
where accelerated amortization aimed at reducing payments pressures reduced 
the net inflow of such loans. In Venezuela, a rise in the already high 
rate of debt amortization led to .a net disinvestment, This was not the 
case in Chile, Peru and Colombia, which received one-third of the net 
non-compensatory loans to Latín America, although in recent years they have 
been facing the sane payments pressures as Brazil, ArgerLina, and Venezuela. 
Net disbursemtnts of loans to the economically relatively less developed 
countries amounted to 16 per cent of the regional total, with Bolivia, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Uruguay, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Panama 
receiving the largest net flows. Among this group of countries, net non,- 
compensatory loans are coming to forro a significant part of total externa]. , 
financing in Honduras, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Uruguay, 
El Salvador and Paraguay. The same is true in Chile, Peru and Colombia, 
The flow of short-term non-compensatory capital (residentsl net foreign 
liabilities) also was mainly to Mexico (28.4 per cent of the total), despite 
which Mexico experienced no payments pressures, possibly because of the 
stability of its currency and the dynamism of its domestic growth and 
exports, particularly tourism. This was not the case in other countries and 
Argentina recorded net outflows, while in Uruguay, Colombia, Brazill Chile 
and Venezuela payments pressures combined with other pressures resulting 
from the compensatory external financing. .Short-terco liabilities in Peru, 
especially those deriving from trade arrears, had to be refinanced at the 
end of 1967 when Peru devalued its currency and are still exerting pressure 
on payments. Among the other countries of the region, Panama, Nicaragua and 
Guatemala, and to a lesser extent Costa Rica, El Salvador, Bolivia and 
Paraguay, also had some recourse to this kind of financing; Panama was the 
only one of these countries which was not subject to any pressure, which 




Under the head of foreign compensatory capital, official transfer 
payments used to complenent the external financing of all countries,attained -
high absolute or relative levels in some of them, with the exception of 
Venezuela and to a lesser extent Argentina. In 601/le cases they helped to 
prevent payments pressures (Bolivia, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Panama and Costa Rica) while in others (Brazil, Chile, Peru and 
Colombia) they reduced pressure, and in others (Ecuador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Paraguay) they filled gaps in other forms of financing. 
Contrasting these capital flows with current foreign exchange 
receipts, it is found that, of all the countries of the region, Bolivia 
relied most heavily on external financing, the gross and net figures 
(which were 68,9 and 51.1 per cent respectively of its current fcreign 
exchange income), without experiencing serious payments pressures owing 
to the volume of the official transfer payments it received ovar the 
pericd 1955-66. At the opposite end of the scale, Venezuela relied least 
on external financing, which represented 13.2 per cent (gross) and 
4.5 per cent (net) of its foreign exchange receipts. Nevertheless, it 
encountered payments pressures arising out of accelerated,debt repayments 
and the need of the monetary authorities to improve their net position. 
The corresponding gross figures were approximately 48 per cent for Chile 
and Brazil; 36.3 per cent for Colombia; round 35 per cent for Costa Rica, 
Mexico„ Paraguay and Uruguay; Dome 33 per cent for Guatemala and Argentina; 
28 per cent for the Dominican Republic and Peru; approximately 25 per cent 
for Nicaragua, Haiti, and Panama; and between 21 and 18 per cent for 
Ecuador, Honduras and fi Salvadora 
The different levels of amortization and other capital payments and 
the different tercos of external financing must be set against these gross 
figures in each country, when it will be seen that the countries are ranked 
in a different order according to the net figures. Besides Bolivia, the 
countries that cave highest were Costa Rica, Guatemala;  Paraguay and Chile, 
with close to 25 per cent; for Panama and Uruguay the figure is approximately 
22 per cent; for Heade°, Peru and Nicaragua, 19 per cent; for Brazil and 
Haiti, 17 per,cent; for Colombia and the Dominican Republic, 16 and 15 per 
cent respectively; and for Ecuador, Argentina, El Salvador and Honduras, 




In general, payments pressures were most acute in- the countries 
which relied most on short- and medium-term compensatory and non-compensatory 
external.financing to cover their current deficit on the balance of payments. 
The de#Icit was mostly due to the decline in príces and the contraction of 
demand, which reducecrthe value of exporte. 'Without going into all the 
reasons, it should be noted that international financing was on the whole 
somewhat inflexible and costly: This was dué to short repayment periods 
and high interest rates for loans, and to heavy reffiittances of profits on 
dírect investment, all of which are factors that weigh heavily in the 
present structure of the -regiones balance of payments. 
(ii) The net inflow14:12....tal and the incidence of capital  
servicing. A clear view 'pf this topic will be'gainea by comparíng the 
volume and sign of the net inflow of foreign capital and the incidence of 
capital servicing with the value of exports pf goods and services (see 
tables 1-54 and 1-55). 
The inflow of foreign capital has generated a counterflow of 
services payments - amortization and interest on debts; and profits and 
depreciation in respect of direct investment which has grown so rapidly 
and steadily that the net result has become an outflow rather than an 
inflow. This was the case in 1965, owing to the debts incurred in earlier 
years; as the inflow of new capital declined in volume, servicing 
commitments actually led te an outflow of capital amounting to nearly 
1,000 million donarse The increase in the gross inflow in subsequent 
years helped to lower tbis figure, although the net inflow remained a 
negative amount (410 million dollirs in 1966 and 500 millíon in 1967). 
Unless there is a very stea,dy and rapia increase in the inflow of new 
capital, 'there will inevitahly be great nps and downs in the net inflow 
of external frinds; the net figure will be Ugh when the inflow increases 
sharply, and low when it declines and'the servicing coánitments in respect 
of earlier inflows consume a larger share. 
The problem becomes more acute if the increase in the service payments 
on foreign capital is not accompanied by a similar increase in exports, 
since such servicing is absorbing a growing share of current income from 
exports of goods and services. There has been a very marked trend in this 
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During the period 1955-59, remittances of pronto andinterest, 
and amortization and other payments on foreign capital represented 
approximately 25 per cent'of the current value of exports of goods and 
services. This proportion rose to an average of around 33 per cént during 
the'period 1960-64 and climbed to aboye 37 per tent in 1965, falling 
slightly iw1966 and 1967. 
Despite the more favourable trends of these. last two years, these 
proportions are very high ánd have appreciable repercussions on the 
structure and stability of the regional balance of payments. The proportions 
vary from country to country within the region. ,compared with the average 
of 35 per cent in,1967 for the region as a whole,' in at least four countries 
(Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Mexico) the proportion was aboye 40 per cent; 
in three (Argentina, UruguaY asid Venezuela) it was close to or slightly 
aboye 30 per cent; in seven (Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, the Dominican 
Republic, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua) Wwas between 20 and 30'per 
cent; in threé (Ecuador, Honduras and Panama) it fluCtliated between 15 and 20 
20 per cent; and only in Haiti was it below 10 per cent. 
In 1968 these proportions may have dropped again.to sone extent,.both 
because of the increase in the gross inflow of external capital and because 
of the rise in exports of goods and -.Services„ Atthe_same time, however, 
these short-term variations imply greater liabilities in the future„-and 
they do nothing to modify the structure of the regional balance of payments, 
which will probably remain one of the basic'problens of the externa' 





THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The general linee followed by development policy since the beginning 
of the current decade have laid a heavy burden of responsibility on the 
public sector, in respect of both its direct action and its sphere of 
indirect influence. The objectives pursued — the acceleration of economic 
growth, the introduction of reforms in several basic aspects of tie economic 
and social structure, the expansion of social services on a considerable 
sc.ale and the promotion of more equitable income distribution, the 
establishment of bases for an integrated Latín American economy:  etc. — 
presuppose action on the part of the public sector, in its role as an 
agent of development, which exterids far beyond the scope of its traditional 
functions. Accordingly, in drawing up a balance of some of the 
characteristics of the regionfs economy at the close of the nineteen—sixties, 
it seems appropriate to take into account the extent to which the public 
sector is equipped to formulate and apply development policies. 
In the following pages an attempt is made at organized presentation 
of some of the relevant data available, with reference to three aspects 
of the question which seem especially important: first, the resources 
channelled through the public sector, the size and sources of its income 
and the composition of its expenditure: secondly, the institutional 
organization of the public sector, and guiding principies and procedures 
for reforms in its administrative etructure; and., thirdly, its capacity 
to implement planning decisions, either through planning machinery and 
instrumente proper, or through the traditional media of economic policy. 
The background data and evaluations that can be presented in this 
connexion are fragmentary and often conjectural. Notwithstanding the 
obvious importante of the topic, relatively little progrese has been made 
in systematizing a continuous and comprehensive flow of data on the public 
sector. In many cases, difficulties are encountered even in evaluating 
its size in tercos of the resources it uses, since the orderly presentation 




done in relation to the regional and local authorities, autonomous agencies 
and public enterprises. In other instantes, data deriving from the public 
sector accounts are classified by institutions and are not broken down 
to a low enough level of aggregation for their economic or social 
significance to be apparent. Such factors as these suggest the need for 
a more energetic drive to improve reporting systems in the fields under 
discussion, so that the requisite statistical data can be obtained with 
punctual regularity, and a periodic balance can thus be drawn up, suitable 
for the purposes of economic analysis, and comparable to those which are 
now systematically prepared for other aspects of the operation of 
economic systems (for example, the recording of external transactions in 
balance -of -payments accounts). 
1, 1.3229219.ps channelle11~11112Willikl=tat 
The ratio between public expenditure 11 and the total domestic 
product varíes widely from one Latin American country to another (see 
table 1-56). In three countries Brazil, Chile and Uruguay it 
reached or exceeded 30 per cent in 1966; it fell between 25 and 30 per 
cent in Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Peru; 
and in El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay 
it was less than 20 per cent. 
For illustrative purposes, it is worth mentioning that the ratios 
in the first two groups are comparable to those generaily shown by the 
industrialized economies between 30 and 40 per cent in the countries 
of Western Europe and about 30 per cent in Canada and the United States 
while the corresponding figures for the third group are far lower. 
The public sector's nercentage shares in the p('oduct are the result 
of heavy and increasíng pressures for expansion of expenditure and of the 
no less formidable rigidities and obstarles that stand in the way of a 
corresponding ímprovement in income. Hence it is that in many countries 
- including Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru 
and Venezuela - the ratios in question underwent no very marked changos 
between 1955 and 1966; on the other hand, they increased significantly 
elsewhere, for example, in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras and Mexico. 
1/ 	For the purposes of the present comparison, the concept of "public 
expenditure" includes general government expenditure on current account 
(excluding that of public enterprises) and capital outlays of the 
consolidated public sector. Data on a sufficient number of countries 





LATIN AME RICA: 	PERCENTAGE SHARE OF PUBLIC SECTOR a/ 
IN GROSS DOLIESTIC PRODUCT 
Countries 1955 1966 
Argentina 27 28 
Bolivia •• 23 
Brazil 24 33 
Chile 23 35 
Colombia 20 21 
Costa Rica 17 21 
Dominican Republic O. 25 
Ecuador 21 23 
El Salvador .. 18 
Guatemala 13 14 
Haiti .. 10 
Honduras 12 16 
Nlexi c o 15 22 
Nicaragua 17 
Panama 21 22 
Paraguay 00 18 
Peru 19 21 
Uruguay 26 30 
Venezuela 28 26 
Source: ECLA,:on the oasis of official statisticso 
á/ Comprising total general government expenditure (including that of 




(a) Rigiditv of public sector income 
In addition to the fact that tax machinery is not equal to the task 
of keeping tax yields abreast of the increases in the total product, 
various other determinants have been responsible for the somewhat restrictive 
trends pf public sector income. 
One of these factors, to which great significance attaches in several 
countries of the region, derives rom the steldy decline of the external 
sectorts relative importance in the economy as a whole, and from the 
changes in the composition of foreign trade in general and of importa in 
particular. As long as the external sector accounted for a relatively 
high proportion of the product, the amount of resources provided by 
export taxes was also relatively large, especially as the transactions 
concerned are easy to keep under supervision; but the significance of 
these resources has decreased in the same proportion as the over—all 
coefficient of exports, and also in so far as efforts to diversify the 
composition of exports have had to be accompanied by tax incentives 
applicable at least to the new unes of production. Much the same thing 
has happened in the case of import duties, the incidente of which has 
weakened as the over—all import coefficient has declined and the 
substitution process has gradually confined the composition of imports 
to essential consumer goods, intermediate products and capital goods, 
which lend themselves less readily to the application of high duties 
than consumer goods of a non—essential or definitely luxury type. 
In some cases, not only has the relative importance of externai•-sector 
taxation decreased, but in addition instruments such as multiple exchange 
retes, which at certain times have represented a valuable source of funda, 
have been eliminated. 
Elsewhere, and Particularlz,i¿ tale dentraí American countries, the 
expansion of intra—regional trade, based on procedures for reducing or 
abolishing duties on imports,from within the area, has likewise weakened 
the significance of taxation on external transactions. 
A better idea of the scale of the process can be obtained from the 
following figures: between 1960 and 1966 the proportion of total tax 




37 to 25 per cent in Argentina, from 12 to 9 per cent in Brazil, from 
34 to 33 per cent in Chile, from 46 to 32 per cent in Guatemala, from 
27 to 16 per cent in Mexico, and from 82 to 77 per cent in Venezuela. 
Owing to there and other similar factors, the partial loss of such 
sources of public sector income has had to be offset by increased internal 
taxation, which in its turn has necessitated more complex machinery for 
the application of tax provisions and controls, especially in the case 
of direct taxes. Thus, "tax reform" has become one of the salient 
objectives of economic policy, especially during the nineteen-sixties. 
In practice„ there have been continual modifications of the tax systems, 
which in such countries as Brazil, Chile and Mexico - precisely those 
in which public expenditure has gained most in relative importante - have 
signified appreciable changes; but even so, generally speaking, no radical 
metamorphosis of the existing systems has taken placer 
In several instantes, the relative decline in taxation on foreign 
trade has been counterbalanced by a relative increase in the proportion 
of indirect taxes, and in a very few cases by a real expansion of the 
share of direct taxes. In 1966, current income from sources other than 
taxation represented relatively small proportions of total current income 
less than 10 per cent in Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela, although 
the corresponding figures for Brazil and aboye all Argentina were higher. 
Tax revenue in the aggregate has been prone to lag behind public 
expenditure requiranents, and current savings have not sufficed to finance 
capital outlays. Hence there has been a growing tendency to resort to 
financing by means of internal and external c redits. Although the figures 
usuelly vary a good deal from one year to the next, the situation in 1966 
may be considered fairly representative. In that year, the proportion of 
capital expenditure financed out of current savings anounted to approximately 
60 per cent in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, and to about 40 per 
cent in Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay, while in other countries 
(Argentina, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Peru) it was much smaller. 
2/ 	See Economic Surver of Latin America 1161 (United Nations publication, 
Sales No.: E 69.II.G.1), where experience in this respect in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela is analysed in fuller 




Of the credits which bridged the gaps in the same year„ the percentages 
that carne from internal and from external sources varied widely, For 
instancej  whereas in Argentina the proportion of internal credits was 
very high, in the Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Peru one-third or 
more of the deficit was covered by external loaras. 
(b) 11.220:12.4112A1I-9.5121112252Pnature 
In face of the relativa inelasticity of income, pressures for the 
expansion of public expenditure affected its different compenents in 
widely differing degrees, according to the economic structure, 
institutional organization and over-all economic policy of the various 
countries. Hence it is hardly possible to generalize on the composition 
of public expenditure by purposes in relation to Latin America as a whole. 
A very broad picture of the situation in 1966 is afforded by the 
figures for thirteen Latin American countries appearing in table 1-57. 
As can be sean, the share of current expenditure ranged from a little 
over 50 per cent (Colombia) to about 80 per cent (Dominican Republic), 
standing at approximately 70 per cent in most cases. As a counterpart 
capital outlays accounted for significant proportions of total public 
expenditure - some 30 per cent as a rule, although in individual countries 
figures as low as 20 per cent or as high as about 50 per cent may be noted. 
Great differences are also observable in breakdowns of current 
expenditure by consumption iteras prinarily for the administrative, 
economic and social services supplied directly by the public sector -
and transfer payments, in which the mejor weight is carried by official 
contributions to social security systems (Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay), 
and other forms of current subsidies (Brazil), together with interest 
payments on the public debt. In the course of the nineteen-sixties, 
pressure for the expansion of each of the se types of expenditure has 
become stronger. Social betterment objectives, reflected in some instante:', 
in specific targets for the expansion of particular services (health and 
educational services, for example) have presented a greater drain on 
national budgets, a development whichl in the last analysis, implies that 
a serious responsibility is incumbent on this public sector function as a 
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' UY- Vi 43.-. 
ment ing 
Argentina 7068 40.4 28.9 29.2 25.2 1.4 2.6 
Brazil 69.6 41.3 28.3 30.4 29.2 1.2 
Chile 66,8 5905 21,6 35.2 22.1 7.8  303 
Colombia 52.8 40.6 9.0 47.2 34.8 12.4 
Cesta Bioa 70.2 47,5 17.0 29,8 19.6 4.3 5.9 
Deminiean Republio 78.7 69,6 8.8 21.3 15.2 2.4 3.7 
Ecuador 7t.8 53.9 16.9 29.2 22.4 6.8 
Guatemala 69.1 56.3 12,8 30.9 1.5,7 12.2 
Mextee 60.9 31.1 29.8 39.1 27.7 11.4 
Paraguay 57.1 42.9 25,6 94 8.3 
Pera 68.3 60,6 7.7 31.7 13.7 11.8 6.2 
Uruguay 65.o 31.5 33.2 35,0 19,4 9.8 4.6 
Venezuela 57,2 49.8 4.7 42.8 25,9 2.6 5.5 
Souroet ECLA, en the basis of offioial statistios. 
21 The peroentages given do net add up to 100 in all ciases beoause some minor /tema have not been taken 
finto a000unt. The capital expenditure of Venezuela does not inolude transfers of capital to publio 




of employment opportunities, especially in the case of population sectors 
which have had access to some forro of secqndary education, has exerted 
another kind of pressure on the volume of expenditure on general 
administrative services; although total Mínpower ábsorption in the public 
sector has not far outstripped the growth of the product and of the 
economically, active population, II has cqnstituted, in roladve terms, 
an obstacle.to the transfer.of resources from álministrátive services 
to others of higher priority, In mány countries, the social security 
systens still benefit comparatively small segments of the labour 
and the authorities are consequently faced with persisten, demanda for 
their extension to the groups not yet oovered. In others, where the 
systems are more comprehensive and have been in operation longer, the 
absolute level of the resources required for their maintenance is 
high, while at the same time the possibilities of temporarily using 
them as sources of funds for investment purposes are steadily decreasing, 
with the transition — de jure,  or de facto — from capital formation 
systems to distribution systems, Lastly, the incidence of interest 
payments on the public debt is also becoming heavier, in so far as 
governments have had increasingly intensive recourse to borrowing. 
Demande for the expansion of capital expenditure derivo both from 
the general rule that over—all investment coefficients are relatively 
low, and from the public sectorts responsibility for augmenting specific 
componente of the national stock of capital, primarily infrastructure, 
in addition, damand for the provision of housing facilities and allied 
services has been consideably stepped"up in recent years, especially 
where low—cost housing is concerned, 
Clearly, in 1960-66 the growth ratea of public investment in most 
of the Latin American countries exceeded those of private investment, 
whatever the levels and trends of the over—ali investment coefficient. 
Thus, in some countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay) 
the more dynamic evolution of public investment made up for the sluggish 
growth or the decline of private investment, while in others (Bolivia, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru) the expansion of public 
investment was accompanied by similarly significant increases in private 




There were also same countries — including the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela — in which these trends were 
reversed; over the same period, public investment increased slightly less 
than private investment, largely because the pace at which the latter rose 
was unusually fast. 
The outcome of all these trends was that in most countries public 
investment carne to represent much larger proportions both of the product 
and of total investment. In other words„ the allocation of a considerable 
share of the resources mobilized for capital formation fell within the 
province of direct official decisions, although in many cases appreciable 
inroads were made opon these funds by the servicing of the cumulative 
public debt (see again table I— ). Most of the resources in question were 
used for real investment, while a smáller proportion which, however, 
acquired significante in 1966 in certain countries, including Chile, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela represented financial investment, 	funds 
for capital formation which were transferred through various channels to 
other institutional sectors. 
The lack of a systematic flow of data mates it difficult to give a 
fairly accurate account of the destination of public investment by 
purposes and by sectors of economic activity. Broadly speaking, the biggest 
proportion goes to investment in infrastructure, including generation of 
electric power ard, principally, transport and conrniunications. In some 
countries, and in certain years, the public investment channelled into the 
fuels sector has attained relatively high levels. Again as a general rule, 
only modest shares fall to agriculture and manufacturing, although it must 
be borne in mind that in some cases, in additinn to the funds allocated to 
agriculture, considerable amounts are invested in the construction of dams 
and irrigation works (Mexico) and in specific regional developrnent programes 
(Peru). The proportion of social investment variesaubstantially from one 
country to another and from one year to the next, especially in the case of 
housing programes, since investment in the expansion of basic facilities 
for the provision of educational and public health services is usually 
more steadily maintained. 
This over—ali picture shows how little reliance can be placed on any 
generalization as to either the aggregate relative importante or the 




particular angle that is of interest here - that is, the ability of the 
public sector to formulate and apply specific development policies- a few 
general conclusions can be drawn. One of these relates to the all-too-
well-known difficulties of reconciling the steadily increasing demard for 
expansicn of public expenditure with the structural and institutional 
rigidities which hamper the public sectoris efforts to rai3e its income, 
In some countries, this incompatibility has been_keeping the 
importante of total public expenditure stationarY.during the nineteen-sixties, 
while in o:,hers the obstacles have been overcome and the ratio between public 
expenditure and the aggregate domestic product has risen to a rennrkable 
extent. In the latter group in particular, appreciable changos have been 
introduced in tax systems; but even there no substantive tax refonn can be 
said to have taken place, espeeially if other questions, such as the impact 
of taxation on inconie redistribution, are taken into account. Within total 
public expenditure, relatively more dynamic trends have been shown by capital 
outlays„ of which considerable proportions have been financed in some cases 
out of non-tax resources that irnply increasing indebtednens. In several 
countries these trends in public investment have offset a relative decline 
in prívate investment or have combined with the latter to raise the over-all 
investment coefficient. A9 a result of the trends in question and of the 
ratios formerly prévailing, the proportions of resources channelled through 
the pábilo sector vary widely at present from one country to another, In 
general terms, however, it may be concluded that public institutions have 
broadened their sphere of direct action and,thereforel their possibilities 
of significantly influencing the use of resources to pron-ot:e some of the 
basic objectives of development policy. 
2. The institutional or anization of the ublic sector 
The proportion of resources ehannelled through the public sector is 
one of the factors which determines how effective the State is.in promoting 
and directing development. It is not the only factor, however, since the 
effectiveness of the State also depends on the way in which such resources 
are used. It may be appropriate here to consider a particular aspect of 
this question-and to look at the background of the institutional organiiation 





Some of the fragmentary information available covering a number of 
countries ín the region is summarized for purposes of illustration in 
table I-58, which shows the proportions of public spending attributable 
to the Central Government, state or provincial governments, municipalities, 
autonomous bodies and public enterprises, 
Logically enough, the proportion of resources channelled through the 
Central Government as such is very much dependent upon the political and 
administrative structure of each country, and being much higher in countries 
with unitery systems than in those with federal systems. In 1966, for 
example, the proportion of current expenditure attributable to the Central 
Government was relatively low in Argentina and Colombia (34 and 42 per cent 
respectively) and very high in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic (56 and 
77 per cent respectively). In Argentina and Colombia, the proportion 
attributable to provincial and stage governments is quite large: over 
one-quarter of total current expenditure for Argentina and almost one-sixth 
for Colombia, while in all four countries the proportion attributable to 
municipalities is relatively small, With the exception of the Dominican 
Republic, however, in all the countries listed the proportion of current 
expenditure attributable to autonomous bodies represents more than one-third 
of total expenditure, and in Chile the proportion is close to 60 per cent, 
which explains the small proportion for the Central Goverrment despite the 
fact that Chile is a country with a unitary system 
Under capital expenditure, however, the proportion attributable to 
the Central Government - or to the state or provincial governments in federal 
systems - is relatively much lower, while that of the autonomous bodies and 
public enterprises is greater. 
The way in which resources are channelled through the various components 
of the public sector is of particular importance when consiuering how effective 
planning machinery is in redirecting public spending to conform with specific 
development policy objectives. Since this question will be discussed more 
fully in the following section, the components of the public sector will be 
described in some detail here. 
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Munic- Auton- 	 Public 
ipal- MOUS enter- 
ities bodies 	 prises 
PlizauáL-Wt1WitIlld a/ 
Argentina 	33.9 	26,0 
Chile 	41.7 
Colombia 41.9 	14.9 
Costa Rica 	55.9 
Dominican . 
Republic 	76.8 
Brazil 	12.0 b/ 8.8 
Chile 28.6 	0.0 
Colombia 	20.5 3.3 
Costa Rica 15.6 	SIDO 
Dominican 
Republic 	46.1 
Mexico 	34.0 b/ 
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	 29.3 	 30.4 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
a/ The current expenditures of public enterprises weré not analysed, 




The number of decentralized or autonomous bodies has increased 
rapidly since the Second World Mar in most Latin American countries, 
as has their sphere of action, In many cases new responsibilities 
led to the establishment of special organs to fulfil the new functions 
required, and this trend was strengthened by efforts to eliminate the 
rigidities (in procedures, recruitment methods, wage and salary 
systems, etc,) of the traditional public administration. The result 
has often been a multitude of autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies which 
have been grafted on to an administration without enough effort being 
made to modernize it and equip it to meet its new -responsibilities. 
These decentralized bodies are sometimes regional and sometimes 
sectoral in scope and their aims are very diverse, ranging from the 
provision of specific services to the execution of public works, and 
even the management of credit funds, Such bodies have made it easier 
to give special attention to particular problems and their efforts 
have enjoyed same degree of continuity, since they are relatiely 
untouched by the political vicissitudes to which the central 
administration is usually subject. On the other hand, they have 
probably made it more difficult to co-ordinate and revise priorities 
at the national level because of their large degree of independence 
of the Central Government and because of their natural wish to retain 
control over their own activities. 
In contrast, local governments;  especially municipalities, have 
probably tended to lose some of their importance as channels for 
public resources, Changes in the structure of the economy, and, 
most of all, the trend towards the geographical concentration of 
economic activity, and aleo the fact that many componente of the 
infrastructure are becoming increasingly larger in scale, are all 
factors which have led to a gradual reduction in the sphere of 
action and responsibilities of local governments. The fact that 




on their own, and their'declining.ability -.becáuse bf:their political 
status to influence:the decisions of thé central Statebodies or 
public entérPrises in any si¿nificant respect, have meant that their 
functionalave been réstricted-to'représenting a region in a very 
broad political sense and to administéring strictly municipal public 
services (street4ighting,sanitatión, maintenance of ruralroads and 
sometimos the administratión of urbán or suburban transport services), 
So far the link between local goernments and the new planningloodies 
has been flimsy, or even non-éxistent,'and hence the resources 
received -have not been sufficient to romote devélopment. In the 
case of municinalities„ prógress is usualiy confined to the preparation 
of what are termed "regúlatóry plans"'for a few cities which aim at 
rationalizing the loCation of certain urban activities, improving the 
provision of local services and defining the function of the city 
and its sphere of influénee within'Swider regional context áll 
this, however, confined to physical planning. Only the few 
municipalities in the largest cities are able to plan action on a 
larger scale and mobilize a significant amount of resources. 
Given the increased stress laid on improved regional distribution 
of economic activity in national development policy in recent yeárs„ 
conditions are potentially ripe for a revival of the role of local 
governments. However, as occurred with the traditional administrative 
structure onto which new bodies wére grafted,' this cdncern 'hat- led 
to the establishment of new machinery for promoting regional 
development, with wide-ranging regional responsibilities. In some 
cases this machinery acts in more than an advisory capacity andis 
specially responsible for the co-ordination and even the direct 
execution of the principal development projects in a region.' 2his 
is the case, for example, with thé Department for the Development 
of the NordéSte (Superinteindenéiá'de'Désenvolvimento do Nordeste 




area (Corporación Venezolana de Guayana), the Cauca Valley Corporation 
(Corporación del Valle del Cauca) in Colombia, the Centre for the 
Rehabilitation of the South (Centro de Reconversión del Austro) in 
Ecuador, etc. 'These are generaily more or less technical bodies 
and are relatively independent of local governments, which act 
mainly in an advisory capacity in relation-to these bodies; in 
addition, the technical bndies may pften have direct decision- 
making powers in economic matters regarding either infrastructure 
or agricultural or industrial production. 
Because of their nature, public enterprises require a delegation 
of authority and flexibility of operation which are difficult to 
reconcile with the usual procedures of the traditional forms of 
administration; so much so, in fact, that the, often have to 
operate in accordance with private rather•than public law. The 
extent and nature of their functicns vary depending on the special 
features of each cOuntry; with the provision of public services, 
especially transport and electricity, accounting for the major 
share. In many cases, public enterprises have had a significan 
part to play in particular branches of manufacturing, as part of 
a deliberate policy to promote development, or have sometimos 
been formed as a result of quite fortuitous circumstances,3/  
This was the case, for example, with some public enterprises 
in Argentina which were formed as a result of the nationalization 
of German enterprises towards the end of the Second World War, 
and also with some in the Dominican Republic„ which were formed 
when certain industrial concerns were táken over by the State 




A recent study on the thirty largest enterprises in each of six 
Latin American countries gives some idea -oí' the relative importance of • 
public enterprises and of the range óf activities that they now cover.W 
It appears froM the study" that the •assets of public.enterprises are': 
equivalent to approximately oné-third of the total-capital of .the thirty 
largest enterprises in.each country. 0£ the seventy-one public or semi-
public Stateoontrolled enterprises in the list, eighteen carry on 
financial or banking activitiésx thirteen prOduct and distribute electric 
energy, seven run railviaYs, six'are'produders of ironl-and steel, four 
of petroleum, four provide telephone.servites and carry out municipal 
works, and a smaller number are concerned with sugar production, 
preparation of chemical products, distribution of goods, ports and 
shipping fleets, tourism, airlines, gas supply and mining. 
To some extent, the growth of public enterprises is a consequence 
of tochnological progress, which necessitates'large-scale production 
units ami Substantial investment0 Sinct Private'entrepreneurs in Latín 
America do not have enough capital, in practice, new development proj'ects 
can be financed only with the help of public funds or foreign investftent. 
Illustrative in this connexion is "a recent compilation of data on filty 
of the largest enterprises in Argentina - enterprises with sales totalling 
more than 7,000`million pesos annually - from which it Appears that 
one-third of the total value of sales of these enterprises is attributable 
to State enterprises, approximately half to foreign enterprises and one-
sixth to Argentinprivate companies. /  
In short, the traditional administrative apparatus of the Central 
Government>, and in some cases that of state or provincial governments 
and local governments, on to which a whole complex of autonomous bodies 
Frank Brandenburg, The development of Latin American private  
22,12£21-2112 (Wadnington, National Planning Association, May 1964). 
The countries covered by the study are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Nexico and Venezuela. Excluded from the study are 
enterprises holding petroleum contracta in Argentina and all the 
petroleum enterprises of Colombia and Venezuela. 
5/ 	Julián Delgado, "Industria: adesafío a la Ar entina", Primera 




with specific functions or with sectoral or regionl res: onsibilities 
anda growing number oí public enterprises have been grafted, now forms 
an extremely complex public sector in most Latin American countries. 
InasmuCh as this has not been the out come of an over-all plan but, rather 
of the necessity of meeting needs as they arise, it is inevitable that 
there should be quite a high degree of overlapping of functions, 
duplication of responsibilities, lack of communication between bodies 
influencing certain aspects of the econamy, and ,difficulty in co-ordinating 
action and allocating resources in line'with a Common approach te a 
clearly defined development policy. 
All this experience does not seem to have been anal *sed in sufficient 
depth with a view to developing an approach on the basis of which the 
institutional structure could be reorganized in line with current 
development needs. Hence, although there has been widespread acceptance 
in recent years of the need for administrative reform, there has been 
little actual progress towards it. Becaáse no approach of this kind 
exista., efforts have tended to focus in the main on auxiliary functions 
relating to the internal methods and procedures of the public administration 
and much less on equipping the administration todeal with the substantive 
tasks it must undertake0 
Substantial progress has been made in such matters as personnel 
administration, procurement of supplies, accounting systemsp systems for 
settling internal disputes, and improvement of organization and methods, 
and it is olear that progress must continue. In other words, some advance 
has been made in rationalizing the administration by improving the way in 
ihich auxiliary tasks are performed, but there has been no similar advance 
in equipping the whole administrative structure te carry out its substantive 
functions more effectively, and thus there are'still obstacles in the way 
of the decision-making procese, objectives are ambiguous, the powers and 
functions of each body are not clearly defined, and there is stiil a 
shortage of information and a lack of communication between those 




Herm% it would appear that a more thorough aaa1 sis still needs 
to be undertaken of the wgy in which resources are allocated and decisions 
taken)  and of their effects on the public sector as a whole, and also on 
the private sector; but this is probably much more a problem of political 
science than of administrative reorganization in the strict sense of 
the word. 
3. The capacity for planned decision—mak,las 
This is an important question among others of equal importance — 
unde'rlying Latin Americals difficulties in consolidating an effective 
planning madhinery to facilitate the definition and application of 
consistent development policies, which constitutes the most fundamental 
of the efforts to rationalize the 'substantive action of the public 
administration. 
In the course of the present deca de, practically all the Latin 
American countries have established special planning mechanisms and have 
prepared development piens which differ both in nature and in acope. 
The experienCe gained,'in terms of the positive resulte they have 
adhieved and the identification of factors which limit their efficacy 
and prevent them from becoming fully effective, has been carefully 
evaluated at different times.:1/ For example, the United Nations Committee 
for Development Planning, composed of experta from the different parts 
of the world, has highlighted, as some of the positive reSults achieved 
so fax, the preParation of technical bases and the traininpof larger 
numbers of skilled planning personnel; the contribution to the definition 
of over—all development policies and the adoption of mare'rational criteria 
in the állocation of resources, especially in the public sector; and the 
The Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. XII, N° 2 (October 1967) 
contains three supplem-entary articles on this subject: a study by 
the ECLA secretariat on the present state of planning in Latin America)  
the pertinent part of the report of the second session of the United 
Nations Committee for Development. Planning (held at Santiago, Chile)  
in April 1967), and a brief account of the discussion on planning 
in Latin America at ECLAts twelfth session, together with the 
resolution on this subject «Un:1 adopted. Other considerations on 
the subject are set forth in EFES, Discusiones sobre planificación 




fact that planning has become a widely accepted principie, The Committee 
identified what in its view were the main deficiencies and obstacles, 
distinguishing between "the weaknesses of planning itself" and "externa' 
obstacles to plan Implementation". Under these two heads, as well as in 
the final recammendations, attention is drawn to questions relating to 
the administrative organization of the public sector and the procedures 
for adopting and implementing decisions, the general sense of which is 
given briefly below. 
First, it is recognized that some of the shortcomings derive from 
the difficulty of incorporating planning in the administrative structure, 
which is partly due to the inertia of the structures themseives and the 
sluggishness of the efforts to modernize theme According to the Committee, 
"even planning ítself has neglected this essential aspect of change, and 
plans that have explicitly outlined a policy of administrative reform 
are few and far between. Such stops as have been taken to reorganize 
the administration have very seldom made allowance for the specific 
requisites of organization for planned development policy"s2/  
Another question brought into focus in this connexion is the lack 
of basic mechanisms to complete the planning system, both from the 
standpoint of the plans formulated — in particular the need for annual 
operational piens — and from that of the establishment and operation of 
effective madhinery for the periodic review, control and evaluation of 
the practical implementation of plans. 
Thirdly, the Committee states that the isolated position of planning 
agencies with respect to the Whole,national administrativo system is due 
to "the superimposition of modern institutions on machinery that is, as 
a rule, unsuitable for the Implementation of development policy". It is 
therefore necessary to make greater efforts to modernize the whole 
administration, and to redefine the functions of planning maphinery and 
consider in the light of each countryfs circumstances, what place should 
be given to planning in the administrative structure. 
/ 	ECLA, "Planning and plan implementation in Latin America", Economic 




The progress and limitationz of planning ,have a basic influence on 
the public sectores ability to rationalize its action, not only the 
allocation of resources for which it assumes direct,resposibility, but 
also its indirect action through the varieus.instruments of economic 
policy«. 
As noted previously, public investment has come to represent a 
high proportion which varíes from country to country - of total capital 
formation. It might therefore be assumed that the public sector today 
has'a fairly broad sphere of responsibility in channelling investment, 
sine the allocation of such resources is fully, compatible with development 
praxis. In practice, however, the real scope of that responsibility is 
confinad, in most cases, to the Central Government proper, mainly as a 
result of the fairly widespread introduction of performance budgeting; 
but thus far it has not extended equally effectively to decentralized 
agencies and' public enterprises, through which a substantial part of 
public -capital expenditure is channelled. A somewhat similar situation 
crises, although on a lesser-scale in relation to current cohsumption 
expenditürt. 
In any event, the decisions regarding the bulk of the resources 
are taken by the private sector, and in this respect the eiTectiveness 
of the guidelines of national development policy dependa on whether or 
not planning efforts are faithfully reflected in the handling of various 
economic policy instrumente. In this connexion, the lack or inadequaoy 
of short-tera operational plana is one of the main limitations still 
observable in the planning procesa in Latin America. Hence, the 
development'patterns deriving from longer-term plans are not translated 
into specific monetary, exchange, financial, credit and other measures; 
and ultimately there is little or no relation Between medium,- and 
long-tern guidelines and the economic policy measures which the ministries, 
central banks and other administrative bodies are constantly having to 
adopt. This cleavage means a Loss of consistency and efficiency in both 
types of action; on the one hand, the potential feasibility of over-all 




of their objectives; on the other, short-terco policies remain outside 
their over-all context and tend to respond to pressures of the moment 
rather than contribute to overcoming the basic development problems. 
All this not only weakens the public sectorts ability to influence 
the allocation of resources channelled by the private sectors, but aleo 
malees for the overlapping of functions in various public bodies or 
prevente them from effectively pooling their efforts to deal with 
specific problems. Thus there are striking inconsistencies or frank 
contradictions in the effects of the provisions adopted by different 
government bodies responsible for handling economic policy. In other 
cases where a given objective is sought in a particular field, the 
difficulty is to bring to bear on that objective the activities and 
measures of a great many relatively indepemdent decision-making centres, 
hich are not operating normally under a sufficiently clear-cut system 
of common guidelines. 
The persistente of such limitations must be noted however, withmt 
losing sight of the outstanding improvements that have been achieved 
during the ccznparatively short time that planning has been in effect. 
Subsequent improvements in planning will represent further progrese in 
the public sectorle ability to define and apply effective development 
policies such as those that seem to be required for the next decade, 
l 
t 

4 
1 
1 
